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The purpose of this research is to capture valuable corporate knowledge from the senior 
leaders responsible for contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
two primary reasons. The first reason is to document the history and evolution of 
CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C–JTSCC); and the second, to 
use the consolidated lessons learned to shape recommendations to improve future 
contingency contracting operations. In this study, we focused on senior-level leadership 
within the DoD, both from the acquisition and non-acquisition communities, to capture 
strategic-level lessons learned. Our research relies on qualitative data received via 
interviews with senior leaders.   
The loss of organic resources during the past 21 years of force restructuring and 
reductions left many capability gaps, and increased the need for contracted support. 
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan only magnified the DoD’s reliance on contracted 
support, and forced the DoD to focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of contingency 
contracting activities. The evolution of contingency contracting has not only been in 
scope, but in the expectations placed on contingency contracting officers, the use of 
contingency contracting as a battlefield enabler, and the recognition of the need to 
manage contractors as part of the total force. 
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A. BACKGROUND   
As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have evolved over the past 11 years, so too 
have contingency contracting operations. Not only have there been changes to the scope 
of what is expected from contingency contracting officers, but there has been a paradigm 
shift regarding the use of contracting as a battlefield enabler.   
The loss of organic resources during the past 21 years of force restructuring and 
reductions left many capability gaps, and the increased need for contracted support. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), and Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) only magnified the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) reliance on 
contracted support, and forced needed focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
contingency contracting activities. What was once viewed as administrative purchasing 
execution is now recognized as a non-kinetic weapon requiring significant planning, 
integration, and synchronization throughout all phases of operations.  
In 2004, the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) was created 
as the unifying effort for all contracting activities within Iraq and Afghanistan (Defense 
Contract Management Agency [DCMA], 2006). In 2010, JCC-I/A was re-designated  
as the Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Theater Support Contracting Command  
(C-JTSCC). Since its inception, the organization has been commanded by general 
officers from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force and is responsible for awarding over 
$758 billion in contracts (Commission on Wartime Contracting [CWC] in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2012). As operations come to a close in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is 
imperative that we capture the contracting lessons learned from the senior contracting and 
operational stakeholders responsible for operations.   
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to capture valuable corporate knowledge from the 
senior leaders responsible for contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
for two primary reasons. The first reason is to document the history and evolution of 
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CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC); and the second, to 
use the consolidated lessons learned to shape recommendations to improve future 
contingency contracting operations.   
Significant amounts of research and documentation encompassing all areas of 
contingency contracting, from individual training to strategic planning, have been 
published. However, no consolidated publication exists that captures lessons learned from 
the strategic leaders who have overseen the evolution of contingency contracting 
operations and doctrine during Iraq and Afghanistan. This research captures those lessons 
learned, evaluates them compared to current doctrine and policy, and determines if 
changes are needed to better support future contingency operations, regardless of the 
scale.   
As learning institutions, it is imperative that we reflect on our experiences 
during the past 10 years to assess the impact and understand both our 
strengths and weaknesses. This is necessary to see ourselves so we can 
determine how we should adapt and institutionalize the lessons of the last 
decade. This will enable us to promote the knowledge, skills, attributes, 
and behaviors that define us as a profession, and develop our future 
leaders. (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3) 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is, what conclusions and recommendations can be 
derived from assessing strategic lessons learned from contracting operations in OIF, 
OND, and OEF to improve contingency contracting operations in the future?  The 
secondary research question is as follows: How did the organization and operations of C-
JTSCC evolve since its inception in 2004? 
D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
We wrote this research with the assumption that the reader has a basic 
understanding of the military’s organization and structure, to include the basic functions 
of each staff element. Additionally, we assume the reader understands contracting’s 
relevancy on the battlefield, and the need for research and improvement based on the 
DoD’s increasing reliance on contracted support. 
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With this research, we focus primarily on lessons learned from strategic leaders 
involved with contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The primary 
focus is on preparatory contracting functions required for the execution of contingency 
operations. This research does not focus on “how” contracts were executed, but rather on 
the strategic oversight and management of contingency contracting operations.  
 The results of our research uncovered many areas of improvement. Regrettably, 
resource and time constraints required us to limit our primary focus to specific trend 
areas. While we focused on identifying the common themes in the data, we did not fully 
analyze all of them, nor did we make recommendations about each theme. The common 
themes not explored in detail in this paper are submitted as recommendations for further 
research.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
In conducting research for this project, we used multiple forms of data. First, we 
completed a literature review of academic sources, DoD doctrine and publications, 
policy, government and third-party reports, websites, and articles relating to contracting, 
contingency contracting, operational contract support (OCS), and joint operations. The 
literature review provided the framework for representative interview questions relating 
to contingency contracting and OCS. Second, we conducted interviews with previous 
commanders of CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC), 
senior contract officials, supported commanders, Secretariat staff, Joint Staff J4 (OCS), 
commissioners, and other supporting agencies.   
We utilized two basic frameworks to categorize our data. First, for findings 
related to other than contract-actions, we used a common DoD problem-solving construct 
used to evaluate non-materiel solutions for the DoD comprised of doctrine, organizations, 
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-
P). And second, for findings related to contract actions, we utilized the six-phase contract 
management process to categorize the data. Further information regarding the interview 
process and data analysis is presented in Chapter III, Methodology. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
The organization of this report is presented in what we believe to be a logical 
manner. In Chapter I, we outline the structure and direction of the report. In Chapter II, 
we provide a literature review, laying the foundation for the direction of the research. We 
discuss an industry perspective of contracting versus the DoD perspective, the evolution 
of contingency contracting, findings of multiple federal agencies regarding contingency 
contracting, and the current status of each DOTmLPF-P element. In Chapter III, we 
provide details on the methodology used for interviews and data analysis. Chapter IV 
includes a presentation of the findings, beginning with a history of C-JTSCC, followed 
by the findings for each of the DOTmLPF-P and six-phase contract management process 
categories, concluded with a root cause analysis. In Chapter V, we provide a detailed 
analysis of the integration of contracting and operational contract support into the joint 
operation planning process. In Chapter VI, we present our recommendations. And our 
summary, conclusion, and areas for further research are found in Chapter VII.    
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we provide a foundation in how contracting influences 
organizations, both within industry and the DoD, and explore published research and 
documents regarding contracting and operational contract support. First, we present an 
industry perspective of contracting and how it is integrated into strategic and operational 
planning and execution. Second, we evaluate the same elements from a DoD perspective. 
Third, we analyze published reports from federal and federally directed agencies that 
evaluated contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, we outline 
the existing DoD doctrine, policies, organizational structures, and training. By building 
our literature review in this fashion, we provide a current snapshot of contracting and the 
environment in which it exists within industry, the DoD, and, ultimately, the battlefield. 
B. CONTRACTING IN INDUSTRY  
1. Introduction 
Industry has understood, for many years, that contract management can positively 
(or negatively) affect an organization’s bottom line. Many successful models of 
contracting support, processes, and integration have been developed by industry. As a 
result, multiple U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) reports, Inspector General 
(IG) reports and third-party studies have been conducted regarding the application of 
commercial practices within the DoD. It is important to understand that successes within 
industry can be applied within the DoD to create a more effective organization. Many 
initiatives to bring commercial acquisition processes have been supported by the DoD 
and are finding success. One area receiving little focus in the application of commercial 
practices is contingency contracting  
2. Evolution of Industry Perspective 
The past decade has seen a significant shift in how industry views purchasing. 
Industrialization, multiple conflicts, and globalization led to an increased focus on the 
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value of purchasing in regard to operational success. A common theme regarding today’s 
purchasing environment is that “purchasing must continue to become more integrated 
with customer requirements, as well as with operations, logistics, human resources, 
finance, accounting, marketing, and information systems” (Monczka, Handfield, 
Giunipero, & Patterson, 2011, p. 27).  
It is important to understand the basic purchasing principles within industry. 
Purchasing is not only a functional activity, but a functional group found on the 
organizational chart. The purchasing group is responsible for many aspects of purchasing 
outside of the day-to-day operations of procurement. Supply management, which is “a 
strategic approach to planning for and acquiring the organization’s current and future 
needs through effectively managing the supply base, utilizing a process orientation in 
conjunction with a cross-functional team to achieve the organizational mission” 
(Monczka et al., 2011, pp. 10–11), is the responsibility of the purchasing group. Supply 
management requires the purchasing department not only to focus on purchasing 
activities, but to apply a strategic orientation to accomplishing the organization’s mission. 
3. Purchasing Process, Objectives, and Responsibilities 
Industry takes a holistic approach to purchasing, incorporating not only tactical 
objectives but strategic objectives into the mission of the purchasing group. Purchasing 
& Supply Chain Management (Fifth Edition; Monczka et al., 2011) defines the 
purchasing process as a process “used to identify user requirements, evaluate the user 
needs effectively and efficiently, identify suppliers who can meet those needs, develop 
agreements with those suppliers, develop the ordering mechanism, ensure payment 
occurs promptly, ascertain that the need was effectively met, and drive continuous 
improvements” (p. 41). During the process, consideration is given to not only the 
satisfaction of internal customers with the product or service, but also their satisfaction 
with the process. The objectives of the purchasing group have grown beyond simply 
obtaining goods and services, and, instead, the purchasing group now has multiple 
objectives relating to the overall success of an organization. Purchasing objectives now 
include maintaining supply continuity, managing the sourcing process efficiently and 
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effectively, developing supply base management, developing aligned goals with internal 
stakeholders, and developing integrated purchasing strategies that support organizational 
goals and objectives (Monczka et al., 2011, pp. 42–44). 
As previously stated, the purchasing group has both tactical and strategic 
responsibilities. Figure 1 provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities identified 
for the purchasing group. These roles and responsibilities outline how purchasing has 
become a key player in enabling an organization’s competitive advantage and improving 
success. In fact, a significant number of companies have added a chief procurement 
officer that reports directly to the chief executive officer (Nelson, 2006).   
 
Figure 1.  Purchasing’s Roles and Responsibilities: Strategic vs. Tactical  
(From Monczka et al., 2011, p. 42) 
Supply base management is identified as one of the responsibilities of purchasing 
and is achieved with supply integration. Supply integration is a complex endeavor 
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requiring the management of both suppliers and internal customers.  “Integration spans a 
number of areas, including operating strategy development, finance, engineering, 
logistics, service operations, production, new-product development, and customer 
service” (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 117). This integration includes synthesizing both 
internal and external stakeholders. One of the key internal stakeholders for supply 
management is the operations group. The development of global operations strategy is a 
critical link between supply management and operations. Supply management strategy 
must be aligned with operations strategy and plans. Because of this link, supply 
management often reports directly to operations. Integration with the other organizational 
groups is important as well. Figure 2 shows purchasing’s communications flows and 
linkages. These are essential to understanding how important it is to fully integrate supply 
management within an organization.   
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Figure 2.  Purchasing’s Communications Flows and Linkages  
(From Monczka et al., 2011, p. 120) 
4. Industry Policies, Procedures, and Organization 
Similar to the DoD, industry creates and implements policies and standard 
operating procedures. Industry policies outline items such as those defining the roles of 
purchasing, the conduct of personnel, social and minority business objectives, buyer–
seller relationships, and operational issues. Specifically, those policies related to the roles 
of purchasing outline the lines of purchasing authority, objectives of the group, and 
responsibilities of each level of the purchasing group (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 92). These 
policies provide guidance regarding how and where purchasing is placed within the 
organization, and give insight into the value that the organization places on purchasing as 
part of its overall strategy.   
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Purchasing can be an upper-level function, a second-tier function, or a lower-level 
function. One study found that “having a higher-level procurement officer who makes 
regular presentations to the president or chief executive officer is the design feature that 
correlates highest with the achievement of procurement and supply objectives” (Monczka 
et al., 2011, p. 168). This study supports the idea that the relative importance of 
purchasing’s impact on organizational goals is reflected in its location in the 
organizational structure. Figure 3 shows purchasing at different functional levels. 
 
Figure 3.  Purchasing at Different Organizational Levels  
(From Monczka et al., 2011, p. 169) 
 11
5. Integrative Strategy Development 
As discussed, several factors impact how purchasing is integrated into 
organizational strategy development. There are several different layers of strategy within 
an organization. Corporate strategies define the business the company is involved with 
and how resources are acquired and allocated within the different business units. 
Business unit strategies outline the scope of each business unit, how it links with the 
overall corporate strategy, and how each unit will gain competitive advantage. And 
finally, functional strategies identify how the unit will support the business-level 
strategies and how the function will complement other functional strategies. When 
corporate strategies are filtered to all levels of functional planning and used as the basis 
for individual strategy development, this process is considered to be integrative planning. 
Integrative planning ensures that those people responsible for the implementation of the 
corporate strategies have significant input into them (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 193). 
C. CONTRACTING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
1. Introduction 
As profit-driven organizations, the commercial industry recognizes the 
significance of integrative planning for purchasing activities. The savings recognized are 
directly related to an increase in the bottom line. As a public agency, the DoD does not 
have this direct correlation between savings and the bottom line, leaving purchasing or 
contracting often viewed by the operational community as an administrative function 
necessary to accomplish certain outcomes. However, in recent years, the importance of 
contracting has become apparent, due to the DoD’s heavy reliance on contract support 
during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this section, we provide an overview of the 
roles and responsibilities of DoD contracting within the DoD, the organizational 
structure, and command versus contracting authority.   
2. DoD Contracting Roles and Responsibilities 
While commercial companies formulate contracting policies and procedures to 
support their overall mission and vision, DoD contracting is governed by the Federal 
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Acquisition Regulation (FAR; 2012) System. The FAR System includes the FAR and all 
agency-issued FAR supplements, such as the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS; 2012). The FAR (2012) is chapter 1 of Title 48, Code of Federal 
Regulations (C.F.R.), and the DFARS (2012) is chapter 2.   
The FAR identifies slight nuances regarding specific roles and responsibilities 
within the acquisition community. It is important to understand these in order to 
understand current operations. 
Acquisition, as defined by FAR 2.101 (2012), is 
the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services 
(including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government 
through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or services are already in 
existence or must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. 
Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are established and 
includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, 
solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract 
financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those 
technical and management functions directly related to the process of 
fulfilling agency needs by contract.  
On the other hand, contracting is defined as 
purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise obtaining supplies or services 
from nonfederal sources. Contracting includes description (but not 
determination) of supplies and services required, selection and solicitation 
of sources, preparation and award of contracts, and all phases of contract 
administration. It does not include making grants or cooperative 
agreements. (FAR, 2012, 2.101) 
There is a slight nuance in the definitions that has significant implications. 
Contracting is not responsible for determining requirements; the requiring activity is. 
However, contracting does carry some of the responsibility for defining the validated 
requirement. Requirements definition is a team effort, comprised of the requiring activity, 
contracting, and other organizations as necessary. The team works in concert to define, 
validate, contract, inspect, accept, and pay for requirements. The FAR (2012) states that 
defining the “acquisition team” is important to ensure that all participants are identified. 
The team is identified as all those involved, starting with the customer through to the 
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contractor that is providing the item or service. It also states that members must be 
empowered to make acquisition decisions within their realm of responsibilities and that 
authority and accountability should be delegated as far down in the system as possible. In 
addition to using law and regulations to guide decisions, the team must also use sound 
business judgment (FAR, 2012). FAR 1.102–4(e) specifically states, “contracting officers 
should take the lead in encouraging business process innovations and ensuring that 
business decisions are sound.”  This statement supports the newly developed path and 
identity that DoD contracting is facing.   
DoD acquisition programs are governed by the Defense Acquisition System, as 
directed in the DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000 series, which provides for a structured 
management process. Dedicated program offices are authorized, and a program manager 
retains responsibility for the success or failure of the program. In contrast, contracting 
efforts for day-to-day operations and maintenance of the force are not managed in this 
highly regulated and directed manner. At military installations, it is common for the 
contracting officer to act as the central coordinator (pseudo program manager) for the 
acquisition process. Per FAR 1.602 (2012), contracting officers (KOs) are appointed in 
writing by the agency head, and are responsible for “ensuring performance of all 
necessary actions for effective contracting, ensuring compliance with the terms of the 
contract, and safeguarding the interest of the United States in its contractual relationship.”  
The interpretation of “all necessary action for effective contracting” impacts the role of 
KOs within the organization.   
Historically, contracting has been viewed as an administrative function, not 
critical to mission success. KOs were process oriented and risk adverse, focusing on the 
fundamental processes of contracting. However, with the DoD’s increased reliance on 
contractors, the expectations placed on the KO have changed, and KOs are now expected 
to act as business advisors, integrating their functions with the goals and objectives of the 
organization (Nelson, 2006). This shift required the DoD to begin approaching 
contracting as a core competency (Kelmen, 2001). To evaluate this new paradigm, it is 
important to understand the organizational structure of DoD contracting.   
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3. DoD Contracting Organizational Structure 
a. DoD Contracting Authority 
The authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the United States is 
considered an inherently governmental function that requires explicit written 
authorization (Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP], 2011). Per FAR 1.601 
(2012), the authority and responsibility to contract is vested in the agency head, which in 
the case of the DoD is the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). This authority flows from the 
SECDEF to the heads of the departments and agencies. DFARS 202.101 (2012) contains 
a list of current contracting activities within the DoD that have been delegated 
contracting authority. Each department and agency head is authorized to delegate 
contracting authority within their applicable activity.   
This delegation flow is how KOs receive their express authority to enter 
into contracts on behalf of the DoD. FAR 1.601 (2012) states that agency heads formally 
delegate contracting authority through a formal chain of command (Smith, 2005). It is 
important to understand that there is a difference between the contracting authority chain 
of command, and the command and control chain of command, which will be discussed 
later in this literature review. For purposes of this review, we will focus on the flow of 
contracting authority for military agencies responsible for contracted mission and 
installation support, as well as contracted expeditionary support. 
b. Department of the Army Contracting Organization 
DFARS 202.101 (2012) identifies 18 different contracting activities within 
the United States Army (USA). Each of these activities performs authority delegation 
through individual chains of command to the assigned KOs. USA contracting underwent 
a major organizational restructuring in 2008 as a result of the findings in the final report 
of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations (2007), also known as the Gansler Commission. 
In 2007, the Secretary of the Army assigned an independent commission 
to evaluate Army acquisition operations. The intent was to provide recommendations for 
the future development of the workforce and improve effectiveness and efficiency. The 
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final report became known as the Gansler Report, and it identified four key improvement 
areas (Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management, 2007). They are the 
following:  
1. Increase acquisition workforce, both military and civilian; 
2. Restructure the organization to support home station and contingency 
operations; 
3. Develop a training program for contingency contracting operations; and 
4. Obtain policy and regulatory assistance to improve contracting 
effectiveness.  
The report stated, “The Army is the DoD ‘Executive Agent’ for 
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is unable to fill military or civilian contracting 
billets, in either quantity or qualification” (Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management, 2007).     
In response to the recommendations, the Army Contracting Command 
(ACC) was established as a subordinate command to U.S. Army Materiel Command 
(AMC). ACC is composed of two subordinate commands—the Mission and Installation 
Contracting Command (MICC) and the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC). 
MICC is responsible for installation contracting, while ECC is responsible for 
expeditionary contracting (ACC, 2012). Since its inception, ACC has grown 
substantially. The Gansler Report served as a wake-up call to the Army, and many 
changes were implemented to improve its acquisition workforce.   
c. Department of the Navy Contracting Organization 
DFARS 202.101 (2012) identifies 12 contracting activities for the U.S. 
Navy (USN), including two U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) activities. The organizational 
structure of the USN contracting activities supports the expeditionary nature of the USN 
and USMC missions. 
d. Department of the Air Force Contracting Organization 
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has 19 identified contracting activities in 
DFARS 202.101 (2012). The Major Commands (MAJCOMs) are identified, and  
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installations and programs are assigned to the MAJCOM. The MAJCOM is then 
responsible for the majority of all buying activities for all identified installations within 
its command.  
e. Acquisition Planning within the DoD  
Planning for acquisitions in the DoD can take different forms based on the 
requirement. FAR 2.101 (2012) defines acquisition planning as 
the process by which the efforts of all personnel responsible for an 
acquisition are coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive plan 
for fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost. 
It includes developing the overall strategy for managing the acquisition. 
There are three key processes that work in concert to plan and integrate 
acquisition programs within the DoD: the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS); the Defense Acquisition System; and Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE). The JCIDS process is used to identify, assess, 
validate, and prioritize capability requirements. The DoD 5000 series governs the 
Defense Acquisition System, which is the management process that guides all DoD 
acquisitions programs. And the PPBE is the process by which the DoD allocates 
resources. These three processes form the framework to deliver timely and cost-effective 
capabilities to the warfighter (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2012).   
Planning at the operational level for day-to-day mission support is less 
formal and guided by the FAR, DFARS, and individual department procedures. This 
guidance does not focus on integrating contracting into strategic-, operational-, or 
tactical-level mission planning.   
D. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN THE DOD 
1. Introduction 
Now that we have laid the foundation for contracting within industry and the 
DoD, we shift our focus to contingency contracting. While there are differences, it truly 
is the same processes in a different environment with different challenges. Contracting in 
contingency operations is not a new concept; however, the past 11 years of operations 
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have opened the aperture to the importance of fully understanding how to effectively 
integrate contract support into contingency planning. In this section, we define 
contingencies, describe the types of contingency contracting support and organizational 
structures, and discuss the phases of contingency operations and the evolution of theater 
contract support. 
2. Definition  
Contracting, as defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR; 2012), is 
obtaining supplies or services from non-federal sources. This definition encompasses 
everything from the refinement of the requirement to the administration of the contract. 
Contingency contracting encompasses the same responsibilities; however, the governing 
regulations, environment, and available resources are modified. A contingency can either 
be declared or non-declared (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy [DPAP], 
2012b). The FAR 2.101 (2012) defines a declared contingency as,  
A military operation that— 
(1) Is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military 
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or 
against an opposing military force; or 
(2) Results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members 
of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 
12305, or 12406 of 10 U.S.C., chapter 15 of 10 U.S.C., or any other 
provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by 
the President or Congress. 
The formal declaration of a contingency is important to a contingency contracting 
officer (CCO) because it is a trigger for increased thresholds and accessibility to more 
flexible and streamlined acquisition processes to respond to the high operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO) of contingency operations. While CCOs also support non-declared 
contingencies, they are not afforded the use of the same regulatory relief as in a non-
declared situation (DPAP, 2012b). Figure 4 provides a list of examples of military 
operations, all of which CCOs are called to support. 
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Figure 4.  Examples of Military Operations (From Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff [CJCS], 2011b, p. I-15) 
In addition to the multiple types of operations that CCOs may support, the 
contracting environment can be either mature or immature. A mature contracting 
environment is characterized by an established supply chain that can rapidly respond to 
changes and has a vendor base with an understanding of the federal contracting process. 
An immature contracting environment has little to no infrastructure established and very 
few vendors capable of supporting requirements (DPAP, 2012b).    
3. Types of Contingency Contracting Support and Organizational 
Structures 
a. Types of Contingency Contracting Support 
For the different type of operations, the size, scale, and nature of 
applicable tasks and objectives will determine whether a single-Service force can 
accomplish the mission or if a joint force headquarters is required (CJCS, 2011a). Due to 
the fact that contract authority follows a separate flow than command authority, similar 
standards apply to the contracting support organization of an operation. Before we 
discuss the types of contract support organizations, it is important to distinguish between 
the different types of contract support commonly provided during a contingency. There 
are three categories of support contracts: external support contracts, systems support 
contracts, and theater support contracts. As previously discussed, contracting authority 
flows through the Services and is not typically associated with the contingency being 
directly supported. This means multiple Head of Contracting Activities (HCA) may have 
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contracts supporting a contingency, thus increasing the difficulty of management and 
oversight of contingency planning and support (DPAP, 2012b). 
External support contracts are awarded outside of theater and are owned 
by a specific Service. The contracts are awarded under the contract authority of the 
owning Service or agency, and can vary in type and scope. Civilian Augmentation 
Program (CAP) contracts owned by the Services are an example of external support 
contracts. Other examples are construction support contracts written by the U.S. Army 
Corp of Engineers (USACE), and fuel contracts awarded by the Defense Energy Support 
Center. These contracts are typically used to provide logistical support and selected non-
logistical support to the joint forces (DPAP, 2012b).   
Systems support contracts provide technical support, maintenance, and, at 
times, repair parts for military weapons and support systems deployed into theater. These 
contracts are owned by the acquisition program management office (PMO), and fall 
under the HCA authority assigned to the particular PMO. These contracts are typically 
awarded with the original system award and are often not considered when planning for 
contingencies (DPAP, 2012b). An example of a systems support contract is a field 
service representative accompanying units to provide support to newly fielded weapons 
systems, to include aircraft, land combat vehicles, and automated C2 systems (Joint Staff, 
2008).  
Theater support contracts are the only contracts awarded by contracting 
officers within the area of operation under the contracting authority assigned to the 
particular operation. For declared contingencies, these contracts are typically awarded 
utilizing expedited contracting authority and provide supplies, services, and construction 
from local and global commercial sources. These contracts are typically considered 
contingency contracts (DPAP, 2012b). Examples include contracts written to procure 
supplies, services, and construction in the operational area (Joint Staff, 2008). 
b. Types of Contingency Contracting Organizational Structure 
Now that we have explained the different types of contingency support 
contracts, we will explain the three different contracting organizational structures 
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available for theater support contracts. Based on the scale of the mission, there  
are three contracting organizational structure options that may be utilized: a Service 
component provides support to its own forces; a lead Service component is designated as 
the component responsible for theater support contracting; or the most resource-
demanding structure, a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, is established. 
Currently, these options generally would apply only to the joint task force (JTF) level,  
not to a geographic combatant command (GCC). While there is currently not one 
preferred option, it is possible that the organizational needs may evolve during the 
operation. The DPAP, Contingency Contracting, Additional Text website 
(http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/html/additional_text.html) identifies factors 
considered when determining the organizational option:  
 size, primary mission, and expected duration of the joint operation; 
 scope criticality and complexity of the theater support contracting 
requirements; 
 need for enhanced JFC control of the theater support contracting mission; 
 location of supported units when compared to available commercial 
vendor base; and 
 dominant user and most capable Service considerations. (DPAP, 2012a) 
For smaller scale operations that are expected to be short in duration, the 
GCC normally allows Service components to provide contract support to their own 
forces. This organizational structure is also applicable to operations in which different 
Services will be operating in geographically separated areas. This structure limits the 
potential of competition among the Services for the same vendor base (DPAP, 2012b).   
However, in joint operations where Services are working within the same 
area of the joint operations area (JOA) and theater support contracts are more complex, 
the designation of a lead Service component responsible for contracting may be more 
appropriate. This option will typically be used for long-term operations in which there is 
a need for the JFC to have consolidated contracting efforts. The lead Service maintains 
command and control of other identified Services, receives manning augmentation from 
the other Services, and is typically the Service responsible for common user logistics 
(CUL) within the JOA (DPAP, 2012b). 
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When operations become larger and more complex, the JFC may require 
more synchronized oversight that cannot be afforded by the previously explained 
organizational options. The establishment of a Joint Theater Support Contracting 
Command (JTSCC) may become necessary when operational conditions are the 
following, although these conditions are not a requirement: 
 an extremely complex operation that requires direct control of theater 
support contracting by the JFC commander; 
 a mission of long-term duration; 
 a mission that is beyond the capability of a single Service; 
 a mission that requires significant coordination of contracting and civil–
military aspects of the JFC’s campaign plan; and 
 significant numbers of different Service forces operating in the same area 
or joint bases served by the same local vendor base. 
When a JTSCC is established, it assumes command and control authority 
over designated theater support contract organizations within a designated area of 
operations. While the JTSCC performs the same function as a lead Service agency, the 
JTSCC reports directly to the JFC Commander versus the Service Component (DPAP, 
2012b). DoD Directive 5101.1 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of 
Administration and Management [OSD DA&M], 2002) defines a DoD Executive Agent 
(EA) as 
the Head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, 
functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for 
operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that 
involve two or more of the DoD components. The nature and scope of the 
DoD Executive Agent responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall  
 3.1.1. Be prescribed at the time of assignment. 
3.1.2. Remain in effect until the Secretary of Defense or the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense revokes or superseded them. (para. 
3.1) 
The JTSCC received HCA authority from one of the Services, typically 
the lead Service or executive agent for CUL (DPAP, 2012b). The EA for theater support 
contracting can be issued as well, in which case the EA will provide HCA authority to the 
 22
JTSCC (DoD, 2009). While no approved formal organizational structure for a JTSCC has 
been established, Figure 5 depicts a typical JTSCC structure. 
 
Figure 5.  Example JTSCC Organizational Structure (From DPAP, 2012b, p. 37) 
Regardless of which contracting support organization is selected for a 
particular operation, planning for the preferred organizational structure should be 
considered and planned for prior to a contingency operation (DPAP, 2012b). 
c. Service Theater Support Contracting  
When considering which organizational structure to utilize for a particular 
operation/mission, it is important for the JFC commander to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of each Service in regard to theater support contracting capabilities. Each 
Service approaches the development, training, and deployment of its contracting 
personnel uniquely.   
The U.S. Air Force has a large capacity for theater support contracting. 
Enlisted and officer military contracting professionals are developed early in their career 
and are afforded the opportunity to gain a significant depth of experience by spending the 
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majority of their careers in the contracting field. Individuals gain experience at 
installation contracting support offices, augmented by contingency contracting training. 
The force is structured to deploy under modular skill and capability mixes called unit 
type codes (UTCs). Considerations for AF deployment packages are typically based on 
skill levels versus rank. The enlisted contracting force is robust and very experienced 
(DPAP, 2012b).   
As previously stated, the U.S. Army recently underwent a major 
contracting organizational restructuring. The new contingency contracting structure is a 
modular approach. Noncommissioned and commissioned officers are assigned to 
Contract Support Brigades (CSB), which are subordinate to Expeditionary Contracting 
Command. The CSBs are composed of contingency contracting battalions and 
contingency contracting teams. Department of the Army civilian contracting specialists 
are also utilized to augment the contingency contracting force structure (DPAP, 2012b).   
The U.S. Navy does not have a dedicated contingency contracting force 
structure. As operations require support, naval officers and civilians assigned in 
contracting positions are deployed. Due to the expeditionary nature of the USN, it has a 
global logistic chain that it leverages to provide support to its forces (DPAP, 2012b). 
The U.S. Marine Corps maintains a small number of CCOs to deploy as 
part of a Marine air–ground task force (MAGTF). The assigned CCOs develop a contract 
support plan identifying the number of personnel to be deployed (DPAP, 2012b).   
As previously discussed, theater support contracting agencies are not the 
only contracting agencies providing support to the JOA. Two primary combat support 
agencies provide contracting support during contingencies, the Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). 
The DLA is responsible for providing worldwide logistics support during 
times of peace and war. The DLA maintains its own contracting authority and reports to 
the OUSD(AT&L) through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Materiel Readiness. In addition, the DoD established the Joint Contingency Acquisition 
Support Office (JCASO) under the DLA, to be discussed later in this review.   
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The DCMA is responsible for ensuring the cost, schedule, and 
performance of major DoD acquisition programs. The DCMA’s primary responsibility 
during contingency operations is to provide contingency contract administration services 
(CCAS) for delegated contracts, whether they are external support, systems support, or 
theater support contracts. 
4. Contingency Contracting Support Phases 
Four typical phases of contracting support occur during a contingency: 
mobilization and initial deployment, buildup, sustainment, and termination and 
redeployment. Research indicates the need for an additional phase, which is further 
discussed later in this review. Priorities and requirements are different for each phase, 
and the amount of time spent in each phase varies based on the operation. Figure 6 
depicts the four phases, major requirements occurring during each phase, and areas that 
CCOs should focus attention on.   
 
Figure 6.  Four Contracting Phases of a Contingency (From DPAP, 2012b, p. 112) 
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Phase I, mobilization and initial deployment, is characterized by controlled chaos. 
Operations tempo is high and CCOs are typically focused on assessing available 
resources and obtaining required facilities and services to provide contracting support. 
Requirements focus on life-support items required to beddown initial forces, and 
expedited contract vehicles are frequently used (DPAP, 2012b). 
Phase II, buildup or joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 
(JRSOI), comprises the reception and beddown of the main force. Typically, additional 
contracting support arrives to assist with theater contract support. Priorities continue to 
focus on basic life support; however, efforts to establish command and control, 
requirements processes, and coordination should be a priority (DPAP, 2012b).   
Phase III, sustainment, is characterized by the stabilization of contracting 
operations. Contracting support expands to enhance quality of life and more permanent 
facilities and services. In this phase, business practices, policies, and procedures should 
be active, and more emphasis should be placed on transitioning from short-term 
expeditious contracts to long-term contract vehicles. Efforts should be focused on 
expanding the vendor base and utilizing reach-back contracting capabilities when 
appropriate (DPAP, 2012b). 
Phase IV, termination and redeployment, is characterized by the urgency to 
redeploy forces out of the JOA. New requirements continue, but shift focus to services 
and supplies supporting the redeployment of equipment and forces. CCOs must negotiate 
the termination of existing contracts, follow up on any open payments, and close out all 
contracts and claims. Preparation for Phase IV should be a consideration during Phase III 
by including the appropriate terms and conditions in contracts written to support the 
contingency operation (DPAP, 2012b). 
5. Evolution of Theater Contract Support  
Historically, theater contract support provided basic logistics, life-support-type 
supplies and services, and minor construction. Contracts were often reactive to a need 
arising during operations and were rarely integrated into the planned phases of the 
operation. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan brought a 
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paradigm shift to contingency contracting and the role it plays in the potential success or 
failure of particular COIN missions. Joint Publication 1–02 (Joint Staff, 2010) defines 
COIN as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and 
to address any core grievances” (p. 71). As operations progressed, strategic leaders 
recognized contracting not only as a key component to stabilizing the economy, but also 
as an enabler to successful kinetic and non-kinetic missions. Generals David Petraeus and 
James Amos formalized contracting’s role in tactical operations in FM 3–24, 
“Counterinsurgency,” published in December 2006 (Headquarters [HQ] Department of 
the Army). COIN requires not only fighting, but also rebuilding efforts. It combines 
offensive and defensive operations with stability operations, and varies depending on the 
specific mission. Contracting elements are identified as one of the key U.S. military 
capabilities in COIN operations, along with dismounted infantry, human intelligence, 
language specialists, military police, civil affairs, engineers, medical units, logistics 
support, and legal affairs. Economic development is a key logical line of operation 
(LOO) vital to restoring stability in an area, and contracting efforts can directly impact 
the growth of an economy through theater support contracts. CCOs have become a 
critical component of the combat forces and help to support tactical operations through 
the appropriate expenditure of funds for rebuilding efforts (HQ Department of the Army, 
2006).   
As the COIN manual was issued, the focus of contracting efforts on the ground 
was evolving. Effects-based contracting became a cornerstone of contracting strategy 
during the “enable civil authority phase” of operations in Iraq. The key to effects-based 
contracting is to ensure contracting representatives are incorporated early in the planning 
process for tactical operations (Poree, Curtis, Morrill, & Sherwood, 2008). Maj Gen 
(USAF Ret.) Darryl Scott stated, “synchronizing contract execution with a commander’s 
intent requires the contracting process to be an active part of operations/mission planning 
so that the desired operational and tactical goals are understood and translated into 
effective contracting actions” (DCMA, 2006, p. 26). The fact that contracting efforts 
were now considered to be “commander’s business” was reiterated with the publication 
of the COMISAF’s COIN Contracting Guidance, issued on September 8, 2010 
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(Commander, International Security Assistance Force [COMISAF], 2010). GEN 
Petraeus’ directive stated, “I expect Commanders to consider the effects of our contract 
spending and understand who benefits from it.”  Contracting was recognized as a 
powerful enabler, representing both an opportunity and a threat (COMISAF, 2010). This 
possible threat underscored the need for integration of contracting into operational 
planning. 
During his time as the Senior Contracting Official–Afghanistan (SCO-A), 
Brigadier General Casey Blake took direct action to ensure contingency contracting 
operations were adapted in relation to the changes in battle-space conditions. In his 
article, Putting Contracting on the Offensive in Afghanistan (2012), Brig Gen Blake 
identified the need to implement new policies and procedures that account for the shift in 
the acquisition landscape. During the transition of operations from U.S./International 
Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF) to Afghan National Forces, senior maneuver 
commanders recognized the importance of the SCO-A mission. Additionally, contracting 
has become a “key force enabler” during the demobilization of the maneuver force.  “In 
this capacity, contracting cannot abdicate its roles and responsibilities to better integrate 
the kinetic and non-kinetic battle-space; it is the catalyst for success” (Blake, 2012, p. 
22).   
To apply a quasi-DoDI 5000 approach to contracting operations, Brig Gen Blake 
created integration cells within the two largest regional command centers. The cells were 
comprised of a contracting officer, program manager, Afghan business advisor, and 
contractor support (primarily focused on minor works construction).  “The primary focus 
in creating the integration cells was to provide acquisition advisory assistance to help 
better integrate kinetic and non-kinetic battle-spaces” (Blake, 2012, p. 23). Brig Gen 
Blake recognized there is a fundamental difference between kinetic and non-kinetic 
operations. Kinetic operations are governed by doctrine and nearly every aspect of 
offensive operations is accounted for in the governance. On the other hand, the non-
kinetic is more difficult to synchronize and manage. Comprised of economic capacity 
building, stability operations, governance, the elimination of corruption, and many other 
 28
factors, the non-kinetic environment requires careful planning and preparation to ensure 
operations create the intended effects.   
The integration cells provided an interim solution; however, Brig Gen Blake 
recommends that a program executive officer (PEO) be responsible for non-kinetic 
battle-space operations. This will provide the same effect and focus as the maneuver 
force. Figure 7 outlines the notional architecture for the management of the non-kinetic 
battle-space. 
 
Figure 7.  Integration Cell Architecture (Future State-Notional)  
(From Blake, 2012, p. 24) 
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6. Evolution of the Present Day Battlefield 
a. Historical Overview of Contracting on the Battlefield 
Contingency contracting is not a new concept to military operations. 
References to the procurement of logistical support date back to 1775. Some early 
attempts to contract for logistical support ended in failure, but contingency contracting 
has been a key enabler since World War II (Luse, Madeline, Smith, & Starr, 2005). What 
has changed over time is the complexity and duration of services being contracted, as 
well as an increased reliance on contractors to support the logistic tail of military 
operations. One clear indicator of this heavy reliance is the contractor-to-military ratio 
during military operations (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency 
Operations Task Force, 2010a). Two trends have led to a high degree of reliance on 
contractors: the downsizing of military forces, and a trend toward shifting performance of 
government functions to the private sector (Dunn, 2005). Additionally, the increasing 
contractor-to-military ratio can be attributed to other factors including the shift to an all-
volunteer force, increased reliance on technically complex weapon systems and 
equipment, and decreasing budgets (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in 
Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a). Figure 8 provides a historical view of the 
ratio for previous conflicts. 
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Figure 8.  Historical Perspective of the Battlefield  
(From CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010, p. 3) 
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The extended duration of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provided the 
DoD the first view of the full effect of this increased reliance. Contractors are a force-
multiplier that are now being used to fill critical capability gaps when it is considered not 
cost effective to create the organic capability (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support 
in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a). Contractors are no longer supporting 
only logistics; instead, contract support now spans the spectrum of combat support and 
combat service support. At times, the decision to contract services, such as security, has 
been directly related to congressionally mandated ceilings governing the number of 
military forces in the operational area. Some research shows that contract support has 
become the default solution during contingency operations due to the ease of use and 
quick fulfillment of immediate needs.  
The 21st century total force represents a shift from traditional military 
operations (Commission on Wartime Contracting [CWC] in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
2011b). Today’s total force is comprised of active and reserve military components, civil 
servants, and contractors. Considerations for the employment, deployment, and support 
of the new total force must be taken into consideration during operational planning (DoD, 
2006). 
The DoD has been required to increase focus on the robust nature of what 
is now being called the fifth force (contractors). At times during contingency operations, 
the fifth force may equal or exceed its military counterparts. This brings about the need to 
plan support and management of contract personnel as part of the total force. 
b. Contractors Accompanying the Force 
A full discussion of the implications of relying heavily on contracted 
support in contingency operations is too large for the scope of this research; however, we 
provide a brief overview of the overarching implications of having contracted support 
entering the JOA and the considerations for the CCDR and JFC CDR. Contractors 




subcontract personnel, to include third country nationals (TCNs) and host nation (HN) 
personnel (OUSD[AT&L], 2005). Figure 9 depicts the current overview of contractors in 
contingency operations.  
 
Figure 9.  Contractors in Contingency Operations (From CJCS Dependence on 
Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a, p. 4) 
Deploying contractors and having them support military operations brings 
about special considerations. The contract between the defense contractor and the DoD 
provides the only source of the legal relationship between the parties. Different contracts 
provide for different types of government-provided sustainment and life support. Life 
support includes items such as medical support, housing, morale support, legal assistance, 
mortuary affairs, food services, and so forth. Generally, theater support contractors 
receive life support from local sources, system contractors are deployed to multiple 
locations within the JOA and receive life support from the unit they are assigned to, and 
external support contractors obtain life support from the Service Component Command 
or support themselves. The extent of the provided services is included in the contract 
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terms and conditions (Combined Arms Support Command, n.d.). Ensuring commanders 
at all levels understand the relationship with contractor personnel is an important aspect 
of managing contractors on the battlefield.   
E. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN THE JOINT OPERATIONS 
ENVIRONMENT 
1. Introduction 
Due to Service-unique capabilities and expertise, contingency contracting 
operations have become a joint endeavor. As such, it is important to understand the 
fundamental concepts associated with planning for and executing joint operations. In this 
section, we provide the basic framework for the joint organizational structure, joint 
operations, and joint operation planning.   
2. Joint Organizational Structure 
In response to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the DoD reorganized to 
enhance the effectiveness of military operations, which provided the foundation for 
today’s organizational structure. Implementation of the act is an ongoing process that 
emphasizes the joint force continuing to be key to operational success and “the most 
effective force must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, 
doctrinally, and technically” (CJCS, 2000 p. 2). 
Figure 10 shows the current organization of the DoD and the span of control and 
influence of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).   
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Figure 10.  Organization of the Department of Defense (From Directorate for 
Organizational and Management Planning, 2012) 
a. Department of Defense 
DoD Directive 5100.01 (OSD DA&M, 2010) identifies the functions of 
the DoD and its major components. The SECDEF is responsible for all functions of the 
DoD, which is comprised of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Office of the Inspector General (IG), the combatant commands, 
the military departments, the defense agencies, and the DoD field activities.   
b. Office of the Secretary of Defense  
The OSD is the principle staff element providing support for policy 
development, planning, resource management, fiscal and program evaluation and 
oversight, and interface with other U.S. government (USG) departments and international 
governments and agencies. The OSD also provides oversight of the defense agencies and 
DoD field activities (OSD DA&M, 2010).   
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c. Joint Chiefs of Staff 
The JCS cooperates and coordinates with the OSD to provide staff 
assistance and is the immediate military staff of the SECDEF. The JCS is comprised of 
the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff, and the 
Military Service Chiefs. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, 
SECDEF, National Security Council (NSC), and Homeland Security Council (HSC). The 
CJCS also provides the communication link between the President and SECDEF and the 
commanders of the combatant commands (OSD DA&M, 2010). The advice provided by 
the CJCS represents the advice and opinions of the members of the JCS and combatant 
commanders (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011). The Joint Staff provides assistance to the 
CJCS in conducting its assigned responsibilities. The Joint Staff is comprised of military 
members from each military department and is directed by the CJCS. Directorates of the 
Joint Staff are responsible for translating the staff’s planning, policies, intelligence, 
manpower, communications, and logistics functions into military support action. Each 
directorate has specific roles and responsibilities (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011). The 
directorates are as follows: 
 Director of the Joint Staff, 
 DOM—Directorate of Management, 




 J5—Strategic Plans and Policy, 
 J7—Joint Force Development, and 
 J8—Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment. 
d. Military Departments 
For all purposes other than operational direction, the chain of command 




department secretaries, to the chiefs of the Services. The Service chiefs are also members 
of the JCS under the CJCS and Vice Chairman of the JSC (VCJCS). Though duel-hatted, 
the responsibilities to the JCS take precedence. Each military department is led by a 
civilian secretary, with the authority and responsibility to manage the affairs of their 
respective Service. These responsibilities include recruiting, training, organizing, 
supplying, and equipping (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011). The military departments are also 
responsible for performing functions necessary to fulfill the current and future 
operational requirements of the combatant commands, including assigning forces (OSD 
DA&M, 2010). 
e. Combatant Commands 
Prior to the 1986 reorganization of the military in response to the 
Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act (1986), the JCS maintained operational control of 
the military. Today, responsibility for conducting military operations flows from the 
President to the SECDEF, directly to the commanders of the unified combatant 
commands. Combatant commands are established by the President, through the SECDEF, 
and are responsible for performing assigned missions (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011). 
Combatant commanders (CCDRs) are responsible for exercising authority, direction, and 
control over the commands and forces assigned. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) 
defines the command authority of the CCDR to give authoritative direction to subordinate 
commands to include the following:  
 prescribing of the chain of command;  
 organization of the commands and forces; 
 employment of forces necessary for assigned missions; 
 coordination and approval of administration, support, and discipline; and 






A full list of CCDR functions is found in DoDD 5100.01 (OSD DA&M, 
2010). Military departments assign forces to the combatant commands, while all 
unassigned personnel remain under the command authority of the military department. 
There are currently nine combatant commands, six geographical commands, and three 
functional commands (see Figure 11; Feickert, 2012).   
 
Figure 11.  Combatant Command Reporting Organization (From Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 
2011, p. 144) 
CCDR staffs closely reflect the directorates of the Joint Staff, but differ 





Figure 12.  Traditional Combatant Command Joint Staff Organization (From Joint Staff, 
J-7 JETD, 2011, p. 125) 
f. Types of Command Authority 
It is important to understand the different types of command authority in 
order to grasp the complications with contracting authority, discussed later in this paper.   
Title 10, U.S.C., Section 164 (2012) provides CCDRs with combatant 
command authority (COCOM), which is not transferable or shared within the lower 
echelons in the chain of command. COCOM is the authority over assigned forces and is 
only exercised by the CCDRs. COCOM provides authority for the CCDR to perform 
functions such as organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, 
designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over military operations, joint 
training, and logistics deemed necessary to support assigned missions. The authority to 
direct logistical support enables the CCDR to execute operations efficiently and 
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effectively, while minimizing duplication of effort among the Services. During 
peacetime, the CCDR exercises appropriate authority, but refers disputes to the military 
departments for resolution. During crisis or war, the authority and responsibilities are 
expanded to include the use and direction of all facilities and supplies of all the forces 
assigned under the CCDR’s command (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011).   
Operational control (OPCON) is another common level of authority 
utilized during joint military operations. The CCDR may delegate OPCON authority to 
lower echelons. OPCON is typically delegated by the superior CDRs to CDRs of 
subordinate commands and joint task forces (JTFs) of assigned or attached forces. 
OPCON provides full authority to organize forces and assign tasks and objectives to 
accomplish an assigned mission. The CDR may retain or delegate OPCON or tactical 
control as necessary, and it can be limited by time, function, or location. OPCON does 
not include the authority over matters associated with administration, discipline, internal 
organization, and unit training (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011). 
Tactical Control (TACON) is defined as “the detailed and, usually, local 
direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or 
tasks assigned” (Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 2011, p. 99). By virtue of having COCOM or 
OPCON of Service-assigned or other combatant command-assigned capabilities, 
TACON can be delegated further down the chain within the same organization. 
Figure 13 shows the chain of command and control relating command 
authority for a typical operation within a combatant command. 
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Figure 13.  Command Relationship Synopsis  
(From CJCS, 2011b, p. III-3) 
Further discussion in Chapter V outlines the correlation between the chain of command 
and control, flow of contracting authority within joint operations, and the associated joint 
planning considerations. 
g. Command Authority vs. Contracting Authority 
It is important to understand there is a difference between command and 
contract authority. Unifying and synchronizing contingency contracting activities in an 
area of operation becomes challenging due to different activities deriving their contract 
and command authorities from different organizations. Joint Contracting Command-Iraq 
(JCC-I) faced significant challenges early in its establishment due to this issue. Figure 14 
provides a snapshot in 2006 of the command versus contract authority. Each head of 
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contracting activity is designated via a red line, and the assigned command or 
coordination authority is color coordinated in accordance with the key.   
 
Figure 14.  Contracting Command Versus Contracting Authority  
(From Scott, 2012 
3. Joint Operations 
Joint doctrine provides a common framework for planning, training, and 
conducting military operations. Per Joint Publication (JP) 1, joint doctrine “represents 
what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right” (CJCS, 2009, p. ix).   All JPs 
must be approved by the CJCS and serve as authoritative guidance to be used by the Joint 
Staff, CCDRs, subordinate unified CDRs, JTF CDRs, subordinate CDRs, and the military 
Services (CJCS, 2009, p. A-1).   JP 1 is the capstone doctrine and provides “the 
overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States” 
(CJCS, 2009, p. I-1).   
A fundamental principle identified in JP 1 is the fact that the U.S. conducts 
military operations as a joint force, and the document goes on to say, 
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“Joint” connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which 
elements of two or more Military Departments participate. Joint matters 
relate to the integrated employment of military forces in joint operations, 
including matters relating to (1) national military strategy (NMS); (2) 
strategic planning and contingency planning; (3) command and control 
(C2) of joint operations; and (4) unified action with the U.S. interagency 
and intergovernmental communities, nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs), and multinational  forces (MNFs) and organizations. (CJCS, 
2009, p. I-2) 
The DoD has shifted toward capabilities-based planning (CBP) for force 
planning, which is a subset of joint strategic planning (CJCS, 2009, p. I-11). The 
framework and language forming the foundation for CBP is comprised of joint capability 
areas (JCAs).  “JCAs are collections of like DoD capabilities functionally grouped to 
support capability analysis, strategy development, investment, decision-making, 
capability portfolio management, and capabilities-based force development and 
operational planning” (CJCS, 2009, p. I-11). JCAs are tiered, starting from a very broad 
category down to more specifically focused capabilities. There are nine Tier 1 JCAs: 
force support, battle-space awareness, force application, logistics, command and control, 
net-centric, protection, building partnerships, and corporate management (CJCS 
Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010a).  
JP 3–0, Joint Operations (CJCS, 2011b), identifies three levels of war: strategic, 
operational, and tactical. In regard to military operations, the strategic level provides “a 
set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and 
integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives” (CJCS, 
2011b, p. I-13). Operation level refers to the link between national and military strategic 
objectives and the tactical employment of forces. And the tactical level is the 
“employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Joint doctrine 
focuses this term on planning and executing battles, engagement, and activities at the 
tactical level to achieve military objectives assigned to the tactical units or task forces 
(TFs)” (CJCS, 2011b, p. I-14). Leaders at the operational level utilize operational art to 
design, plan, and execute operations. Operational art refers to commanders and their 
staffs utilizing creativity, supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience, to design 
strategies and employ military forces.   As part of operational art, operational design is 
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“the conception and construction of the intellectual framework that underpins joint 
OPLANs and their subsequent execution” (CJCS, 2011b, p. II-4). The operational 
approach is determined by combining operational art and operational design. Figure 15 
depicts the essence of how operational art and operational design are utilized to 
determine the operational approach.  “Together, operational art and operational design 
strengthen the relationship between strategy and tactics” (CJCS, 2011b, p. II-4).  
 
Figure 15.  Operational Art (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-2) 
4. Joint Operation Planning 
JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning (CJCS, 2011a), provides guidance to CCDRs 
and their subordinate joint force commanders for planning activities associated with joint 
military operations in response to contingencies and crises (p. I-1).   All entities involved 
in joint operation planning are known collectively as the Joint Planning and Execution 
Community (JPEC). Figure 16 identifies the participants in the joint planning process. 
Strategic guidance is provided by the President and the SECDEF. 
 44
 
Figure 16.  Joint Planning and Execution Community  
(From CJCS, 2011a, p. II-12) 
Joint operation planning takes place within Adaptive Planning and Execution 
(APEX). APEX is “the department-level system of joint policies, processes, procedures, 
and reporting structures. APEX is supported by communications and information 
technology that is used by the JPEC to monitor, plan, and executive mobilization, 
deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities 
associated with joint operations” (CJCS, 2011a, p. I-3). APEX supports the iterative 
nature of joint planning, and facilitates collaborative planning between the different 
echelons of command (CJCS, 2011a). Figure 17 shows the relationship between the 
different levels and products produced by each.   
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Figure 17.  National Strategic Direction (From CJCS, 2011a, p. II-5) 
“In conducting joint operation planning, commanders and staff blend operational 
art, operational design, and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) in 
complementary fashion as part of the overall process that produces  the eventual plan or 
order that drives the joint operation” (CJCS, 2011a, p. I-5). JOPP is an analytical 
decision-making process consisting of seven logical steps: (1) planning initiation, (2) 
mission analysis, (3) course of action (COA) development, (4) COA analysis and 
wargaming, (5) COA comparison, (6) COA approval, and (7) plan or order development 
(CJCS, 2011a, p. IV-1).   
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Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is part of APEX and is 
the system technology utilized to develop the plans and orders. Joint operation planning 
results in multiple planning and execution products that are created during deliberate and 
crisis action planning (CAP). Deliberate planning encompasses the planning efforts for 
non-crisis situations, and is used to develop theater and global campaign plans, along 
with a broad range of contingency plans. Deliberate planning relies heavily on 
assumptions and should provide the framework for a seamless transition to CAP if a 
crisis arises. There are four levels of planning detail for contingency plans (CJCS, 2011a, 
pp. II-21–II-23). Figure 18 outlines each level in detail.   
 
Planning Detail Description Product 
Level 1 Least amount of detail and focuses on 
producing multiple COAs to address a 
contingency 
Commander’s Estimate 
Level 2 Describes the concept of operations 
(CONOPS), major forces, concepts of 
support, and anticipated timelines for 
completing the mission. Normally does 
not include annexed or a TPFDD.* 
Base Plan (BPLAN) 
Level 3 Acts as an abbreviated OPLAN. Will 
likely require considerable expansion or 
alteration to convert into an OPLAN or 
operation order (OPORD). Will typically 
have Annexes A, B, C, D, J, K, S, V, and 
Z. May have a TPFDD produced. 
Concept Plan 
(CONPLAN) 
Level 4 Is the complete/detailed joint plan. 
Contains the full description of CONOPS 
and all applicable annexes and a TPFDD. 
Can be quickly developed into an 
OPORD 
Operation Plan (OPLAN) 
*Time-phased force and deployment data: The time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and 
personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan or operation order, or ongoing rotation of forces 





Crisis action planning (CAP) takes place when an incident or situation occurs 
quickly and sets the conditions for the commitment of U.S. military forces and resources. 
There may be very little warning and these situations require expedited decision-making. 
CAP involves the activities associated with the time-sensitive development of OPORDs. 
Deliberate planning is typically conducted for anticipated events, whereas CAP is based 
on the condition that exists during the planning (CJCS, 2011a). Figure 19 shows a 
comparison of deliberate and crisis action planning. 
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Figure 19.  Deliberate Planning and Crisis Action Planning Comparison  
(From CJCS 2011a, p. II-30) 
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The operational approach allows commanders to begin describing the possible 
combinations of actions needed to achieve a desired end state given the knowledge and 
understanding of the operational environment and the description of the tensions that 
describe the problem. This reflects the fact that the operational approach provides the 
framework behind the combination of tasks that describe the CONOPS for a particular 
end state (CJCS, 2011a).  “The operational approach promotes mutual understanding and 
unity of effort throughout the echelons of command and partner organizations” (CJCS, 
2011a, p. III-15). Figure 20 depicts the process of developing the operational approach. 
 
Figure 20.  Developing the Operational Approach  
(From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-3) 
Joint publication 5–0 (CJCS, 2011a) states, “The operational approach may be 
described using lines of operations (LOOs)/lines of effort (LOEs) to link decisive points 
to achievement of objectives” (p. III-16). Commanders synchronize activities along 
complementary LOOs to get to the end state.  “A line of effort links multiple tasks and 
missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward 
establishing operational and strategic conditions” (p. III-28). LOEs are an extremely 
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valuable tool to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multi-national forces and 
civilian organizations where unity of command is impractical. LOEs may cross more than 
one instrument of national power to support interagency coordination during execution. 
LOOs and lines of effort may be used together to connect objectives to a central, unifying 
purpose. The combination of the two allows commanders to include nonmilitary activities 
into operational design. Figure 21 depicts decisive points, nodes, and links between the 
instruments of national power. The complex challenges faced by the U.S. require 
commanders to embrace the reality that interagency and multinational partners must be 
synchronized to create a coherent operational approach. Commanders make the 
determination when and how to incorporate these outside organizations, and must 
understand that the operational approach may end up being a consensus-based product 
(CJCS, 2011a). 
 
Figure 21.  Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure 
System Analysis (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-10) 
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When planning operations, CCDRs apply a phasing model. JP 5–0 (CJCS, 2011a) 
outlines a notional phasing model comprised of six phases, distinct in time, space, and/or 
purpose. While activities during each phase may overlap, there should be clear conditions 
set for transition between the phases. Figure 22 provides a notional operation plan 
phasing model and the associated activities and levels of military effort during each 
phase. 
 
Figure 22.  Notional Operation Plan Phases (From CJCS, 2011a, p. III-39) 
Commanders are the central figure in creating operational design. They possess 
the experience to make judgments and decisions necessary to guide staff through the 
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process. As the complexity of a problem increases, the commander’s role in early 
planning becomes more critical. Commanders understand that solutions must be tailored 
to each situation and draw on their own knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition 
to generate a clear understanding of the conditions needed for success. 
Additional information regarding joint operation planning can be found in JP 5–0 
(CJCS, 2011a).   While the information provided in this section is not a comprehensive 
discussion of the joint operation planning process, it provides a basic foundation to 
analyze the integration and synchronization of OCS and contingency contracting into the 
joint planning process.   
F. MAJOR OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES’ OBSERVATIONS AND 
FINDINGS 
1. Introduction 
The increased reliance on contracted support early in operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan significantly increased the need for oversight and audit of contract 
operations. Approximately $159 billion was awarded via contract or grant by the DoD, 
Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development between 2002 and 
2011, magnifying the need to ensure that appropriate management regulations were in 
place to avoid fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer dollars. A wide range of oversight 
controls and committees have been established to monitor operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan over the past 11 years. The vast number and nature of the reports makes it 
impossible to provide a thorough overview of all agencies and findings. In this section, 
we discuss major findings and observations made by the DoD Inspector General (IG), the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Commission on Wartime Contracting 
(CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
(SIGIR), and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). 
2. DoD Office of Inspector General 
There are numerous DoD IG reports evaluating contracting operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. However, for the purpose of our research, we focus primarily on DoD IG 
Report No. D-2010–059, Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform, published 
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in 2010. This report was written to provide information to key players regarding 
systematic contracting issues identified within a three-year window (2007–2010). The 
report was a comprehensive evaluation of 32 DoD IG reports, two Special Plans and 
Operations (SPO) reports, and 19 Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) 
investigations, all conducted between October 2007 and April 2010. The DoD IG (2010) 
looked for systematic issues with contracting operations and identified five areas of 
needed improvement:  
 Requirements: Agencies must ensure that they begin the acquisition 
process effectively by clearly defining what the requirements are. Unclear 
and changing requirements cause significant cost increases and 
administration issues.   
 Contracting Pricing: CCOs failed to follow FAR (2012) requirements 
when establishing whether prices were fair and reasonable. The 
documentation maintained did not reflect proper competition or research 
to make these determinations. 
 Oversight and Surveillance: Several examples were found identifying a 
lack of contract oversight and surveillance. Many contracts did not have a 
Quality Assurance and Surveillance Plan included, outlining what 
performance would be evaluated and how surveillance would be 
conducted.  
 Property Accountability: As expenditures increased, so did the amount of 
government property in theater. CCOs were not monitoring property 
records, and many items have not been accounted for. The sheer volume 
and value of the property in theater requires active management and 
oversight. 
 Financial Management: CCOs have not maintained appropriate control of 
vendor payments. Overpayments and outstanding payments have grown 
significantly.  
While these challenge areas had been previously identified, this report provides a 
singular document covering the most common problems identified within contingency 
contracting operations. Despite the identification of issues, the covered reports had repeat 
findings year to year, leading one to believe that the corrective measure taken may not 
have been successful (DoD IG, 2010). 
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3. Government Accountability Office 
The GAO, also known as the “congressional watchdog,” is a non-partisan 
independent organization assigned to Congress. The intent of the GAO is to evaluate how 
taxpayer dollars are spent and, based on findings, provide recommendations and advice to 
lawmakers and agency heads to improve operations. The GAO issues hundreds of reports 
and products per year (GAO, 2012). A quick advanced search of the GAO website 
reveals 139 GAO products related to some aspect of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
For the purpose of this research, we focus on a general overview of a few key areas for 
the GAO and some key findings from recent reports.   
The GAO recognized the DoD’s reliance on contractors to support contingencies 
in the early 1990s and has since made many recommendations to improve contract 
planning, oversight, and management. In GAO-03–695, Military Operations: 
Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately 
Addressed in DoD Plans, the GAO (2003) stated that the DoD utilized contractors with a 
wide variety of skills due to the limitation of forces and the lack of skill in areas such as 
communication services, interpreters, base operations services, intelligence analysis, and 
oversight over other contractors. In the report, the GAO (2003) made six executive 
recommendations:  
 Enforce compliance with DoD Instruction 3020.37, Continuation of 
Essential DoD Contractor Services During Crises (Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Force Management Policy [ASD(FMP)], 1996). 
 Develop procedures to monitor the implementation of DoDI 3020.37. 
 Develop DoD-wide guidance on the use of contractors. 
 Require the use of standardized deployment language in contracts that 
could potentially support deployed forces. 
 Develop training for CDRs and other senior leaders deploying to areas 
with contract support. 
 To provide visibility to CDRs, the Financial Management Regulations 
should identify the services provided and a list of contractor entitlements, 
and identify all contracts supporting contingency operations. 
The GAO again highlighted the increased use of contractors in GAO-08–572T 
(2008), Defense Management: DoD Needs to Reexamine its Extensive Reliance on 
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Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight. The GAO stated that 
the DoD’s primary challenge with regard to the heavy reliance on contractors in 
contingency operations was the ability to provide effective management and oversight. 
The report specifically stated, 
Our previous work has highlighted long-standing problems regarding the 
appropriate role and management and oversight of contractors in the 
federal workforce—particularly DoD—and I have identified 15 systemic 
acquisition challenges facing DoD. … Since 1992 we have designated 
DoD contract management as a high-risk area, in part due to concerns over 
the adequacy of the department’s acquisition workforce, including 
contract oversight personnel. (GAO, 2008) 
These findings represent only a partial look into the major challenges faced by the 
DoD, but provide good insight into the fact that, while contractors are a force multiplier, 
there are inherent challenges that come with over-reliance on contract support to provide 
key support functions critical to contingency responses and operations. 
4. Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, 
Section 841 of Public Law 110–181, signed on January 28, 2008, established the 
Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The primary goals 
of the CWC were to conduct a thorough assessment to identify systemic problems; 
identify fraud, waste, and abuse; and ensure accountability for those responsible for such 
acts. Congress instructed the CWC to make recommendations that would help to avoid 
recurring issues in future contingencies. The recommendations were to meet two primary 
criteria: 1) The recommendation must address the underlying causes of the poor 
outcomes of contracting, and 2) they must institutionalize changes so they have lasting 
effects. The findings of the CWC were reported in two interim reports, five special 
reports, and one final report prior to its decommission on September 30, 2011 (CWC in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, 2012).   
Our research focuses primarily on two reports: the second interim report to 
Congress entitled At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in 
Contingency Operations (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a) and the final report 
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entitled Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks (CWC in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b). The Commission recognized the same issue as the DoD IG 
and the GAO: The federal government’s reliance on contractors to support defense 
operations was at an unprecedented level and accompanied by several concerns and 
issues (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a).   
The second interim report identifies several benefits of utilizing contractors in 
contingencies to include freeing up military personnel, providing flexibility in performing 
certain functions, and offering skills that the government lacks. However, there are also 
consequences, such as misconduct of contractor personnel and increased fraud and illegal 
activities, associated with the contracting process. The report states, “In the current 
setting of heavy reliance on contractors and clear weaknesses in federal planning and 
management, the Commission believes the United States has come to over-rely on 
contractors” (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a, p. 9). This conclusion was reached 
by considering the government’s ability to preserve core capabilities, protect mission-
critical functions, and balance mission requirements against the ability to provide the 
appropriate level of oversight for contracted support. The report made 32 specific 
recommendations categorized into five broad categories. The bullet list that follows 
presents the five categories identified in the report:  
 New and expanded, often time-critical missions combined with ceilings on 
civilian and military personnel have led senior officials and commanders 
to rely on contractors as the default option. 
 Existing agency cultures all too often relegate contracting to an 
afterthought, thereby inhibiting sound planning, resourcing, and 
management of contractors. 
 Current interagency mechanisms and intra-agency resource allocations do 
not support the changing missions of agencies in contingency operations, 
resulting in greater reliance on contractors and less focus on contract 
outcomes. 
 Without effective competition and accurate assessment of contractor 
performance during contingency operations, money is wasted, and the 
likelihood of fraud and abuse increases. 
 Agencies’ failures to effectively use contract suspension and debarment 
tools, and the U.S. government’s limited jurisdiction over criminal 
behavior and limited access to records, have contributed to an 
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environment in which contractors misbehave with limited accountability 
(CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011a). 
The final CWC report to Congress was issued in August 2011 and the CWC 
continued to identify weaknesses and areas of needed improvement within the federal 
government to manage the heavy reliance on contract support. While the CWC’s second 
interim report stated that $177 billion had been obligated by all federal agencies in Iraq 
and Afghanistan between the fiscal years 2002–2010, the final report stated that at least 
$31 billion, and possibly as much as $60 billion, had been lost due to fraud and waste 
during fiscal years 2002–2011. The commissioners determined that much of this loss 
could have been avoided (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b).   
The extended duration and continued growth of operations led to the over-reliance 
on contracted support. This resulted in significant increases of contracted personnel on 
the battlefield. Service contracts for security were common and came with a significant 
level of complication. The increased reliance on contractors for operational installation 
support increased the quality assurance workload on an already over-tasked force. These 
factors, along with operation tempo and turnover, further magnified contractor-related 
issues in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b).   
In the final report, the CWC offers 15 recommendations to improve current and 
future operations: 
 Use risk factors in deciding whether to contract in contingencies. 
 Develop deployable cadres for acquisition management and contractor 
oversight. 
 Phase out the use of private security contractors for certain functions. 
 Improve interagency coordination and guidance for using security 
contractors in contingency operations. 
 Take actions to mitigate the threat of additional waste from 
unsustainability. 
 Elevate the positions and expand the authority of civilian officials 
responsible for contingency contracting at the DoD, Department of State 
(DoS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
 Elevate and expand the authority of military officials responsible for 
contingency contracting on the Joint Staff and the combatant 
commanders’ staffs, and in the military Services. 
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 Establish a new, dual-hatted senior position at the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) and at the National Security Council (NSC) to provide 
oversight and strategic direction. 
 Create a permanent Office of Inspector General for contingency 
operations. 
 Set and meet annual increases in competition goals for contingency 
contracts. 
 Improve contractor performance-data recording and use. 
 Strengthen enforcement tools. 
 Provide adequate staffing and resources, and establish procedures to 
protect the government’s interests. 
 Congress should provide or reallocate resources for contingency 
contracting reform to cure or mitigate the numerous defects described by 
the commission. 
 Congress should enact legislation requiring the regular assessment and 
reporting of agencies’ progress in implementing reform recommendations. 
Based on the recommendations, the CWC further identified the need for a 
strategic approach to contingency operations, and recognized the importance of having 
the structure and organization in place prior to an event to effectively integrate contract 
support (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b).   
5. The Office of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction  
A congressional amendment passed in 2004 established SIGIR. Prior to the 
creation of SIGIR, oversight of reconstruction was performed by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority Office of Inspector General (CPA-IG). After initial operations in 
Iraq, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) was established, and those funds 
were utilized to rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq. SIGIR reports directly to the State and 
Defense Secretaries, and submits quarterly and semi-annual reports to Congress (SIGIR, 
2012). The SIGIR (2012) website outlines the organization’s responsibilities as follows: 
 Provide for the independent and objective execution and supervision of 
audits and investigations; 
 Provide objective leadership and coordination of, and recommendations 
on, policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in 
the management of Iraq reconstruction programs and operations; 
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 Prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse; 
 Review existing and proposed legislation and regulations and make 
appropriate recommendations; 
 Maintain effective working relationships with other governmental 
agencies and non-governmental organizations regarding oversight in Iraq; 
 Inform the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Congress of 
significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies in operations, and track the 
progress of corrective actions; 
 Report violations of law to the U.S. Attorney General and report to 
Congress on the prosecutions and convictions that have resulted from 
referrals; and 
 Submit regular reports to Congress. 
Multiple reports are available from SIGIR; however, in this research, we focus 
primarily on their publications regarding lessons learned from Iraq reconstruction efforts. 
In 2006, SIGIR released a compilation of lessons learned regarding acquisition entitled, 
Lessons in Contracting and Procurement. The report divided the lessons learned into two 
large categories: those related to strategy and planning, and those related to policies and 
processes.  
The primary lessons learned regarding strategy and policy called attention to the 
need for early involvement of contracting personnel in strategic planning efforts. Clear 
definitions of roles and responsibilities, smaller projects in early phases of reconstruction, 
and avoidance of the use of sole-source and limited-competition acquisition strategies 
were also noted as strategic lessons learned. Key lessons regarding policies and 
procedures focused around the creation of standardized procedures, easily deployable 
procurement systems, and improvements in data collection, retention, and evaluation 
(SIGIR, 2006). 
SIGIR provided six specific recommendations for the improvement of 
procurement operations during reconstruction efforts. Those recommendations are as 
follows (SIGIR, 2006): 
 Explore the creation of an enhanced Contingency FAR (CFAR), 
 Pursue the institutionalization of special contracting programs, 
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 Include contracting and procurement personnel at all phases of planning 
for contingency operations, 
 Create a deployable reserve corps of contracting personnel who are trained 
to execute rapid relief of reconstruction contracting during contingency 
operations, 
 Develop and implement information systems for managing contracting 
and procurement in contingency operations, and 
 Pre-compete and pre-qualify a diverse pool of contractors with expertise in 
specialized reconstruction areas. 
6. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
Section 1229 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 
established SIGAR to “promote economy and efficiency of U.S.-funded reconstruction 
programs in Afghanistan and to detect and deter fraud, waste, and abuse by conducting 
independent, objective, and strategic audits, inspections, and investigations” (SIGAR, 
2012b). SIGAR reports quarterly to Congress on the status of reconstruction in 
Afghanistan, and the majority of items addressed are related to specific projects/services. 
In the July 30, 2012, report, SIGAR identified the need for “more aggressive, actionable 
recommendations” (SIGAR, 2012a). In his cover letter, the Special Investigator General 
discussed the need for SIGAR to move beyond just evaluating individual projects and to 
further evaluate systemic root causes behind deficiencies and provide recommendations 
to address those areas (SIGAR, 2012a). 
G. MAJOR DOD INITIATIVES 
1. Introduction 
The increased reliance on contract support is not a new concept to the DoD and 
initiatives to better manage contractors have been taking place since the 1990s (GAO, 
2008). However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan magnified areas of weakness and 
opened the aperture of areas to focus on. The combination of operational duration and 
complexity and increased use of contracts, not only to support operations but also to 
assist with the reconstruction of local economies, has driven the need for new approaches 
to manage contingency contracting operations. The DoD and the military departments 
have undertaken multiple initiatives to address contract support; however, we focus on 
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initiatives related to addressing the CWC recommendations, improving contract 
intelligence, and managing operational contract support. 
2. Task Force on Wartime Contracting 
Upon the release of the CWC Interim Report, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) established the DoD Task Force 
on Wartime Contracting (TFWC). The task force was a joint effort with members from 
all Services. The purpose of the TFWC was to analyze the findings of the interim report 
and determine the actions that should be implemented to correct immediate items of 
concern. There were eight immediate concerns identified in the CWC Interim report 
(DoD, 2009):  
1. Iraq drawdown, 
2. Contracting Officers Representative (COR) resourcing and training, 
3. Competition—Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III 
Transition, 
4. Inadequate contractor business systems, 
5. Subcontractor accountability—LOGCAP, 
6. Afghanistan buildup, 
7. Afghanistan Contracting Command, and 
8. Training and equipping private security contractors. 
The TFWC worked diligently to address as many areas as feasible to improve 
contingency contracting operations. The following are some of the most significant 
accomplishments: 
 The finalization of Joint Publication (JP) 4–10, Operational Contract 
Support, published in 2008 (Joint Staff, 2008). JP 4–10 identifies doctrine 
and policies that serve as a groundwork for joint operations.   
 The DoD took actions to reorganize in order to identify primary contacts 
for contingency operations. The Director, Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy created a dedicated team to support deployed 
personnel. Additionally, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 
Support) engaged in contingency and operational contract support.   
 To enable training, the DoD continued to revise the Defense Contingency 
Contracting Handbook (DPAP, 2012b) to support training and continuity 
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in operations. This handbook provides a framework for all stages of 
contracting and support elements. 
 Formal training courses, continuous learning modules, and documentation 
were created to assist in the preparation of both contracting and non-
contracting personnel. A COR course was created for individuals assigned 
as quality assurance personnel (DoD, 2009). 
The TFWC determined that the DoD was proactive in acquisition reforms prior to 
the CWC. The TFWC identified that 94% of the observations made by the CWC were 
proactively being addressed by the DoD, while the other 6% found the DoD in a reactive 
state (DoD, 2009). 
3. Contracting Intelligence 
Operations in Afghanistan proved to be significantly different than those in Iraq 
and required the Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to place 
special attention on the area of corruption. Several conditions created an environment that 
allowed corruption to flourish, to include “a fragile war economy sustained by 
international aid, security assistance, the narcotics trade; and a society fractured by three 
decades of war; and weak governance institutions” (Headquarters International Security 
Assistance Force [HQ ISAF], 2011). The high levels of corruption threatened the success 
of the ISAF’s mission, and, therefore, had to be addressed. In response, Combined Joint 
Interagency Task Force–Shafafiyat (CJIATF–Shafafiyat) was established in 2010. Led by 
Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, CJIATF–Shafafiyat (Pashto for transparency) 
integrated three existing task forces: CJIATF–Nexus, Task Force Spotlight, and Task 
Force 2010. CJIATF–Nexus was responsible for analyzing “the criminal patronage 
networks, the narcotics trade, and the insurgency as a basis for Afghan and coalition law 
enforcement and military efforts” (ISAF HQ, 2011). Task Force Spotlight and Task Force 
2010 worked closely to increase coordination and oversight of contracting processes and 
ensuring that ISAF understood where funds were going. Task Force Spotlight was 
responsible for dealing with private security companies (ISAF HQ, 2011).   
Task Force 2010 was originally established after surveys were released stating 
that corruption in Afghanistan had nearly doubled in three years. Task Force 2010 
(TF2010) was initially led by RADM Kathleen Dussault, and was tasked with ensuring 
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that money spent in Afghanistan was meeting the counterinsurgency intent. Twenty 
individuals were to follow the flow of contracting dollars from prime to sub-contractors 
and perform financial forensics on contracts and contractors (Abi-Habib & Rosenberg, 
2010). TF2010 enabled commanders and personnel to better understand who they were 
contracting with. TF2010 assisted in recovering over 180,000 pieces of equipment and 
identified over 120 vendors that the government would no longer do business with 
(Schwartz, 2011). Task Force 2010 and Task Force Spotlight were integral to 
implementing COMISAF’s COIN Contracting Guidance issued in September 2010. The 
guidance directed ISAF to 
 understand the role of contracting in COIN; 
 hire Afghans first, buy Afghan products, and build Afghan capacity; 
 know those with whom we are contracting; 
 consult and involve local leaders; 
 develop new partnerships; 
 look beyond cost, schedule, and performance; and 
 invest in oversight and enforce contract requirements (ISAF HQ, 2011). 
To fully implement the guidance, the link between the intelligence and the 
contracting community became critical. The primary challenge was that contracting 
networks lacked transparency since the privity of contracts remained with the U.S. 
government and the prime contractor. There was no system established to identify first, 
who the USG was contracting with at the prime level, and second, who the prime 
contractor was hiring (or subcontracting with) to perform the work (Lyons, 2012). Task 
Force 2010 and Task Force Spotlight partnered with C-JTSCC and others to produce a 
process for vetting, suspending, and debarring numerous companies (ISAF HQ, 2011).  
4. Operational Contract Support 
a. Operational Contract Support Overview 
The increased reliance on contracted support and multiple 
recommendations from oversight committees forced the DoD to look closely at the 
integration of planning for contractors within military operations. Per the Deputy 
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Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support; DASD[PS]) website, DASD (PS) was 
established in 2006 by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Logistics and Material 
Readiness. DASD (PS) was created to establish a program management approach to 
operational-level contract support (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
2012). The John Warner FY 2007 NDAA, Section 854 called for the DoD to place 
increased focus and organizational movement in three specific areas: requirements 
definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting. DASD (PS), 
working with the Joint Staff J4, focused on implementing changes within the DoD to 
improve contract management and visibility of contractors, strengthen interagency 
cooperation, and prepare the non-acquisition military community for contracting duties 
(Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2012)   
Today, the DASD (PS) has become the central organization responsible 
for the oversight and management of what is now known as operational contract support 
(OCS). The DoD defines OCS as “the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, 
services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations along 
with the associated contractor management functions” (Joint Staff, 2008). To fully 
understand the intent of OCS, the following definitions from JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) 
are important to understand: 
Contingency Contracting: the process of obtaining supplies, services, and 
construction from commercial sources via contracting means in support of 
contingency operations … is a subset of contract support integration and 
does not include the requirements development, prioritization, and 
budgeting processes. (p. vi) 
Contract administration: a subset of contracting … the oversight function, 
from contract award to contract close-out, performed by contracting 
professionals and designated noncontracting personnel … during 
contingency operations is referred to as contingency contract 
administration services (CCAS). (p. vi) 
Contractor management: the ability to manage and maintain visibility of 
contractor personnel and associate contractor equipment providing support 
to the joint force in a designated operational area. It is closely related to, 




management of contractor performance in complying with contractor 
personnel-related requirements and the management of the government’s 
responsibilities for life and other support when such support is required. 
(pp. vi–vii) 
b. Doctrine and Policy 
JP 4–10, Operational Contract Support, published by the Joint Staff in 
2008, provides the doctrinal foundation for the integration, synchronization, and 
coordination of all matters relating to OCS. The publication is currently under revision, 
but has not been republished to date. JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) states that contract 
support is “delivered to the joint force through a process comprised of five key tasks: 
planning, requirements determination, contract development, contract execution, and 
contract closeout” (p. v).  
JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) provides multiple definitions that are key to 
understanding the fundamental premise of operational contract support. 
Contingency acquisition is the process of acquiring supplies, services, and 
construction in support of the operations. … From the contracting aspect, 
contingency acquisition begins at the point when a requiring activity 
identifies a specific requirement…which includes proper funding support, 
contract award, and contract administration. (p. I-2) 
Operational contract support is the process of planning for and obtaining 
supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of 
joint operations along with the associated contractor management 
functions. Successful operational contract support is the ability to 
orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contracted support 
and management of contractor personnel. … Contract support integration 
is the coordination and synchronization of contracted support executed in 
a designated operational area in support of the joint force. Contractor 
management is the oversight and integration of contractor personnel and 
associated equipment. … While directly related, contract support 
integration and contractor management are not one-and-the same and both 
require significant JFC oversight. (p. I-2) 
Contingency contracting is the process of obtaining supplies, services, and 
construction from commercial sources via contracting means … [it] is a 
subset of contract support integration and does not include the 
requirements development, prioritization, and budgeting process. (p. I-2) 
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The intent was to provide guidance related to joint operations, not day-to-
day operations typically conducted by the individual Services. Each Service has slightly 
different contracting procedures, which at times makes coordination between them 
difficult. JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) sets the guidelines for inter-Service and inter-agency 
coordination and identifies the applicable command structure associated with joint 
operations. JP 4–10 also calls for early integration of contracting operations with the 
overall joint force logistics support effort. This publication outlines the importance of 
strategic planning efforts for contracting (Joint Staff, 2008). JP 4–10 recognizes the 
difficulty of bringing contractors into contingency operations, while still realizing the 
need for them. JP 4–10 contains significant discussion on the need for proper contract 
administration by both contracting and non-contracting personnel (Joint Staff, 2008).    
In March 2009, the OUSD(AT&L) issued DoDD 3020.49. The directive 
establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for program management for the 
preparation and execution of contingency operation acquisitions. The directive identifies 
OCS as “the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract 
support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the joint force 
within a designated operational area” (OUSD[AT&L], 2009, p. 2). Additionally, program 
management in relation to OCS is identified as “the process of planning, organizing, 
staffing, controlling, and leading the OCS efforts to meet the JFC’s objectives” 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2009, p. 2).   
Since 2008, significant efforts have been made to institutionalize the 
importance of contract support and the integration of OCS in joint operations. In 
December 2008, the CJCS established the Task Force on Dependence on Contractor 
Support in Contingency Operations. The purpose of the TF was threefold:  
 Evaluate the current range and depth of service contract capabilities in 
Iraq, 
 Develop a standardized capabilities-based methodology to document 
linkages between Joint Operational Planning shortfalls and contract, and 
 Identify policy issues that inhibit effective and efficient OCS planning 
processes and recommend changes. (CJCS Dependence on Contractor 
Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2010b)  
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The task force phased the research and assigned three sub-task forces to 
conduct research in specific areas. To date, four major reports have been issued by the 
task force. Task Forces I and II evaluated the range and depth of service contract 
capabilities in Iraq in regard to both security and combat training and other support areas 
dependent on contracted support. The first two reports identified the increased reliance on 
contracted support, but found that the use of such support was appropriate. A key 
recommendation of the first report was to “evaluate operational plans to determine the 
range and depth of contracted capabilities necessary to support the joint force in 
contingencies” (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations 
Task Force, 2011).  
Building on that recommendation, Phase II evaluated other key areas to 
determine the extent of contract support required to conduct contingency operations. 
Phase II mapped contractor support by Tier 1 joint capability area (JCA). The Phase II 
report also cross referenced JCAs to the Uniform Joint Task List (UJTL), which is a task 
library providing the foundation for capabilities-based planning across military 
operations. This cross reference was used to determine whether the contracted support 
was consistent with mission-derived tasks. The report noted that due to the high reliance 
on contracted support in certain JCAs, it is imperative that all echelons of commands 
enhance OCS planning efforts throughout all phases of a campaign (CJCS Dependence 
on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2011). Figure 23 shows 
the DoD dependency on contractor support by Tier 1 JCAs. 
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Figure 23.  Contractor Support within Tier I Joint Capability Areas (From CJCS 
Dependence on Contractor Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 
2010a, p. iv) 
Phase III took on the task of meeting the CJCS goal of planning for 
contractors and contracted support in operational and contingency plans. The task force 
identified that, while contract support was recognized as an important capability, 
planning for deployment and use of contract support was not being recognized in the 
strategic or joint planning system. The final report identified the need for a culture 
change and made the following specific recommendations:  
 Complete OCS planning change recommendations to guidance, policy, 
doctrine, and instruction; 
 Develop repeatable processes and templates to enable OCS planning; 
 Refine change recommendations to the Joint Operation Planning and 
Execution System (JOPES) that enable OCS planning and execution; 
 Refine, adjust, and optimize the Contractor Estimate Tool to develop an 
initial spreadsheet-based proof of concept; 
 Revise and update the OCS UJTL; 
 Develop processes and a systems design and development approach that 
“operationalizes” OCS. 
 Determine functional and informational requirements of OCS planning 
and execution; 
 Update Joint Publication 4–10 to reflect OCS lessons learned and to 
enhance joint doctrine; 
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 Develop and refine joint non-acquisition OCS training and education and 
ensure its inclusion in joint exercises; 
 Identify and assign responsibilities to institutionalize OCS lesson 
development, analysis, documentation and use; 
 Integrate OCS planning and execution in multinational and interagency 
forums and participate in validating events; and 
 Develop the requirements for systems that measure, report, and monitor 
contractor readiness. (CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in 
Contingency Operations Task Force, 2011) 
The results of the task force identified what the IG, GAO, CWC, SIGIR, 
and SIGAR had already identified: The need for contract support to respond to 
contingencies will not disappear and, as such, the DoD must take action to fully integrate 
contractors as part of the planning for the total force.   
c. Integration of Operational Contract Support Into Joint Planning 
JP 3–0 (CJCS, 2011b) identifies joint functions that are comprised of 
related capabilities and activities that assist JFCs in directing joint operations. Integration 
of the joint functions is key to mission success. Joint functions fall within six basic 
groups—command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, 
protection, and sustainment (CJCS, 2011b, p. III-1). As part of the sustainment function, 
logistics is the “integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within 
theater, while scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and materiel to 
support the JFC’s CONOPS.”  Logistics covers the following core capabilities: supply, 
maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, health service support (HSS), 
logistics services, engineering, and OCS (CJCS, 2011b, p. III-35). Based on the core 
capability placement of OCS within logistics, the J4 staff element generally retains the 
responsibility for the integration and synchronization of OCS within CCDR planning 
products.   
Multiple joint and Service organizations are involved with the integration 
of the two OCS constructs (contract support integration and contractor management) 
making it a very complex and challenging process. Increasing the complexity is the fact 
that the JOPES Annex W, entitled Contract Support Integration Plan, requires the input 
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and support from primary and special staff elements, many of which are unfamiliar with 
the contract support integration process and the associated contractor management 
challenges (Joint Staff, 2008, p. I-1). The revised Annex W format, in use since 2009, 
requires greater detail than previous versions such as the following:  
 Greater planning detail regarding the type of support contracts; 
 Required assignment of tasks to the staff directors, service components, 
and combat support agencies; 
 Required mandatory instructions relating to OCS synchronization and 
execution administrative functions;  
 Required Contractor Management Plan, which provides advisory 
directions to cover government-furnished support; and 
 Required detailed contractor, contracting, and contractor management 
estimate by location, phase and capability area. (CJCS J4, 2010, p. 9) 
d. Roles and Responsibilities 
As previously stated, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act 
for FY 2007 assigned responsibility for the development of joint policies relating to 
contract requirements development, contingency program management, contingency 
contracting during combat operations, and post-conflict operations to the DASD (PS). 
The DASD (PS) was to work in coordination with the JSC, and the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]) 
retained responsibility for developing and implementing contingency contracting policies 
(OUSD, 2007). The memorandum can be found in Appendix A. 
The findings of the CJCS Dependence on Contractor Support in 
Contingency Operations Task Force Phase III research resulted in direct action of the 
SECDEF. On January 24, 2011, the action memo entitled Strategic and Operational 
Planning for Operational Contract Support and Workforce Mix was issued by the 
SECDEF. The memo stated, 
The Department of Defense has been, and continues to be, reliant on 
contractors for operational support during contingency operations. … I do 
not expect this to change now or in future contingency operations. … 
Based on the CJCS Task Force’s report findings and recommendations on 
contractor dependency, I consider it prudent to focus attention on OCS as 
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an emergent capability area and direct the Department to undertake the 
following actions regarding force mix, contract support integration, 
planning, and resourcing. (Office of the SECDEF, 2011, p. 1) 
Figure 24 identifies the key roles and responsibilities identified in the 
action memo (which can be found at Appendix B) 
 
Figure 24.  OCS SECDEF Action Memo (From CJCS Dependence on Contractor 
Support in Contingency Operations Task Force, 2011, p. 4) 
Following the SECDEF memo, the Director of the Joint Staff issued a 
Director Joint Staff Memo 0380–11, Implementation of SecDef Memorandum on 
Strategic and Operational Planning for Operational Contract Support (OCS) and 
Workforce Mix (Joint Staff, 2011). The memo identifies specific roles for the Joint Staff 
Directorates (Joint Staff, 2011). The full text of the memorandum can be found at 
Appendix C. 
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To solidify responsibilities and procedures for OCS, DoD Instruction 
(DoDI) 3020.41 (OUSD[AT&L], 2011) was reissued in December 2011. The DoDI 
established policy, responsibilities, and procedures for OCS, to include program 
management, contract support integration, and integration of defense contractor 
personnel into contingency operations. Appendix D contains Enclosure 4 of the DoDI, 
entitled “Responsibilities.” 
e. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office  
As previously stated, the call to action to improve contractor oversight and 
the integration of contract support into contingency operations was longstanding. Lessons 
learned in the operational area and oversight reports led to the OSD establishing the Joint 
Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) in 2008, which ultimately became a 
business service center of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The JCASO website 
states that the JCASO “provides strategic and operational level Operational Contract 
Support (OCS) program management across DoD and the Whole of Government” (DLA, 
2012b). The JCASO also provides support to CCDRs, as requested, to coordinate and 
plan for OCS program activities.   
The premise of the JCASO dates back to 2006, when DUSD(Industrial 
Policy) prepared a concept paper on what was to be identified as the Contingency 
Acquisition Support Office (CASO). Per the draft concept paper, the mission of the 
CASO would be “the direct application of the economic instrument of national power 
towards meeting the objectives of the supported joint force commander” (Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial  Base, 2006). The 
initiative addressed a Deputy Secretary of Defense memo issued on January 22, 2006, 
tasking the USD(AT&L) to “design a new institution to exploit effectively our ‘Fifth 
Force Provider,’ the private sector” (DUSD[Industrial Policy], 2006). While designing 
the organization, it was identified that to be efficient and reduce the duplication of effort 
and skill sets, one central acquisition office should be the focal point for all joint 
acquisition program operations.   
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The concept emerged for a permanent, moderately-sized office…within U.S. Joint 
Forces Command (JFCOM) with strong competencies in contingency contracting 
and program management which could be deployed and expanded to become a 
JCC-like command for any given contingency operations, from initial deployment 
to the end of a conflict or emergency. (DUSD[Industrial Policy], 2006)   
 
Figure 25 shows the initial organizational concept of the CASO found in 
the draft concept paper. 
 
Figure 25.  Original Organizational Makeup for the CASO (After Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial  Base, n.d., p. 7) 
The concept paper (2006) recommended that the CASO should be a staff 
element of JFCOM with the two star reporting directly to the JFCOM commander and 
should be duel-hatted as the HCA. Figure 26 shows the timeline of events for the stand-










Figure 26.  JCASO Evolution (From Joint Contingency Acquisition  
Support Office, 2012, p. 3) 
On December 20, 2011, the CJSC issued a notice regarding the CCDR 
employment of the JCASO. The notice identified the JCASO as an “on-call enabling 
capability providing OCS coordination and integration during peacetime and contingency 
operations” (CJCS, 2011). The JCASO can, as requested, provide a team during 
peacetime and contingency operations, to assist with OCS planning and program 
management. The organization is comprised of two divisions: Operations and Policy. The 
Operations division provides Mission Support Teams (MSTs) and planners embedded 
with the combatant command staffs. The MSTs augment other contracting functions to 
provide OCS expertise. The support configuration of the JCASO during a contingency 
operation is depicted in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27.  JCASO Support Configuration During Contingency Operations  
(From CJCS, 2011c, p. A-5) 
DoDI 3020.41 (OUSD[AT&L], 2005) identifies JCASO’s responsibilities as follows: 
 Provide OCS planning support to the CCDR through Joint OCS Planners 
embedded within the geographic Combatant Command staff. Maintain 
situational awareness of all plans with significant OCS equity for the 
purposes of exercise support and preparation for operational deployment. 
From JCASO forward involvement in exercises and operational 
deployments, develop and submit lessons learned that result in improved 
best practices and planning.  
 When requested, assist the Joint Staff in support of the Chairman’s OCS 
responsibilities.  
 Facilitate improvement in OCS planning and execution through capture 
and review of joint OCS lessons learned. In cooperation with United 
States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), military Services, other DoD 
Components, and interagency partners, collect joint operations focused 




exercises to inform OCS policy and recommend doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTmLPF) 
solutions.  
 Participate in joint exercises, derive OCS best practices from after-action 
reports and refine tactics/techniques/procedures, deployment drills, and 
personal and functional training (to include curriculum reviews and 
recommendations). Assist in the improvement of OCS related policy, 
doctrine, rules, tools, and processes.  
 Provide the geographic CCDRs, when requested, with deployable experts 
to assist the CCDR and subordinate JFCs in managing OCS requirements 
in a contingency environment. 
 Practice continuous OCS-related engagement with interagency 
representatives and multinational partners, as appropriate and consistent 
with existing authorities.  
 Participate in the OCS FCIB to facilitate development of standard joint 
OCS concepts, policies, doctrine, processes, plans, programs, tools, 
reporting, and training to improve effectiveness and efficiency. 
(OUSD[AT&L]), 2005) 
f. Operational Contract Support Planners at the Combatant 
Commands  
As discussed in this review multiple times, the increased reliance on 
contracted support heightened the DoD’s interest in and attention to the need for planning 
and integrating contract support into operational planning. This intensified focus led to 
the DoD making significant changes to deliberate and crisis action planning through 
strategic guidance—the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint 
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP; Sweeney, 2011). The GEF is classified secret/limited 
distribution (SECRET/LIMDIS) and incorporates guidance for security cooperation, 
deliberate planning, global posture, global force management, and nuclear weapons 
planning (Sweeney, 2011). The JSCP provides CCDRs and JCS guidance on 
accomplishing tasks and missions based on military capabilities. The documents work in 
concert and now require CCDRs and military Services to plan for the integration of 
contracted support. The new requirements represent new mandates and work for the 
CCMD and military Services (CJCS J4, 2012). As shown in Figure 12 the CCMDs have 
an organizational staff structure broken down by function. OCS has been designated the 
responsibility of the J4, Director for Operations and Logistics.   
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CJCS J4 recently released an OCS manpower study in response to a 
SECDEF memo in which he “directed his staff and the CJCS to focus attention on OCS 
as an emergent capability area and to undertake actions regarding contract support 
integration, planning, and resourcing” (Joint Staff J4, 2012, p. I-1). The study examined 
the demand signals from Congress, the DoD, CJCS, doctrine, military Service guidance 
and other sources, requiring well-trained OCS planning and analytical personnel. The 
CJCS J4 contacted the Joint Staff J1, J3, J4, J5, and J7; DCMA; JCASO; National 
Defense University (NDU); CCMD J4 staffs; the military Service’s manpower offices; 
and OCS functional proponents for inputs regarding current OCS-related force structure 
actions (Joint Staff J4, 2012, p. I–4). To formulate a standardized manning template, 
USNORTHCOM and USCENTCOM J4 Contracting Division structures and subject-
matter expert (SME) input were combined to create the following benchmark for OCS 
planning staff at the CCMD: 
 1 senior policy supervisory analyst, 
 3 analysts, 
 2 planners, and 
 1 military officer. 
Currently, the two planner positions are filled by JCASO planners. The 
report recommends the JCASO planners be realigned to directly report to the CCDR. In 
addition to CCMD staffs, the report recommends personnel requirements for sub-unified 
commands, Service Component commands, and the Joint Staff J4 (Joint Staff J4, 2012). 
The report identifies a mutual skill set for planners and analysts: planning, acquisition, 
logistics or other JCA, and operations. There is a footnote in the report stating, 
OCS does not require acquisition certification, but some level of 
acquisition knowledge is recommended in all OCS-related 
positions….because the OCS planner may at times advise…on how to best 
close an operational gap or implement a course of action with a 
contracting solution. (Joint Staff J4, 2012, p. 4–9) 
Appendix E provides the full list of identified responsibilities and skill, 
knowledge, and experience requirements for OCS analysts and planners. The study also 
outlines the OCS competency model identifying the competencies at the strategic and 
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operational level, this list can be viewed at Appendix F (Joint Staff J4, 2012). The 
conclusion of the study captures the essence of the OCS issues:  
Without adequate force structure, OCS will remain fragmented. Efforts to 
improve oversight will fail because of a patchwork of organizational 
structures and manning that lacks proper skills or background. Past 
mistakes will repeat when the next conflict requires contract support to fill 
operational gaps. (Joint Staff J4, 2012, p. 5–2) 
H. SUMMARY 
In this literature review, we have attempted to provide a strong foundation for our 
research by reviewing the meaning of contracting—both in commercial industry and the 
DoD—the meaning of contingency contracting, the way in which the DoD’s 
organizational structure compliments contingency operations, the major findings of 
oversight committees, as well as major initiatives underway by the DoD to improve 
contingency operations and OCS management. Our research focuses on lessons learned 
from the strategic leaders responsible for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which cover 
a significant array of topics and subjects. In this review, we provided the informational 




In this chapter, we explain how data were collected and analyzed to meet our 
research objectives and, ultimately, answer our research questions, which were 
introduced in Chapter I. Specifically, we describe our methods for choosing our first and 
subsequent groups of interviewees, formulating questions used during the interviews, 
grouping the results into a framework, and analyzing the results utilizing the groupings to 
determine recommendations.    
Motivated by the 2012 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s call in A Profession 
of Arms to “reflect on our experiences during the past 10 years to assess the impact and 
understand both our strengths and weaknesses,” and the necessity to, “see ourselves so 
we can determine how we should adapt and institutionalize the lessons of the last decade” 
(Dempsey, 2012), we were motivated to choose an area of research within contingency 
contracting that had the utmost relevancy and urgency within the Department of Defense. 
After conducting an extensive search of published documents on contingency contracting 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, we learned that the vast majority of studies and articles dated 
within the past decade only addressed issues during a specific “snapshot” in time, usually 
within a 12-month timeframe. Furthermore, we concluded from our search that nothing 
had been published that captured contingency contracting lessons learned from an 
executive DoD perspective within the past 10 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The absence of such a critical document is what ultimately led us down the path of our 
current research. Capturing the lessons learned from the current DoD leaders will assist in 
establishing the foundation needed to improve the DoD for future leaders and ensure the 
same challenges are not repeated. 
B. KEY ORGANIZATIONS 
Our intent with this research was to capture the DoD executive perspective 
regarding contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based upon the  
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purpose of our research, and its qualitative nature, we made the determination that we 
needed a wide variety of inputs to ensure we captured the true essence of the historical 
accounts.   
As such, we determined the key organizations would be those responsible for the 
execution of contingency contracting operations, supported commands (customers), 
oversight commissions, and those responsible for management of operations. The 
selection of key organizations was expanded as we obtained data and additional 
information from interviewees.   
We determined the initial set of key organizations to be the following: 
CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC, previously JCC-
I/A), Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF), the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) in Iraq and Afghanistan, Joint 
Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), and Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy (DPAP). After conducting the initial interviews and our research 
became more focused on operational contract support, the following were identified as 
key organizations: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support) (DASD 
[PS]), Joint Staff J4 OCS Staff, and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and 
associated Service commands.   
C. INTERVIEW DESIGN 
To collect lessons learned, we determined we would be conducting topical 
qualitative interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). The purpose of these interviews was to 
capture what, when, and why things happened during contingency contracting operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how we can improve for the future. We recognized at the 
beginning the results of the qualitative interviews would shape the research design 
gradually and that focus areas that seemed important at the beginning of our research 
would potentially be of little consequence further in the study. As such, we remained 
flexible in our approach and selection of interviewees and interview questions. The 
interviews were conducted in an iterative process, meaning the results of each group were 
gathered, analyzed, and grouped, which led to the next group of interviewees (Rubin & 
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Rubin, 1995). Based on this process, we ultimately determined the primary focus of the 
later interviews was operational contract support and the integration of contracting into 
the deliberate and crisis action planning process.  
D. INTERVIEWEE SELECTION PROCESS 
To capture an executive-level perspective of lessons learned from the past 11 
years of contingency contracting from OIF, OEF, and OND, we determined interviewees 
would be individuals who had served in a senior leadership capacity within one of the 
key organizations or who were responsible for a specific function within those 
organizations. Our interviews focused primarily on general/flag officers, senior executive 
service members, congressionally appointed commissioners, and senior contracting 
officials.   
To capture lessons learned, the first logical step (after an extensive literature 
review) was to interview the past and present commanders of  C-JTSCC (previously 
JCC-I/A), CWC commissioners, JCASO, and DPAP. To obtain different opinions of 
contingency contracting support we asked the commanders of C-JTSCC to provide 
names of general/flag officers they supported during operations, which formed the 
customer perspective foundation for our second round of interviews. As we continued our 
interviews, we identified emerging themes that led us to interview OUSD(PS), Joint Staff 
J4 OCS Staff, and USPACOM. A full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix G.  
E. REPRESENTATIVE QUESTIONS 
One of the primary goals in qualitative interviews is to obtain results that are 
deep, detailed, vivid, and nuanced. Depth refers to obtaining a thoughtful answer 
supported by significant evidence, while detailed refers to the ability to obtain particulars 
by refocusing questions and asking specifics. Vivid and nuanced are similar in that 
vividness is represented by obtaining the emotional feelings of the interviewee during a 
particular event, and nuanced refers to precision in description (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). In 
order to encourage detailed information, we created interview questions that encouraged 
in-depth discussion. The questions were not necessarily asked in the order presented;  
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however, the discussion led the order of the questions. All efforts were made to address 
all questions throughout the course of the interviews to ensure consistent discussions 
were held with each interviewee. 
Because the interviewees were engaged with contingency contracting operations 
at different times, capacities, and levels, we tailored the questions slightly to each group 
of interviewees. We generated six lists of representative questions for each of the major 
categories of interviewees: contracting personnel, JCASO, Commission on Wartime 
Contracting, supported customers, DPAP, and Program Support. Representative 
interview questions are shown in Appendix H.  
F. FRAMEWORK 
Once the data (literature review and interviews) were collected, we categorized 
the results and identified lessons learned using DOTmLPF-P (doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy) and/or the 
six-phase contract management process. Because we recognized early in our research that 
a joint non-materiel solution would most likely result from our analysis, the DOTmLPF-P 
provided us with the necessary framework to correctly analyze our recommendations in 
the same manner in which all joint non-materiel solutions are generated within the DoD. 
For all contracting-specific lessons learned, the resulting data were categorized within the 
six phases of the contract management process: procurement planning, solicitation 
planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract closeout 
(Rendon, 2007). Between these two frameworks, we were able to successfully “bucket” 
the data that resulted from our interviews. 
G. ANALYTICAL PROCESS 
We used an analytical approach to analyze the data collected from our interviews. 
Fully acknowledging that the results of our interviews would generate a wide range of 
lessons learned, our goal was to identify common threads within the interview groups, 
reveal those common threads, and recommend changes as necessary. Our assumption was 
that, because no other research publication incorporated as many senior leader/executive 
perspectives associated with contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
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any common threads identified among the interview groups would be significant. The 
results of the interviews did not disappoint and common threads were in fact identified, 
thus giving us a strong basis to provide recommendations based on conclusions made 
from the data. 
H. SUMMARY 
In Chapters I through III, we provided the foundation for our research. In Chapter 
I, we introduced our research and established why the research is relevant. In Chapter II, 
we presented the results of an intensive literature review to provide a thorough 
foundation of how contracting is currently viewed within industry and the Department of 
Defense. Chapter II also introduced contingency contracting, major oversight findings 
and recommendations, and provided an overview of current operational contract support 
initiatives. And in this chapter we provided the method of data collection and analysis in 
terms of the interview design, selection of interviewees, and the analysis of the resulting 
data. In the next four chapters, we present our findings, analysis, recommendations, and 
areas for further research. 
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IV. FINDINGS 
The transformation of contracting in Iraq is a textbook case where this 
new organization and concept of support needs to be incorporated into 
joint doctrine and not lost in the trash heap of good ideas. (Cunnane, 2005, 
p. 47) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of our study was to gather lessons learned from strategic leaders 
associated with contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this chapter, we first 
present the evolution of C-JTSCC based on input received from commanders of the 
organization and our literature review to address our secondary research question: How 
have the organization and operations of C-JTSCC evolved since its inception in 2004?  
Next we present the findings resulting from an evaluation of the common themes 
identified in our data regarding lessons learned. These finding represent the senior-level 
lessons learned over the past 11 years. Finally, we explain the root cause analysis we 
conducted on the lessons learned to determine if there was one contributing factor that 
could have addressed many of the challenges faced during operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
Our intent in capturing lessons learned was to obtain open and honest feedback 
from those responsible for operations. As such, the presentation of our findings does not 
specifically attribute provided quotes to individual interviewees; rather identification is 
made as to whether the individual was a contracting or non-contracting senior leader.   
B. EVOLUTION OF THE C-JTSCC FROM 2003 TO 2012 
1. Early History of Joint Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 
“Contracting support, like every other aspect of Operation Iraqi Freedom’s 
stabilization and reconstruction operations, had to evolve and adapt in order to meet the 
commander’s intent and support a mission that was under estimated in size, complexity, 
duration, and intensity” (Cunnane, 2005). The past 10 years of executive-level 
contracting leadership on the battlefield displayed essential and dauntless efforts to 
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evolve theater contract support to the warfighter, while simultaneously shaping the 
capabilities of the contracting command. The following paragraphs capture the history of 
the CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command from the early days of the 
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), to the inception of Joint Contracting Command 
Iraq/Afghanistan, to how the organization stands in 2012.   
Shortly after the initial invasion into Iraq in March 2003, MNF-I leadership 
discovered the immediate need for additional contracting officers and managers. On May 
21, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the 
Executive Agent for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)-type contracts and in-theater contracting were 
utilized to support combat operations. Initial Iraq reconstruction efforts were planned 
through the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and later, 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). At the request of the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, the Project Contracting Office (PCO) was formed to provide direct contracting 
support to the CPA (Williams & Roddin, 2006). Early operations under the CPA were 
criticized for wasteful spending, limited oversight, and rogue CCOs conducting 
contracting operations with little direction (Cha, 2004).   
By late 2003, the planned transfer to the Iraqi Interim Government eventually 
phased out the need for the CPA, but the efforts of the PCO continued. The demand for 
contract support in theater continued to increase. In June 2004, as the PCO continued to 
support contracting efforts for Iraq’s reconstruction, the push to increase the CPA’s 
contracting capability began by integrating program managers and contract managers. 
These construction efforts included the following: restoration of electrical services and 
power generation; water treatment and pumping facilities; sewage treatment and 
processing plants; health clinics and hospital refurbishment; roads and bridges; and 
schools. At the same time, multiple contracting activities were being established to 
provide theater contract support, none of which coordinated or communicated their 
efforts (Houglan, 2006a). Because contracting efforts were not synchronized, it was 
nearly impossible for the U.S. government to benefit from more efficient contracting 
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methods (i.e., strategic sourcing) that would allow contracting officers to leverage buying 
power and available resources. Instead, contracting officers often competed with each 
other for contracted resources. It became evident that a unified effort with one 
responsible organization was needed to improve contract operations (D’Angelo, Houglan, 
& Ruckwardt, 2007). 
2. The Establishment of JCC-I/A 
In November 2004, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) issued fragmentary 
order (FRAGO) 09–668, establishing Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-I) with the 
intent to consolidate contracting efforts within the country (D’Angelo et al., 2007), while 
providing contracting transparency to the warfighter (Houglan, 2006b). JCC-I, a direct 
reporting unit to MNF-I, officially began operations on January 29, 2005. JCC-I began 
the consolidation of contracting efforts on the battlefield by combining the MNF-I 
Principle Assistant Responsible for Contracting-Forces (PARC-F) and PCO Principle 
Assistance Responsible for Contracting-Reconstruction (PARC-R) efforts under a single 
command structure. PARC-R continued to support PCO and Multi-National Security 
Transition Command (MNSTC-I), while PARC-F maintained responsibility for 
contracting support to MNF-I and MNC-I. JCC-I then began coordinating contract efforts 
with the II Marine Expeditionary Force, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Central Air 
Force. The staff’s consolidation efforts resulted in regular meetings with the PCO, State 
Department, USAID, and JCC-I to attempt to promote focused contracting efforts and 
transparency. These meetings were conducted ad hoc, as efforts to officially include the 
PCO, State Department, and USAID as part of JCC-I were unsuccessful. Figure 28 
represents the organizational structure of contingency contracting in 2004. 
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Figure 28.  Joint Contracting Command—Iraq Organizational Chart  
(From Cunnane, 2005, p. 52) 
In July 2005,  USCENTCOM leadership wanted JCC-I to assume control of 
contracting operations in Afghanistan. As a result, CENTCOM FRAGO 07–790 was 
issued, which consolidated operations in Iraq and Afghanistan under the same command, 
resulting in JCC-I becoming JCC-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). JCC-I/A was now a Major 
Subordinate Command (MSC) to both U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I) and Combined Forces 
Command–Afghanistan (CFC-A). With this FRAGO, the task of coordinating contracting 
efforts between both theaters began. The restated mission of JCC-I/A now reflected 
responsive contracting support to U.S. and coalition partners, both directly supporting the 
warfighter and the reconstruction of the applicable area of operations. Additionally, the 
leadership recognized the applicability of a joint command by stating, “The JCC model 
could easily serve as the contracting support template for future Combatant Command 
missions” (Houglan, 2006b, p. 20).   
While the creation of JCC-I/A overcame many significant challenges faced by 
CCOs in theater, multiple problems still existed due to a lack of unity among the Service 
agencies and between the two AORs. FRAGO 09–1117 addressed these issues. Each 
 89
Service was required to update their contracting relationships with USCENTCOM to help 
build the needed continuity. The end state envisioned within the FRAGO had three main 
objectives (D’Angelo et al., 2007): 
 Integrate warfighter campaign plans and strategy and achieve effects 
through contracting that further support the warfighters’ objectives; 
 Achieve unity of effort and economies of scale that exemplify best 
business practices, and serve as a model for commerce in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; and 
 Create synergy with economic activities in local private and public 
sectors, serving as a catalyst for economic growth and the resulting peace. 
Figure 29 provides an overview of the resulting command and control authority 
resulting from FRAGO 09–117. 
 
Figure 29.  Contracting Command and Control as a Result of FRAGO 09–117  
(From D.A. Scott, personal communication, 2012) 
With JCC-I/A established as a true joint contracting command, the focus turned to 
improving operations through Effects-Based Contracting (EBC) with the goal of linking 
the organization tightly to maneuver commanders to synchronize contracting resources 
and capabilities in time, space, and purpose in order to achieve the desired battlefield 
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effects. U.S. Air Force Major General Darryl Scott’s intent behind EBC was to 
synchronize contract execution with a commander’s intent by aligning JCC-I/A priorities 
with the combatant commander’s theater priorities. This required the contracting process 
to be an active part of operations/mission planning so that the desired operational and 
tactical goals were understood and translated into effective contracting actions (DCMA, 
2006).   Regional Contracting Centers (RCCs) were realigned to better support 
operational planning and enabled the RCC to adapt and mobilize alongside their fast-
paced and high OPTEMPO customer. Battlefield circulation to all FOBs and RCC 
locations was regularly conducted to ensure warfighters received the best contracting 
support. At the strategic level, JCC-I/A facilitated MNF-I’s “Iraqi First Program,” which 
supported the country’s economic expansion. Overall, the command continued to focus 
on reconstruction efforts and building JCC-I/A’s capabilities. Regional Contracting 
Centers were augmented as necessary within theater to support theater priorities. With the 
effects-based contracting ethos infused throughout the organization, and its effects 
closely tied to success on the battlefield, contracting was now being viewed as an enabler 
that was vital to mission accomplishment. Figure 30 provides an overview of the 
organization of JCC-I/A in 2006. 
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Figure 30.  JCC-I/A Support Structure  
(From D.A. Scott, personal communication, 2012) 
As the contracting environment began to mature in Iraq, so did the need for 
standardized internal control and management. In January 2008, in light of events 
involving contractor performance of security service contracts in theater, JCC-I/A 
focused on building JCC-I/A’s contractor oversight and internal audit capabilities. This 
task involved increasing the capabilities and expertise of the Procurement Management 
Teams that conducted battlefield circulation to each FOB and RCC to ensure proper 
contractor oversight and contract administration of service contracts. The teams also 
conducted Procurement Management Reviews to ensure RCC compliance with statutory 
regulations. JCC-I/A also vastly increased its oversight capabilities by infusing the 
automated contract writing capability, giving the command an up-to-date common 
operating picture and standardization of contract actions throughout theater. The 
development of Procurement Management Teams and automated contract capability 
increased JCC-I/A’s overall effectiveness on the battlefield.  
By February 2009, JCC-I/A was an effects-based contracting organization that 
possessed a bolstered internal contract oversight capability. The Administration had 
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announced an 18-month withdrawal window for combat forces in Iraq and an increase of 
troop levels in Afghanistan. MNF-I shifted focus towards the drawdown of forces in Iraq, 
while USFOR-A was focused on preparing for surge operations. Contracting’s immutable 
role in daily operations within both theaters made it imperative that JCC-I/A be involved 
in the planning process of MNF-I, USFOR-A, and CENTCOM to ensure a successful and 
responsible drawdown in Iraq, increased combat contracting capability in Afghanistan to 
support the surge, and the necessary relocation and restructuring of the Iraq-based 
contracting command. To ensure synchronization of planning efforts within the MNF-I, 
USFOR-A, and CENTCOM staffs, a strategic planning cell was established within the 
JCC-I/A staff. This strategic focus enabled JCC-I/A to not only focus tactical and 
operational contracting efforts towards the strategic objectives set forth in the Iraq First / 
Afghan First Programs, but also to, more importantly, plan one to two years ahead. This 
outward focus was vital to planning the movement and restructuring of JCC-I/A. The 
drawdown in Iraq meant the eventual culmination of MNF-I, JCC-I/A’s (reporting) unit. 
With support to upcoming surge operations in Afghanistan in mind, as well as the lessons 
learned in Iraq still relevant, the decision was made to elevate JCC-I/A to a direct 
reporting unit under USCENTCOM with two subordinate contracting units, Senior 
Contracting Official–Iraq (SCO-I) and Senior Contracting Official–Afghanistan (SCO-
A).   JCC-I/A would be relocated to Qatar and co-located with CENTCOM’s deployed 
headquarters. Figure 31 provides a snapshot of JCC-I/A in 2010 prior to the 




Figure 31.  JCC-I/A Theater Support—January 2010  
(From W.N. Phillips, personal communication, 2012) 
3. The Emergence of C-JTSCC 
With the announcement of the end of combat operations in Iraq on the horizon, 
JCC-I/A was still entrenched into the three main planning efforts of troop withdrawal 
from Iraq, troop surge in Afghanistan, and the relocation/reorganization of the 
headquarters. In concert with the troop withdraw and transition to full Iraqi control, OIF’s 
three major commands, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I, were merged in January 2010 to 
become the United States Forces–Iraq (USF-I), posturing to serve in the new advise, 
train, and assist role. Contracting’s role within the JLPSBs was key to synchronizing the 
responsible Iraq drawdown. CCO support capabilities were being contracted and 
expanded within Iraq and Afghanistan to provide continued support to COIN operations 
as needed.   The headquarters relocation to Qatar was concurrently being initiated, 
marking the transition and organizational shift to provide support from USCENTCOM.   
By January 2011, SCO-Iraq was now partnered with USF-I, SCO-A was 
partnered with ISAF, and the organization formerly known as JCC-I/A was now re-
flagged as CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command. The re-flagging to 
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C-JTSCC initiated the elevation of the Commander to O-8 / Flag Officer and SCO-I and 
SCO-A billets to O-7 / Flag Officers. This change gave the C-JTSCC Commander and 
subordinate commanders enough stature to sit at the “big table” to effectively represent 
the contracting command to focus on the strategic efforts of USCENTCOM, Operation 
New Dawn, and Operation Enduring Freedom. This change also facilitated an even 
further integration of contracting within all planning efforts. The integration of SCO-I 
was instrumental in USF-I achieving the president’s Iraq withdrawal deadline of 
December 2011. The integration of SCO-A within ISAF facilitated the successful 
implementation of COIN contracting and further complimented the efforts the Combined 
Joint Interagency Task Force (CJITF)–Shafafiyat. As the remaining U.S. forces departed 
Iraq, SCO-I was converted to SCO-Qatar and co-located with the C-JTSCC Headquarters 
to focus on providing support to theater contracting and capturing lessons learned.  
4. C-JTSCC Today 
Today, C-JTSCC provides responsive and effective theater contracting support to 
the Combined Joint Operations Areas (CJOA) of Afghanistan as well as coordination 
authority over all Department of Defense contracting activities operating in Afghanistan, 
Kuwait, and Pakistan in order to provide unity of contracting effort and support 
USCENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation plans and activities (C-JTSCC, 2012c). 
This contract support aids NATO’s primary objective in Afghanistan to enable the 
Afghan government to provide effective security across the country in order to ensure 
Afghanistan can never again become a haven for terrorists (NATO, 2012). In addition to 
orchestrating and synchronizing the provision of integrated contracted support to the 
USCENTCOM Commander, C-JTSCC coordinates the activities necessary to deploy, 
receive, manage, and redeploy contractor personnel, and has two subordinate commands: 
Senior Contracting Official–Afghanistan (SCO-A) and Senior Contracting Official–





Figure 32.  2012 C-JTSCC Structure (From C-JTSCC, 2012b) 
From its original inception in 2004, C-JTSCC has been known for its ability to 
adapt with the ongoing developments on the battlefield, playing a defining role in the 
reconstruction and drawdown from Iraq, to the continuing reconstruction and eventual 
withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. As USCENTCOM continues to be engaged 
throughout the AOR, C-JTSCC will remain vital to its overall mission success and 
accomplishment. Figure 33 provides a list of the commanders of contingency contracting 








CONTRACTING COMMANDERS IN IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN 
RANK / NAME SERVICE DATES NOTES 
COL Anthony B. Bell U.S. Army Jul 2003 – Jun 2005 ORHA / CPA 
BG Stephen M. Seay U.S. Army Jun 2004 – Jan 2005 CPA 
Major General John M. Urias U.S. Army Jan 2005 – Jan 2006 JCC-I/A 
Major General Darryl A. Scott U.S. Air Force Jan 2006 – Jan 2008 JCC-I/A 
Rear Admiral Kathleen M. Dussault U.S. Navy Jan 2008 – Feb 2009 JCC-I/A 
Brigadier General William N. Phillips U.S. Army Feb 2009 – Jan 2010 JCC-I/A 
Brigadier General Camille M. Nichols U.S. Army Jan 2010 – Mar 2011 C-JTSCC 
Rear Admiral Nicholas T. Kalathas U.S. Navy Mar 2011 – Feb 2012 C-JTSCC 
Major General Robert M. Brown U.S. Army Feb 2012 – present C-JTSCC 
Figure 33.  List of Iraq/Afghanistan Contracting Commanders 
C. MAJOR FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS 
As outlined in Chapter III, we categorized the lessons learned from interviews 
into the DOTmLPF-P or six phases of the contract management process based on 
whether the data were contract execution related or not. After compiling the individual 
lessons learned, we evaluated the data in each category to determine the common trends 
within each category. In this section, we present these common trends of our findings to 
address our primary research question. Further analysis of each area regarding the 
integration of OCS and contingency contracting for each DOTmLPF-P category is also 
found in Chapter V. 
1. Doctrine: The Way the DoD Conducts Operations 
The majority of interviewees identified the lack of doctrinal guidance on how to 
effectively perform joint contingency contracting operations as a major challenge to 
effectively managing operations early on. The JTSCC construct has been a result of hard 
lessons learned and growing pains. 
Our greatest contribution to those that will follow in our footsteps is to 
ensure that the lessons learned today are properly incorporated into Joint 
Doctrine so that mistakes and inefficiencies are not repeated in the future. 
(DCMA, 2006, p. 29) 
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Interviewees also identified the need to recognize contracting as more than 
writing contracts. Contingency contracting has become a catalyst of mission success 
during stability and reconstruction operations. Helping operational commanders 
understand how to effectively utilize contracting as an enabler is key to improving 
contracting operations in the future. 
It became way more than just writing contracts and supporting through 
contracting. There was a real change that took place there, but there wasn’t 
really any doctrine at that point. We just knew we had to be relevant and 
be more value added than just writing contracts. (Interviewee I) 
I think that our COCOMs still need to recognize that contractors and 
contracting are very important to them in the warfighting environment, 
that they truly can’t do anything unless they have a contracting officer 
there with them. I think that organizationally our leaders need to 
appreciate that and instead of fighting it, we need to learn how to embrace 
it and really use it as a tool. (Interviewee G) 
The memo that General Petraeus provided back in September 2010 
said…for the first time, “Hey, you guy…there is a strategic construct here 
at play and contracting is a big deal.”  To have the father of the 
counterinsurgency doctrine for the Department of Defense put that in 
writing…wow! (Interviewee H) 
2. Organization: The Way the DoD is Organized to Conduct Operations 
At the onset of combat operations, contingency contracting capability was task 
organized directly to the units they supported. No organization existed that provided 
unity of effort to contracting efforts on the battlefield. It is critical to have the 
organizational structure in place on day one of execution, not years later. 
With the recognition of contracting as a key enabler resulting in non-kinetic 
effects, many interviewees question the placement of contracting. Historically, 
contracting has been nested with the J4 community on the Joint and combatant command 
staff. This should be addressed to improve the integration of contracting in the future.  
I guess overall the theme I would say is we were really trying to get inside 
the operational decision cycle and MNF-I and MNC-I to provide 
operational contract support planning to their staff, which they didn’t 
have. (Interviewee I) 
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I think contracting being…buried in the J4, it loses its value…Although 
you could say that anything with sustainment is in fact in the J4. That’s 
kind of a stretch, because our warfighters don’t see it that way when 
[contracting] is buying linguists … intel analysts … cell phone support.  
(Interviewee Q) 
Organizational changes have been implemented recently to address concerns 
raised early in operations. However, there seems to be disagreement on the future 
effectiveness of those changes. Specifically, concerns were raised regarding the creation, 
placement, and mission of the JCASO. Further discussion is provided in Chapter V.   
3. Training: How the Department of Defense Prepares our Forces to 
Fight 
Interviewees agreed that there is serious need for the DoD to figure out the 
appropriate construct to ensure contingency contracting is incorporated into joint 
exercises. Ensuring the plan for theater contract support is executable before operations 
begin is imperative to success. Contracting often exercises outside of the joint exercise 
construct, which segregates it from the operational community. There must be exercise 
inputs that integrate the warfighter with contingency contracting. This should happen not 
only for the execution of contingency contracting, but also for contract administration 
and oversight.  
Marker number two [for success of integration of OCS into the culture of 
the DoD] will be on joint exercises, how many MSELs [master scenario 
events lists] that you have as part of the exercise that…include the 
contractor component. (Interviewee AL) 
If you are going to exercise a contractor, you have to change how you 
write that contract to put that in there as a requirement. And, oh, by the 
way, who’s paying for it? (Interviewee AC) 
If we put into our exercises more of the OCS construct based on the 
history that we have documented for each COCOM, then we have got the 
COCOM prepared. (Interviewee D) 
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4. Materiel: The Necessary Equipment Needed by our Forces to Fight 
and Operate Effectively 
Leaders expressed the need for a network/database that captures all critical 
contracting information in theater that would assist in planning and decision-making. The 
database would provide a common list of vendors, a list of debarred vendors, types of 
contracts executed within each area of operation, and their associated contracting officer 
representatives. Additionally, the database should provide other critical information that 
provides leaders a common operating picture of contract operations within their battle-
space.   
They had set up a contracts database where all the active contracts in Iraq 
were being kept. You could see who the COR was, how many people, 
what locations were associated with each contract, when they expired, 
when they were stood up, and so we used that. Then, during the rehearsals, 
they could show you the drawdown of contractors over time based on 
when these services ended, and then we could go in and figure out why 
this contractor wasn’t ramping down as quickly as he should. (Interviewee 
AF) 
We don’t have the suite of automated tools that we need to really make 
this [speaking on integrating contingency contracting execution and 
contractor management] happen. There are really three pieces to this 
whole package. There is the operational contract support piece…which is 
the execution. That is the fact we have been concentrating on because we 
have been in the fight and we have had to improve the way we do business 
and we have had to avoid wasting money. … There are two other 
pieces…the contingency program management piece, which is the 
integration of everything…[t]hen the other piece that is even further up 
front, and that is the requirements definition process. (Interviewee L) 
In addition to having a common operating picture, tools and resources to improve 
contract oversight should be pursued. Contract administration was difficult with the lack 
of experience of government personnel and qualified contracting officer representatives. 
Having tools in place to support improved contract administration and oversight is key to 
combating fraud, waste, and abuse. 
We are trying to get our hands over the automated tools that were created 
during the fight…we’re trying to sort out what we need to keep.  
(Interviewee AL) 
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5. Leadership and Education: The Way DoD Prepares our Leaders to 
Lead and Conduct Contract Operations 
The majority of interviewees agreed that ground commanders did not understand 
contracting at the onset of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the initial years of 
operations, contracting was not a major consideration during planning. Most non-
contracting interviewees stated that their first experiences with contracting did not occur 
until they arrived in theater, and that pre-deployment exposure would have been 
extremely useful in preparing them for what they experienced. Significant credit was 
given to U.S. Army General (Retired) David H. Petraeus’ COIN Contracting Guidance 
(COMISAF, 2010) and Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapon System (CALL, 
2009) as instrumental in advocating the importance of contracting’s effects on the 
battlefield.  
Educating the entire force on the importance of contracting and the role each 
member plays in the process is imperative, not only to improved contingency contracting 
operations but also to ensure that commanders understand their role in managing 
contractors on the battlefield and providing oversight of contracts. Contracting out a 
requirement does not alleviate the need to manage it. Commanders must understand this. 
We [the DoD] create a requirement, just because we contract is out, it 
doesn’t get rid of the fact that it’s still our requirement. We contract it out 
and we have to oversee it, so it doesn’t disappear out of a commander’s 
purview.  (Interviewee X) 
But, to me, the biggest single thing is one of education and training, and 
it’s not education and training of the contracting officer that I’m worried 
about. (Interviewee M) 
A lot of times it was commanders not understanding the degree to which 
the way they do contracting and the way they spend money in their area, 
either to reinforce or undermine their mission. So, you know, the 
contracting officer knows the cost, schedule, performance, but really the 
commander has to look at the effect of that contract on the local area and 
in regard to contracting in any kind of the military operation. We write this 
in, obviously, to the Contracting Guidance saying his commander did this 
and so forth and to treat it like an operation and everything else. I think 
that’s what continues to be the problem. (Interviewee AI) 
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It keeps coming back to education. I honestly think we need to start at the 
academies, all the way up through the senior war colleges, and educate on 
how you manage a workforce on a battlefield that is comprised of military, 
civilian, and contractor employees. Contracting Official (Interviewee M) 
6. Personnel: The DoD’s Availability of Qualified Personnel for 
Peacetime, Wartime, and Various Contingency Operations 
There were three primary areas identified in regard to personnel. First, 
interviewees identified the need to have trained and qualified CCOs available to 
adequately support the full range of contingency contracting support. Second, to provide 
contract oversight there must be qualified and trained contracting officer representatives 
available. And finally, in order to effectively integrate contracting into the operational 
tempo, there must be a senior-level advocate to gain appropriate access to other senior 
leaders.   
A common thread identified in regard to personnel was the overall lack of 
qualified CCOs to support the demand signal generated during combat operations. At the 
onset of the war, the Air Force possessed the majority of qualified CCOs, and, in essence, 
provided the majority of the workforce. While the Army and Navy made enormous 
strides on building contingency contracting capability, the Air Force continued to provide 
the additional contracting forces. Interviewees also cited that the recently produced 
workforce that resulted from the Gansler Commission have increased the effectiveness of 
contingency contracting support on the battlefield and have alleviated the strain on the 
Air Force CCO workforce.  
You send a contracting officer in who has not been trained to actually 
write a contract and doesn’t understand their rules well enough and is 
uncertain on what they can do or not do, well, you’re going to do some 
dumb stupid stuff. I mean, you don’t send a rookie into a fight, right? 
(Interviewee M) 
In contracting…we don’t teach people to be contracting leaders…we just 
teach how to be a contracting officer and the rest of it you figure out as 
you work in contracting. (Interviewee L) 
Look what is behind the certification because if someone is Level 2 
DAWIA certified, that means they spent a year in school and a year in 
training…I want to see what experience is behind that. (Interviewee R) 
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The majors, captains, Navy lieutenants and GS-12s are solving 
unprecedented problems every day, and we ought to hang medals on all of 
them. But if we make their successors solve the same problems, all of us 
senior folk ought to be fired! (Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 8) 
In addition to have having qualified CCOs, the DoD must look at the COR 
structure currently being utilized. Contracting out a requirement may result in a decreased 
need to maintain organic capability for the mission; however, it does not alleviate the 
need to provide the appropriate oversight. CORs were often assigned the responsibility of 
contract oversight as an additional duty and rarely had the appropriate expertise to 
provide oversight on the contracts assigned. There have been efforts to improve this 
process, but options must continue to be explored for future operations.  
There are still a lot of problems where we’ve got somebody as the COR on 
the contract and he’s doing eight other things and it’s just a part-time 
responsibility. So you can assign a COR against every contract and look 
good on paper and you may not be covering the waterfront in terms of 
having the right number of resources on it. (Interviewee I) 
Institutionalize contracting officer representatives.  (Interviewee B) 
The weakest link we have to ensuring adequate performance on a contract 
is the COR situation. (Interviewee D) 
7. Facilities: The DoD’s Property, Installations, and Industrial Facilities 
That Support our Forces to Conduct Contracting During 
Contingencies 
There no findings to present regarding facilities.   
8. Policy: The DoD’s Existing Policy That Supports (or Doesn’t Support) 
the Current Practices 
We would be remiss in our report if we did not identify the fact that every 
interviewee responsible for contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan stated the 
support received from the DPAP was outstanding. We received very limited feedback on 
the need to address policy changes, with one exception. Per 10 U.S.C. § 2805 (2012) 
operation and maintenance funds cannot be used for unspecified military construction 
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projects over $750,000. With reconstruction and stability operations, this proved to be 
problematic at times. This is an area to be considered for future operations.  
Unless it is prohibited in statute, DPAP has done everything possible to 
give the commander all the tools they need to execute. (Interviewee D) 
9. Six-Phase Contract Management Process 
Because our research did not focus specifically on the execution of contracting 
during operations due to the expansive amount of research available on that topic, we 
only identified trends associated with three of the six phases: procurement planning, 
contract administration, and contract closeout. 
a. Procurement Planning 
The lack of proper procurement planning amongst all major DoD 
stakeholders within the overall planning process was cited as the most common and 
overarching theme of lessons learned. The lack of procurement planning resulted in 
poorly written requirements and, ultimately, poorly written contracts. Ensuring the future 
leaders recognize this and address it during planning is key to ensuring the integrity of 
the contracting system. Proper procurement planning would have revealed the size, 
scope, and effect that a contracted workforce would have during all phases of the 
operation.   
It was pretty much known that the CCOs were working for each of the 
separate organizations. They were basically autonomous, and they were 
responding to the local command’s priorities, as you would expect. 
Contracting Official (Interviewee S) 
Let’s see all the requirements at the same time. We have never gotten to 
that and that is the one thing that I would love to be able, if I could rewrite 
the script, is have some way to track visibility of all requirements at all 
times to know that we are getting repetitive requests for the same things 
over and over. That then tells you that … maybe there is a better way. 
(Interviewee D) 
Another concern regarding procurement planning was requirements 
definition. There was little guidance on what could be procured, and shifting priorities 
made it difficult for management boards to keep a handle on which requirements were 
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valid. There was not a standard of service, standard process, or single approval authority. 
This led to cases of fraud, waste, and abuse, whether intentional or unintentional.  
b. Contract Administration  
Ensuring that a contractor’s performance met the contractual requirement 
was another common theme derived from our interviews. Requirements generators did 
not have the required number of assigned or trained CORs to support their purchases. 
Contracting officers were not inspecting COR compliance, which only further 
perpetuated the issue. Major contracting incidents like security contractor oversight and 
failed reconstruction efforts were the forcing function for commanders to provide proper 
contractor oversight. After nine years of combat operations, the Army Chief of Staff 
implemented a policy in 2009 that mandated the number of trained CORs a unit must 
deploy with. As operations began to mature, oversight of contractors improved, and 
contracting command’s increased internal controls of COR oversight ensured that 
contract administration was properly executed.  
JCC-I/A was an effective contracting organization, but it didn’t have the 
capability or the manning to perform post award contract oversight and 
execution. Frankly, that was the biggest challenge that I faced. Contracting 
Official (Interviewee A) 
We have got to get after contract management and oversight…Contract 
management is administration through closeout. We took total 
unacceptable risk in those areas. It also gets back into COR management. 
It is not enough just to appoint CORs. It is not enough to do DAU 
training.  What is missing is the technical subject-matter expertise 
bringing to bear on the commodities, more importantly, the services and 
the functional areas. … But, we have got to come up with models on COR 
management. (Interviewee F) 
You have got to have organic capability. So if you are going to use 
Defense Contract Management Agency as a combat support agency [they 
must have the capacity to oversee the required volume of contracted 
support] If not, are you going to tell the services to have the organic 
capability?  Right now, none of us have the organic capability. The Air 
Force has more, but it is tied to their critical support structure, their bases 
… you can’t just rip that out. The Army has very little progress in terms of 
developing a deployable, organic capability. ... If we want to be 
expeditionary and go back to the tent and in very austere conditions, great. 
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If we want to take Iraq and Afghanistan and build up, then we have got to 
change the whole contract management and oversight.  (Interviewee F) 
c. Contract Closeout 
The issue of contract closeout was a common theme by almost all 
contracting executive leaders. Because contracting was executed in a “reaction mode” for 
the first few years of operation, emphasis was placed on the bare minimum of contract 
execution. By the time the JCC-I/A established internal controls for monitoring contract 
closeout, over 10,000 contracts required closeout. Interviewees cited that early emphasis 
must be placed on executing contract closeouts to ensure that the government received 
the product/service, the customer verified the quality, vendors are paid, and remaining 
funds are deobligated.  
I was really trying to get my hands around contract closeout. Closeout is 
one of those things that has really bedeviled the command and its 
reputation for years and years. Contracting Official (Interviewee D) 
D. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
Motivation to conduct this research was to identify not only what and how these 
identified events occurred but also why they happened. Identifying a root cause of the 
issues stated in the previous sections would prove critical in preventing similar 
occurrences from happening during future contingencies. We conducted a root cause 
analysis in hopes of identifying a specific workable corrective measure that prevents 
them from happening in the future. It was important for us to discover and put forth our 
efforts in creating recommendations that would resolve the root cause of the issues and 
not expend energy on the symptoms of the greater issue. The identification of a root 
cause enabled us to further direct this research towards a focused analysis and to make 
feasible, acceptable, suitable, and complete recommendations. 
Based on our evaluation, the root cause that lies at the heart of these findings is 
the lack of planning during Phase Zero. Contingency contracting has predominantly been 
a reactive function and rarely fully integrated into OPLANS. Contributing to this is the 
lack of qualified senior-level contracting officials on the Joint and combatant command 
staffs. The evolution of theater contract support requires a significant shift in business as 
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usual for the DoD. Further analysis of the integration of contracting into the joint 
operation planning process is presented in Chapter V.   
E. SUMMARY 
Through the analysis of our data, we were able to partially answer our research 
questions. Interviewing the commanders of C-JTSCC and conducting our literature 
review provided us with the historical evolution and adaptation of the organization, 
answering our secondary research question. Through applying our frameworks of 
DOTmLPF-P and the six-phase contract management process, we were able to identify 
common themes in our data to present our lessons learned findings.   
Through a root cause analysis, we were able to determine that the absence of 
contracting integration and planning during the early phases of joint operation planning 
for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan was the root cause of the vast majority of findings. 
All interviewees acknowledged the relevance that contracting brought to operations as a 
non-kinetic weapon, and how contracting enables the ground commanders and executive 
leaders to achieve effects on the battlefield like no other weapon. This finding highlights 
the need to appropriately plan for future contingency contracting operations. 
Chapter V provides a detailed analysis of ongoing efforts to integrate contingency 
contracting and OCS into joint operation planning. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE INTEGRATION OF CONTRACTING 
AND OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT INTO JOINT 
PLANNING  
A. INTRODUCTION 
We recognized early in our research that the scope of findings we would 
encounter when attempting to answer our primary research question would be expansive. 
After conducting 35 interviews with key senior leaders associated with contingency 
contracting and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, one common theme took precedence 
over all others; contracting must become fully integrated early in the planning process to 
effectively support any type of contingency response. Contracting can no longer serve as 
a reactive administrative function. Not only has contract support as part of the total force 
become critical to the success of military operations,  contracting has been recognized as 
a non-kinetic weapon that commanders can use to shape the battlefield. In this chapter, 
we analyze the efforts to institutionalize operational contract support and integrate 
contingency contracting into the joint operation planning environment.  
B. DOTMLPF-P ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT 
PLANNING INTEGRATION 
1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter II, multiple commission and oversight agencies have 
evaluated operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and identified areas of improvement for the 
DoD in regard to contingency contracting. These reports have sent a strong message to 
the Department that a change was needed. The following quotes from these reports reflect 
the strong demand for a change.  
Contractors represent almost half the workforce the United States has 
employed to achieve its objectives in the Iraq and Afghanistan 
contingency operations. Despite the extent of this reliance, and despite the 
additional stress this reliance has placed on the contingency-contracting 
function, agencies have in too many cases continued to operate using their 




resources. Supplementing the contingency-contracting function with ad 
hoc solutions has proven to be ineffective. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
2011a, p. 27) 
The Army must fix the cause of such failures, and the symptoms will 
subside. The cause is a culture that does not sufficiently value or recognize 
the importance of contracting, contract management, and contractors in 
the expeditionary operations. Without the necessary contracting 
leadership, the necessary change cannot be achieved. (Commission on 
Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 
2007, p. 9) 
[DASD (PS)] officials stated that taking the discussion of operational 
contract support beyond the logistics community will require a 
fundamental cultural change for DoD. … [findings]identified regarding 
the oversight and management of contractor support to deployed forces 
stem from DoD’s reluctance to plan for contractors as an integral part of 
the total force. (GAO, 2010a, p. 22) 
Without a culture change at DoD that supports more thorough planning, 
sharper doctrine, better training, and improved coordination, future 
contingences will bring repetitions of hasty, improvised, poorly defined, 
and wasteful use of contracting that DoD has said it relies upon in major 
operations. Our troops, our taxpayers, and our national interest cannot 
allow that to happen. (Joint Staff J4, 2012)  
In response to the demand signals, the DoD began significant efforts to integrate 
contractors into the total force. While these efforts are commendable, based on our 
analysis of the interviews with senior leaders involved with contingency contracting 
planning, execution, and oversight, there remain significant concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of the DoD’s current direction for the integration and synchronization of 
OCS. In this section, we provide the major areas of concern, organized under each 
DOTMPF-P category based on analysis of the data and literature.   
2. Doctrine 
The current focus being placed on the new realities of contractor support to the 
DoD in contingency operations provides the perfect opportunity to utilize recent and 
relevant lessons learned to realign doctrine. However, ensuring that the doctrine is 
aligned correctly is the cornerstone to ensuring the changes are institutionalized 
throughout the DoD. 
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JP 1–02 (Joint Staff, 2010) defines doctrine as, “Fundamental principles by which 
the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national 
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application” (p. 99). It further 
defines joint doctrine as, “Fundamental principles that guide the employment of United 
States military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may include 
terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures” (p. 169). Ultimately, doctrine is the 
foundation of how the military Services will proceed. In regard to contracting, JP 4–10 
(Joint Staff, 2008) provides the foundation for the way ahead regarding contractor 
support and contingency contracting. 
During the course of our interviews, we identified one constant theme regarding 
OCS: It spans all staff directorates and functional elements, and will require a “team 
effort” to be successful. While all interviewees are in agreement on that point, there 
remains a serious disconnect regarding the interpretation of what OCS is between those 
charged with managing it and those responsible for executing it. In interviews with 
contracting leaders, there was unanimous agreement that it is imperative to 
institutionalize the integration of contracting planners in the deliberate and crisis action 
planning processes and, ultimately, to operationalize contracting. Opinions are not 
necessarily shared among those responsible for OCS management and planning.   
Well OCS is … getting the material and the services downrange to where 
they need to be. It is how we implement contingency contracting. 
Contingency contracting is actually writing the contract and putting in the 
proper clauses and all of that good stuff and having people with the proper 
warrants to provide the oversight. But OCS is the actual practical means 
so that we get the support to the warfighter that [they need] to have. That 
is kind of the umbrella process. (Interviewee AL) 
Officials responsible for the overall plan writing process at one combatant 
command did not see much value in placing contractor-related information 
in operation plans because they believed contractor issues will be 
addressed by the logistics community once a plan is being executed. 
(GAO, 2010a, p. 21) 
JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) creates a clear divide between contingency contracting 
and OCS, as does SECDEF and JCS guidance assigning OCS responsibilities. The 
inclusion of OCS as a Tier II joint capability area under Logistics further supports the 
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divide, with acquisition residing as a Tier II JCA under Corporate Management and 
Support. The fact that there is a difference between OCS and contingency contracting is 
not the primary concern. Rather the division of roles and responsibilities does not appear 
to support the need to recognize contingency contracting as a line of effort.  
Integrating OCS into the DNA of the DoD will require a significant effort on the 
part of all staff directorates and commanders to understand that contracting, regardless of 
the type, is their business. Current doctrine identifies OCS as the overarching planning 
and management of all things contract support related, and contingency contracting as the 
execution of theater support contracts. This reinforces the idea of relegating contracting 
as a reactive administrative function. This thought process contributed to the significant 
challenges faced in current operations and many of the major oversight findings. While 
the DCCH clearly states that CCOs are not responsible for determining requirements, 
there is an expectation CCOs will act as business advisors to organizations during the 
requirements development process. As business advisors and experts on the nuances of 
contracting, CCOs should be there to assist commanders with understanding how 
contracting efforts can support their mission. Current doctrine and guidance are silent on 
how to operationalize contracting in order to help commanders understand how to use 
contracting as an enabler.   
Money is my most important ammunition in this war—MG David 
Petraeus, 101st Airborne Division Air Assault (CALL, 2009, p. 1) 
Contracting is the nexus between our warfighters’ requirements and the 
contractors that fulfill those requirements … in support of critical military 
operations[;] contractor personnel must provide timely services and 
equipment to the warfighter; and the Army contracting community must 
acquire those services and equipment effectively, efficiently, and legally. 
(Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 2) 
It is not a point of contention that contracting involves multiple agencies. Figure 
34 depicts the typical contracting process and who is involved at each step of the process. 
This figure reflects the need to incorporate the user into the contracting process and 
inculcate the importance of contracting and the surrounding requirements throughout the 
DoD, but the important thing to note is that contracting officers are specifically involved 
 111
with the majority of the process, to include helping users develop requirements 
definitions. Who is better to lead the DoD in the cultural paradigm shift than those that 
have been executing the mission?  Contracting officers understand the nuances of a 
contract and provide business advice to the warfighter to adequately plan for contractor 
support.  
 
Figure 34.  Contracting is More than Writing Contracts  
(From Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 94) 
Contracting is not limited to the process of drafting and executing 
contracts in a contracting activity. It involves everything from a warfighter 
identifying a need that must be filled, through contracting, through 
delivery and acceptance of the supplies or services from a contractor, to 
contract closeout. The Operational Army, or warfighter, plays a large and 
active role in “contracting.” (Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 20) 
[Regarding the Army reorganization] … that was all because of [the 
Gansler,  the operational G side of the military; a big deal, a real big 
deal—policy, operations, field operations. That was a big move … that 
operationalized contracting for the Army. (Interviewee H) 
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One consistent theme among senior contracting leaders responsible for the 
execution of operations for the past 11 years is the level of effort required and given to 
integrate their organization into the operational planning of the units they supported in 
order to operationalize contract support. COIN operations emphasized the fact that 
money is a weapon system, and its use on the battlefield has serious implications to the 
success of missions.   
And then as [Speaking of a Supported Commanding General] put it, we 
arrived at a point that he was convinced that contracting was its own line 
of effort and that it was the single platform by which all other operations 
could determine success or failure, so it’s a huge enabler. (Interviewee R) 
The concept of integrating non-kinetic operations with kinetic operations is not a 
new concept. As discussed in Chapter II, Maj Gen (USAF Ret.) Darryl Scott pioneered 
the principle of effects-based contracting (EBC). The basic foundation of EBC is 
inserting the CCO early in the planning process, at appropriate locations within the unit’s 
battle rhythm, from the corps to the battalion level.   
The first time I actually had this made most clearly to me was [Maj Gen] 
Darryl Scott talking about what he called kinetic contracting [EBC]. It was 
that at the end of the day when you’re going to go in with an operation and 
kick the door down and you want the door replaced that afternoon because 
you really don’t want the people that are in that village to be irritated 
because their door is not replaced for three weeks. If you’re telling me you 
want the door replaced this afternoon and I’m getting asked that question 
at noon, it’s not going to happen. On the other hand, if you bring me into 
the planning cell and I know two weeks in advance or a month in advance 
that you’re going to do this operation and I need the ability to replace 
those doors, we can find a way to get that done. ... I cannot respond 
instantaneously to that requirement, so you’ve got to include me in the 
front end in your planning process. (Interviewee M) 
As I said, it is a line of effort. It has to be a line of effort. Most field plans 
rely heavily on contracting as a force enabler so that they can put more 
guys on the trigger and less guys doing the support functions and they 
contract that out. That is a reality that we will face in a future battle-space. 
(Interviewee R) 
EBC has since been recognized throughout the operational community through 
the integration of EBC into COIN operations. Brig Gen Casey Blake made significant 
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strides in shifting the culture of contingency contracting during his assignment as the 
Senior Contract Official-Afghanistan (SCO-A). He utilized the concept of integration 
cells to put a team into the customer’s operation centers to shape and influence outcomes. 
These teams were comprised of a program manager, contracting officer, local national 
business advisor, and contractor support. His initiatives laid the groundwork to inculcate 
the importance of integrating contracting into the battle rhythm of supported 
commanders, and how this type of cell could ultimately be integrated into the deliberate 
and crisis action planning process at the combatant command level.   
As the maneuver force [in Afghanistan] demobilizes and repositions, 
contracting will be a “key enabler” in achieving the desired COIN effects. 
In this capacity, contracting cannot abdicate its roles and responsibilities 
to better integrate the kinetic and non-kinetic battle-space; it is the catalyst 
for success.  (Blake, 2012, p. 22) 
We’ve raised a generation of operational leaders now, if you think about 
it. Every officer … we have now up to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, 
knows nothing but war. And they also know this, “I don’t know exactly 
what those contracting people do, but I want them right here next to me. 
(Interviewee H) 
Joint doctrine and guidance have laid the foundation to integrate OCS 
considerations into the planning process across all staff directorates and have mandated 
the inclusion of OCS requirements in all levels of planning products.   All interviewees 
agree that each directorate must plan for the use of contractor support and manage those 
requirements accordingly. However, the consensus of our interviews with both 
contracting and non-contracting military leaders is this; you need to have contracting 
involved in the deliberate and crisis action planning process to provide the business 
advice to other staff elements for effective OCS planning. The division of responsibilities 
implemented by joint doctrine and DoD guidance sets a precedence that those responsible 
for executing the plan will be removed from those planning and managing the plan.   
As previously outlined, the recent OCS Manpower Study does not place heavy 
emphasis on the need for acquisition experience. However, based on the responsibilities 
listed in Appendix E, many of the functions expected from these planners require more 
than a basic understanding of contracting, they require the ability to act in the business 
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advisor capacity to assist other staff directorates with understanding how to integrate 
contractors and potential contract needs into their plans. The success of Brig Gen Blake’s 
integration cells in Afghanistan should prove the need to have experienced contracting 
officers involved in the planning process.   
JP 4–10 (Joint Staff, 2008) recognizes the fact that the contract terms and 
conditions establish the legal relationship between the government and the contractor; 
however, they place little emphasis on including those knowledgeable of the legal 
contract requirements on the planning teams (p. IV-2). DoD plans for the future of OCS 
identify the need for a team approach, which all contracting leaders interviewed agree 
with, but there is significant concern regarding the lack of emphasis on having an 
experienced contracting officer involved on the team that will create the plan contracting 
will ultimately execute. The OCS Manpower Study places emphasis on skill sets 
associated with planning, logistics or other JCA, and operations, with acquisition 
experience as a “nice to have,” specifically stating acquisition certification is not 
required.   While the senior leaders we interviewed agree you need a mix of skill sets in 
the OCS planning cell, the lack of emphasis on having a contracting officer/planner as a 
member of the OCS planning staff causes great concern for the contracting leaders that 
have led operations for the past 11 years.   
The fact that almost all of them are logisticians bothers me every time I 
see them ... they’re great and they’ve gotten better over time, but I do 
absolutely think that they should have, as a minimum, acquisition 
experience so they understand the nuances of the processes, the rules, and 
the strategies that have to be in place. The best would be that they would 
actually have combat contracting experience. (Interviewee Q) 
I go back to if you’re going to deliver the capability through a contractor, 
somebody better understand those pieces. (Interviewee Q) 
Include contracting and procurement personnel at all phases of planning 
for contingency operations. Contracting plays a central role in the 
execution of contingency operations, and thus it must be part of the pre-
deployment planning process. Whether for stabilization or reconstruction 
operations, contracting officials help provide an accurate picture of the 
resources necessary to carry out the mission. (SIGIR, 2006, p. 98) 
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To complement the efforts spawned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, a 
body of research exists exploring the addition of a fifth phase to the phases of 
contingency contracting: Phase Zero. Phase Zero was introduced in the NPS Joint 
Applied Project NPS-AM-08–127. The authors researched a joint EBC execution system 
to be utilized during the new Phase Zero contingency contracting phase, which aligns 
with the Shape (Phase 0) of the CCDR’s planning (Poree, Curtis, Morrill, & Sherwood, 
2008). This concept was further discussed in the report NPS-COM-10–160 in which the 
author explored the implications of the lack of an integrated structure and construct at the 
joint strategic level (Yoder, 2010). Multiple other projects have been conducted on how 
to improve contingency contracting, many requiring a strategic approach through the 
integration of contracting officers in the early phases of planning at all levels.  
Outside of the DoD, commercial firms have already recognized the benefits of 
involving purchasing in the creation of strategic goals and objectives. Many use a five-
step process that is similar to what Brig Gen Blake did through his integration cells. The 
five steps are the following: (1) purchasing ascertains the priorities of user departments; 
(2) a mutual priority of targets is developed; (3) a joint plan of attack is made; (4) the 
work is done jointly; and (5) the “limelight” is shared with the user departments 
(Cavinato, 1987). These types of commercial best practices are infiltrating industry 
because every dollar saved via the purchasing department is a dollar earned towards 
profit. Companies recognize that purchasing is an enabling capability that when 
synchronized with their overall strategy results in improved success. While not identical, 
these five steps are similar in nature to the iterative planning process that takes place 
within the DoD during deliberate and crisis action planning.  
Based on our interviews, the culture shift that the DoD is pursuing in regard to 
OCS is a necessary step; however, there appears to be a gap in those efforts, and that is 
operationalizing contracting and integrating contracting officers into the OCS planning 
cells responsible for deliberate and crisis action planning. Changes in business as usual 
are required to shift the culture of the DoD to properly manage contractors as part of the 
total force, and both contracting and non-contracting leaders recognize the need to get it 
right the first time. But if the resulting DoD “DNA” fails to institutionalize the 
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appropriate foundation, the DoD will continue to face the same challenges regarding 
contingency contracting response in the future.   
We need to be operating not as if we have been here [discussing 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan] one year eleven times, but as if we’ve 
been here eleven years. (Interviewee R) 
3. Organization 
Organizational structure provides the formal division, grouping, and coordination 
of tasks. As discussed in Chapter II, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 provided the 
foundation for today’s DoD organization, which was based on a military landscape that 
was very different than the landscape of today’s military. Organizational culture is 
significantly impacted by organizational design, and ensuring the design supports the 
desired organizational culture is imperative (Robbins & Judge, 2012).   
The current DoD initiatives related to OCS are intended to help make the needed 
culture shift to institutionalize OCS into the “DNA” of the DoD. There is agreement 
among all interviewees that this paradigm shift requires all members of the military to 
embrace and understand that contractors are now part of the total force and, therefore, 
must be planned for and integrated as the fifth force. Joint doctrine, guidance, policies, 
and new organizational structures are being implemented to support this shift in culture.   
It is important that a significant culture change occur, one that emphasizes 
operational contract support throughout all aspects of the department, 
including planning, training, and personnel requirements.  (GAO, 2010b)  
The fact that the DoD is placing emphasis on OCS and the appropriate 
management of contingency contracting is a move in the right direction. However, rather 
than identifying an organization that owns the brunt of the responsibilities for OCS and 
contingency contracting together, the roles and responsibilities have been spread 
throughout multiple areas. This separation of management and execution could ultimately 
make integration and synchronization less effective.   
So, technically, if you’re going to ask the question who’s in charge, well, 
Secretary Panetta, but is there really one person that is accountable or 
responsible? Tell me exactly what you want to know and yeah there’s 
someone in charge. But from an OCS perspective, is there one? No. The 
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Joint Staff does stuff, the Comptroller does stuff. [USD]AT&L does stuff. 
Inside [USD]AT&L, [DPAP] does stuff. [DUSD(PS)] does stuff, [Deputy 
Secretary of Defense (Supply Chain Integration)] does stuff. … [T]here is 
also a complex relationship between [USAID] and [the Department of 
State]. … [I]t’s a complex labyrinth of issues. (Interviewee M) 
Based on the data collected during our interviews, there remains disagreement 
among senior leaders associated with OCS as to whether the current approach is 
appropriate to obtain the intended results for the DoD.   The primary areas of concern are 
the appropriateness of placing contracting and operational contract support under the 
logistics directorate (J4) on the Joint and CCDR staffs, and the organization, placement, 
and mission of JCASO. 
As Joint Publication 4–10 states, planners often develop a mind-set that 
contracting is inherently a combat service support function. However, 
contract support for military operations not only includes logistics, but 
also may include combat support functions such as engineering, 
intelligence and signal/communications. (GAO, 2010a, p. 22) 
a. Placement of Contracting 
Many interviewees, contracting and non-contracting, believe the 
organizational direction being taken by the DoD will result in the same challenges in the 
future by not having the appropriate organizational structure in place. While contractor-
to-military ratios have risen to nearly 2:1 in Iraq and Afghanistan and the utilization of 
contracting as a non-kinetic weapon has increased, the DoD continues to perpetuate the 
view that contracting, and what is now OCS, is merely a sub-function to logistics, and, 
more concerning, that contingency contracting is merely the execution arm of contract 
support, while the commission reports have called for acquisitions and contracting to 
become a DoD core competence.  
Agencies must fully accept contracting as a core function if only because 
of the sheer numbers of contingency contracts, their value, and the adverse 
financial, political, and operational impacts of failure. (CWC in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2011b, p. 114) 
Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is not 
an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people; 
but they are understaffed, overworked, under-trained, under-supported 
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and, most important, under-valued. (Commission on Army Acquisition 
and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, p. 21) 
Applying commercial best practices to the DoD is not always successful 
due to the statutory regulations and considerations imposed on the DoD that are not 
applicable to industry; however, there are some practices that could prove to be very 
useful. One practice industry is embracing is the elevation of purchasing within the 
organizational structure and the creation of the Chief Procurement Officer that reports 
directly to the CEO. The CPO has access to the other executive-level officials and 
increased access to other units within the organization that support the success of the 
purchasing department. Industry has recognized the need for an “executive champion” 
and that the position itself is not what is critical; rather the visibility and resources 
associated with such a position send a clear message throughout the organization that 
purchasing is on par with other functional executives (Trent, 2004).  
The current organizational structure with contracting subordinate to the J4 
or Logistics community dates back to pre-World War I, when contracting was very 
limited in nature and scope. The CWC Second Interim Report made the recommendation 
to remove contracting from J4 and create a new contingency contracting J10 directorate, 
citing that the current organizational structure is antiquated and no longer supports the 
reality of today’s military force structure. The new directorate would be led by a flag 
officer with contracting experience (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b). 
Despite contractors’ constituting almost half the total force deployed in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD contingency-contracting matters have been 
mixed together with the J4 logistics directorate. (CWC in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2011a, p. 27) 
The placement of contracting within J4 reflects outdated thinking that 
contracting is only a method to achieve logistical support—not a full 
spectrum of operational contract support. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
2011b, p. 120) 
And too many logistics officers who rise to flag rank lack contracting 
experience and are unfamiliar with the broad range of roles contractors 
play in supporting military operations. Contracting should no longer be 
subordinate to logistics. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, pp. 119–
120) 
 119
As a senior combatant command logistics (J4) director told the 
Commission, “I would like … contracting to be a separate directorate. … 
Two CENTCOM planners are not enough. … They are flying the 
airplanes as they build it.” (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p. 115) 
Acquisition officials have become more knowledgeable and vocal about 
the extent and nature of the problems in contingency contracting, yet 
agencies are slow to change. Meaningful progress will be limited as long 
as agencies resist major reforms that would elevate the importance of 
contracting, commit additional resources to planning and managing 
contingency contracting, and institutionalizing best practices within their 
organizations. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p. 7) 
During the course of our interviews, it became obvious that the CWC was 
not alone in this opinion. The majority of contracting officials interviewed, and 
approximately half of the non-contracting officials, agreed that keeping contracting 
nested within the J4 is not the appropriate organizational structure to support the needed 
culture shift within the DoD.   
We needed to be able to coordinate pretty much on an equal footing with 
all the other staff sections. Now, I’m contracting, so it’s not surprising that 
I’d have that opinion, but I’m a little weary when I see contracting nested 
up under the J4. (Interviewee I) 
A number of our contracts, security, surveillance, dogs, and translators 
were not J4 related. So J4s are great and we need them, but they have a 
narrower focus than the contracting people who do all these other things. 
So, I don’t think it’s appropriate to nest contracting staff under the J4. If 
you have to, that would be the best place to put it, but I wouldn’t do that 
by routine. (Interviewee AF) 
It can’t be just consumed by logistics, although much of contracting is 
logistics related, it is not logistics by design. It is so much more than that. 
… So, yeah, I agree they ought to set up a J10. (Interviewee R) 
The Joint Staff did not adopt the recommendation and stated that the DoD  
did not believe that a new organizational construct would enhance the 
current effort to institutionalize operational contract support, and that 
command and control is strengthened by using established, well-
understood staff structures. (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p.120) 
During the course of our interviews, we were able to conclude that the 
DoD’s intent for the future is that through doctrine, training, and education, OCS will 
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infiltrate throughout the DoD, to include outside the acquisition community. The vision is 
that OCS will become so ingrained in the culture that contingency contracting 
commanders will no longer have a need to manage OCS. The expectation is that 
operational leaders will manage their own OCS requirements, leaving contracting to only 
have to execute contracts. Based on our research and interviews, a change of this nature 
will require significant senior executive-level support, and a senior executive responsible 
for integrating all aspects of OCS, to include the execution of contingency contracting.   
The message sent by the Joint Staff’s response to the concept of a J10 is 
that contingency contracting is merely an execution activity that is subordinate to 
logistics and the increased reliance on contract options does not justify addressing the 
status quo. The conclusion that contingency contracting will not demand an experienced 
executive-level champion to integrate, synchronize, and manage OCS fails to put the 
required emphasis on the initiatives to support the needed cultural change throughout the 
organization. Lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan prove there is a 
need for upward movement of contingency contracting within the organization. Based on 
our interviews, every commander of C-JTSCC was expected to provide management of 
all contracting efforts within the area of operations, regardless of the fact they did not 
maintain command and control over those agencies. While the purpose of the JTSCC 
should not be to act as the single focal point for all things contract related, there should be 
an integrator at the JTF, CCDR, and Joint staffs that is responsible for providing the 
oversight and management required for contingency contracting. The fact remains that 
the need to manage and integrate OCS is a result of a contract action, regardless of where 
that contract is written. Contracting officers have been providing the needed expertise to 
operational commanders for matters related to contracts, not the J4 community. 
As the use of contract support in operations has grown, so too has the 
realities of what contingency contracting entails. As such, contingency contracting has far 
outgrown logistics, and it is time the organization adjust to support the growth of this 
function within the DoD.   
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b. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office 
The John Warner FY07 NDAA, Section 854 called for focus and 
organizational movement in three specific areas: requirements definition, contingency 
program management, and contingency contracting. In addition, multiple reports, 
including reports from the GAO, CWC and Gansler Commission, have called for a 
programmatic approach to contingency contracting. The creation of the DUSD(PS) and 
JCASO were in response to these recommendations and facilitate the current plans to 
institutionalize OCS. While the creation of these organizations often is attributed as a 
result of the multiple commission and oversight reports, our analysis of the data received 
points to a possible misinterpretation of the demand signals.   
The majority of the interviewees support the premise of the JCASO; 
however, there remains concern regarding the current state of the organization. First, 
many are unsure of the purpose of JCASO and view the continued evolution of the 
organization as a way to find relevance. Second, there is disagreement as to what the 
organization should be utilized for. And third, there remains concern with the placement 
of the JCASO within the DLA.  
From the initial draft concept papers through to the most recent overview 
on the JCASO website, the organization has evolved significantly. Based on the draft 
concept paper on the Contingency Acquisition Support Office (CASO) we obtained that 
was created by the DUSD(IP; 2006), the original mission of the CASO was to be “the 
direct application of the economic instrument of national power towards meeting the 
objectives of the supported joint force commander” (p. 2). The emphasis of the 
organization was to expand from contingency contracting to contingency acquisition. The 
following list identifies the key considerations for the proposed CASO organization.  
 Organized under a Joint Acquisition Command (JAC) under U.S. Joint 
Forces Command (JFCOM). 
 Staffed with the full set of acquisition skills such as requirements 
definition, contracting, program management, and financial management. 
Staff would have also included experience planners and liaison officers 
from other DoD and executive branch agencies.  
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 Comprised of 50–60 permanent staff (active duty military, government 
civilian, and contractor support) and a joint reserve unit of 150–200 
reserve members (program managers, contracting officers, and financial 
officers all trained and certified for contingency acquisition operations). 
 Would have been comprised of forward deployed elements providing 
acquisition support to the JFC.   
 The military Services were to retain Title 10 responsibilities, including in-
theater weapons systems logistics support. 
 In-theater oversight of acquisition activities would fall under JAC to 
promote unity of effort. 
 JFCOM would have been delegated Executive Agent for contingency 
acquisition with the CASO director designated as the HCA. 
 In-garrison the CASO would have primarily focused on planning, 
coordination, and readiness functions, and the joint reserve unit would 
have supported joint exercises. (DUSD[IP], 2006) 
The majority of the contracting senior leaders interviewed agree with the 
original premise of the CASO. However, with the new doctrinal foundation of OCS, the 
approach taken for the JCASO is different than initially intended for the organization, 
leaving many senior leaders wondering exactly how the new organization will fit within 
the current acquisition force structure. In CJCS Notice 4130.01 (CJCS, 2011c), the DLA 
JCASO “is an on-call enabling capability providing operational contract support 
coordination and integration during peacetime and contingency operations” (p. 1). At the 
time of the notice, the JCASO was organized in two divisions: Operations and Policy. 
The Operations division contains deployable Mission Support Teams (MSTs) and 
planners embedded at the combatant commands. The Policy division assists those 
responsible for OCS policy, doctrine, and lessons learned. In reviewing the roles and 
responsibilities of the JCASO, a significant portion of the in-garrison assigned roles and 
responsibilities for the JCASO relate to integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating OCS 
efforts during planning efforts. This includes the development of the Annex Ws, 
establishing guidance for the lead service for contracting and participation in strategic 
forums on the topic of OCS. In-theater support includes functions such as deploying an 
MST temporarily until a permanent OCS structure is in place such as a JTSCC, advising 
the CCDR on the lead service for contracting construct and facilitating communication 
 123
between the lead service for contracting, Services, Defense Agencies, and other WOG 
partners. Additional responsibilities include advising on processes and procedures for 
contingency contracting, and advising with the development of economic strategies 
(CJCS, 2011c). This is not an inclusive list of roles and responsibilities. The full list can 
be found at Enclosure A of CJCSN 4130.01, dated December 20, 2011 (CJCS, 2011c).  
During our interviews none of the information and data collected stated 
that the JCASO would be responsible for execution of contingency contracting. In fact, 
we were assured during the course of our interviews that JCASO does not do contingency 
contracting. However, the most recent information paper available on the JCASO website 
(August 2012) reflects the addition of a third division, Contingency Contracting. The 
overview states that the CCDR may designate the JCASO as the head of contingency 
contracting, and the JCASO assets will provide temporary support until a JTSCC is in 
place and operational. While this evolution of the organization appears to move the 
organization closer to the original concept, there are significant differences in 
organizational structure and personnel that make it difficult to understand why the 
organization would evolve to include a contingency contracting capability. With the 
stand-up of the Army’s Expeditionary Contracting Command and the Air Force’s unit 
type code packages, the capability within the JCASO seems to be a duplication of effort 
and the organization not appropriately staffed to provide the appropriate experience 
required to establish a JTSCC and contingency contracting policies and procedures.   
In our interviews, we asked the question, how do you see the JCASO 
fitting within the DoD contingency acquisition community?  The responses scaled from, 
who is the JCASO, to they are appropriately placed and manned for their mission. With 
that said, there were a significant number of interviewees that provided answers 
somewhere in the middle. Many of the interviewees agree that the vision they have for 
the JCASO is similar to what the original intent was for the CASO, and that they should 
be staffed accordingly to provide the contingency acquisition skills and expertise needed 
to provide contingency contracting effectively. However, this viewpoint underscores the 
difference of opinion between the “OCS community” and the “contracting community” 
regarding the direction the DoD needs to take to fully integrate contractor support into the 
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planning and execution of operations. In general, all interviewees agree that there should 
be a joint agency responsible for coordinating the planning efforts across all CCDRs and 
ensure that OCS is integrated. There remains a split between senior leaders as to what 
that organization should look like spanning both ends of the spectrum. One consistent 
point of agreement is that the JCASO should be responsible for capturing joint lessons 
learned and ensuring those are disseminated throughout the community and incorporated 
into training at all levels. 
The final area of concern raised in regard to the JCASO is the placement 
of the organization with the DLA. The DLA provides the full spectrum of combat 
logistics support. The organization provides logistics, acquisition, and technical services 
as requested by military departments and federal agencies (DLA, 2012a). The very fact 
that the DLA focuses primarily on logistics support is of concern for the same reasons 
discussed in the previous section regarding the placement of contracting within the 
logistics community. However, the other concern is that the support provided by the 
JCASO is at the discretion of the DLA. Embedding the JCASO within the DLA does not 
support the idea that contingency acquisition planning must increase in significance and 
should be readily available to the joint force on a day-to-day basis. At this time, the 
support must be specifically requested. The JCASO has no authority to direct action 
throughout the combatant commands and must obtain contracting authority through the 
DLA. If used to establish a preliminary JTSCC, the supporting manpower to provide 
contingency contracting support would deploy with contract authority from their assigned 
Service, and since lead service for contracting is generally given to one of the Services, 
unity of command and effort for contingency contracting will be impossible.  
4. Training 
Joint exercises and rehearsals are critical to ensuring that planning has been 
conducted effectively and provide an opportunity to identify gaps in the plans to address 
prior to future execution of the plan. While our research questions did not focus 
specifically on joint exercises, the topic came up in the majority of interviews. The 
primary issue identified with training is the fact that joint exercises rarely go through 
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Phases IV and V of an OPLAN. While contingency contracting support will begin in 
Phase I, the management requirements associated with OCS generally will not arise until 
the later phases of an operation. The condensed nature of joint exercises make it difficult 
to validate that commanders are appropriately planning for and executing their plans 
associated with contractor support. Some success has been found in performing table-top 
exercises that walk through the later phases of execution, but those still do not account 
for the contractors. Contractor support personnel are not typically included in the joint 
exercises for multiple reasons, but primarily the cost associated with contractor 
personnel.   
While it was recognized that it is difficult to exercise later phases of an OPLAN, 
there were positive commendations made regarding the efforts of the JCASO to assist 
and participate in joint exercises to ensure that commanders are planning for and 
executing OCS plans. 
5. Materiel 
Materiel solutions were not the focus of our research; however, one trend found 
among the interviews is the need for a centralized requirements development tool for 
requiring agencies. There are on-going efforts to develop business tools to support 
contingency contracting and OCS, but in-depth research was not conducted in this area 
and will be recommended for further research.  
6. Leadership and Education 
The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 created joint billet 
coding, and with those billets came the requirement for individuals to obtain Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME). JPME provides the education needed to 
complement training and experience to produce the most professionally competent 
individuals possible. All interviewees agree it is imperative to force OCS training into the 
military school systems at the appropriate levels to educate the force on how to manage 
contractors as part of the total force.   
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It is obviously difficult to add training requirements to the already full 
curriculums of the many training and education programs within the Services. However, 
the only way to fully inculcate the need to manage contractors appropriately is to ensure 
that every member of the DoD understands that contractors are now part of the total force 
and should be planned for and supported just as any other member of the total force. 
Training must focus on the limitations and constraints of command and control in regard 
to contractors. Ensuring this training is provided at all levels consistently will help to 
reinforce the needed culture change with the DoD in regard to OCS. 
Honestly I think we need to start at the academies all the way up through … the 
senior war colleges [to provide] a discussion on how you manage a workforce on 
a battlefield that is comprised of military, civilian, and contractor employees. 
(Interviewee AF) 
During the course of our interviews we were able to determine that the Joint Staff 
J4 OCS Division and the DUSD(PS) have successfully created and integrated OCS 
training modules at the company grade, field grade, and flag officer level. This is a 
significant step in the right direction.   
7. Personnel 
The intent of the personnel component is to ensure that there are appropriately 
trained and qualified personnel available to support joint capability requirements. Having 
the right personnel at the appropriate level, in the right place, and at the right time is 
critical to ensuring the success of any operation.   
Based on our interviews, oversight findings, and commission reports, the DoD 
began contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in a very ad hoc 
manner with little to no centralization of command and control. Oversight was assigned 
based on necessity, not planned and integrated. One key component in ensuring future 
success is ensuring the DoD has the appropriate personnel available to support 
contingency contracting operations. During the course of our interviews and literature 
review, three primary themes were identified. First, having the appropriate level of 
authority and experience available to the JTF commander is critical. Second, ensuring 
contracting officers have the appropriate skill set to effectively integrate with operational 
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units sets the stage for success. And finally, there must be a programmatic approach used 
during the execution of contingency operations.   
a. Personnel Authority Level and Experience 
One theme that became very evident during our interviews is the need to 
have an experienced senior leader positioned appropriately to gain access to the “big 
table.”  Planning and integration take place at many different levels. Based on our 
interviews, regional contracting centers were able to “link in” with operations at the 
tactical level with some success. However, obtaining access and acceptance into the 
senior-level staff and command-level planning efforts, proved difficult in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
In order to make it a core capability in the DoD environment, you have got 
to put stars on somebody’s shoulders. (Interviewee AE) 
While the commanders of C-JTSCC were all a minimum of a one-star 
general officer, they were responsible for synchronizing and managing the oversight of 
two areas of operation and were not available on a consistent basis to sit at the table with 
the other general officers responsible for the multiple facets of operations in each 
country. As such, the responsibility to obtain that access was left to the senior contracting 
official, which until recently was a colonel. In 2011, the first brigadier general took the 
position of senior contracting official since the establishment of C-JTSCC. Additionally, 
the commander, which had been a one-star general officer since 2008, is a two-star GO. 
This change seemed to be critical to obtaining access at all of the appropriate levels to 
fully integrate contingency contracting activities with those of the operational 
community.   
It is unlikely that an Army contracting corps with an adequate number of 
General Officers would have been so ill-equipped to serve the Operational 
Army in expeditionary operations. These flag officers would have been “at 
the table” planning and supporting the operations. (Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, 
p. 5) 
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The results of our interviews appear to support the recommendations made 
by the CWC regarding the need to “elevate and expand the authority of military officials 
responsible for” (CWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011b, p. 129).   
You need a general officer. You know, I had to revise my opinion because 
I thought, hey, we can get rid of the contracting guys. But [contracting] 
really should be the last person [out]. (Interviewee AF) 
There’s no doubt about it. We have senior leaders that are, for lack of a 
better expression, looking out for contracting, but [contracting was not] 
able to engage at [the flag officer/general officer] level … not only does it 
lend credibility, but you are in the different forums you needed to be able 
to help educate and be able to engage. (Interviewee I)  
In addition to the interviews, there is a body of research at the Naval 
Postgraduate School regarding the subject contingency contracting personnel, 
specifically, the Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) (Yoder, 2010). In his research, 
published in 2004, Yoder presents a personnel model comprised of three tiers. Figure 35 
outlines each tier and the functions, experience, and benefits and drawbacks associated 
with each.   
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Figure 35.  Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations  
(From Yoder, 2005, p. 17) 
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Of particular interest to our research is Tier Three—the integrated planner 
and executor (IPE). Our interviewees agree that having a joint qualified general 
officer/flag officer with contingency contracting experience is critical to successful 
integration into operational planning. Rank and authority provide access to other senior 
leaders. The key to gaining momentum on changing the culture of the DoD regarding 
contingency contracting is helping operational commanders to understand and embrace 
their role in the process. Having an IPE provides the conduit to helping those 
commanders understand how contracting can be used as an enabler and, ultimately, 
assists in operationalizing contingency contracting.   
While the contracting officials interviewed unanimously agreed it is 
important to have the appropriately placed senior leaders to plan and execute contingency 
contracting operations, the opinion was not necessarily shared among all non-contracting 
officials. The primary disagreement we observed is that more general officers will 
increase overhead, not effectiveness. This opinion fails to recognize the truth within the 
DoD that to obtain access to certain forums, the appropriate rank is a must. From an 
operational commander perspective, as long as the contracting is done in a timely 
effective matter, the rest is irrelevant. This opinion supports the status-quo DoD culture 
and is likely due to the “zero-sum game” of personnel actions. If additional general 
officers are added for contracting billets, there will be a decrease in general officer billets 
in another functional area. This is a commitment that will generally not be supported by 
the communities that may be impacted by reductions. The DoD has come to a pivotal 
point and must decide to recognize acquisitions as a true core competency due to the fact 
that half of those required to respond to contingencies are contractors, or continue to treat 
the function as administrative and reactive. The second option will result in very little 
change in the culture and will likely lead to the same challenges during the next large 
contingency operation.  
(1) Experienced Contingency Contracting Officers. The need 
for experienced, knowledgeable personnel does not apply only at the strategic leader 
level. Having those senior leaders appropriately placed provides an invaluable asset to all 
contingency contracting officers. Setting the stage to have experienced joint qualified 
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leaders to mentor young officers and non-commissioned officers creates a foundation of 
contingency contracting officers that understand how to make themselves relevant to the 
operational community. This foundation sets the precedence for each generation of 
leaders following, which helps to shift the culture of the DoD in the appropriate direction. 
Each Service brings a unique set of skills and experience to joint 
contracting operations. The primary source of contingency contracting officers comes 
from the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force,  both of which have strengths and 
weaknesses. With the Army’s reorganization of the contracting community, the Service is 
setting the stage to operationalize contracting. Contingency contracting officers spend the 
early part of their career in an operational functional area, moving into contracting as a 
senior captain or non-commissioned officer. This model provides the knowledge 
necessary to understand staff coordination and planning efforts, which, when coupled 
with contracting experience, is the foundation for leaders that understand how to integrate 
and synchronize contingency contracting planning. On the other hand, the Air Force 
recognizes contracting as a primary career field and recruits officers and enlisted 
members into the career field directly out of initial training, though a portion of the active 
duty cadre cross-train from other career fields. What the Air Force lacks is the experience 
in other staff elements such as operations and planning, skills that should be addressed to 
operationalize contingency contracting.   
(2) Programmatic Approach to Contingency Contracting 
Execution. The movement of OCS efforts within the DoD are intended to support the 
need to apply a programmatic approach to contingency contracting. The efforts have 
focused significantly on how to manage current operations and how to plan for the future 
command and control elements of the next contingency contracting operations. What has 
been neglected is how to appropriately manage the personnel requirements for execution. 
Brig Gen Blake’s integration cells provide a good framework for how to approach 




Contingency contracting is not a program in the sense that a 
program manager should be responsible for operations. For example, regional contracting 
centers should continue to be led by contingency contracting officers with the appropriate 
experience. Execution is the responsibility of contingency contracting officers. However, 
having a cell on the JTF staff comprised of a contingency contracting officer, program 
manager, engineers, finance officers, and intelligence analysts, all responsible for 
managing contingency contracting operations, provides the commander with the needed 
expertise to fully integrate and synchronize contingency contracting operations. 
The traditional program management side doesn’t have enough knowledge 
about contracting. They don’t understand [how] … the [fiscal side of the 
house] and contract law intersect together. So to me, the lead is still a 
seasoned contracting [person]. (Interviewee F) 
Treating contingency contracting as a typical acquisition program 
is a mistake that should be avoided. Doing so will result in repeat challenges and 
fragmented operations. 
8. Facilities 
Our research did not identify any areas for analysis regarding facilities. 
9. Policy    
As discussed in Chapter II, contingency contracting operations pose a unique 
challenge in that contracting authority does not follow the same path as command 
authority. In addition, there are multiple agencies with contracting authority within a 
given area of operation, all providing contract support. Consideration must be made for 
this fact early in planning and interagency coordination must be conducted for OPLANS 
to ensure that the designated lead Service for contracting is provided, at a minimum, 
coordination authority with other DoD agencies. Coordination of contract support 
becomes even more challenging during stabilization and reconstruction operations as 
other departments and non-governmental organizations perform operations alongside the 
DoD.   
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A significant challenge that had to be addressed during the creation of JCC-I/A 
was command and coordination authority. The JCC-I/A commander was provided 
OPCON over all forces receiving contracting authority through ASALT. In November 
2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the DoD 
Executive Agent for contracting in Operation NEW DAWN (OND)/Operation 
ENDURING FREEMDOM (OEF), Kuwait and Pakistan. In the memo the Commander, 
C-JTSCC was appointed as the HCA for all contracting activities with the combined/joint 
operations areas (CJOAs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the exception of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM; 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2010). Serious consideration should have been given early 
in operations as to the relationship between C-JTSCC, USSOCOM, and USACE. 
Coordination taking place early in operations was coordinated through informal 
relationships that were only as effective as the personality-driven cooperation at any 
given time.   
I will go to my grave believing that is wrong. [Regarding the exception of 
USACE from the authority of the Commander, J-TSCC]. (Interviewee C) 
In order to effectively synchronize theater contract support, the HCA must be 
given, at a minimum, coordination authority with all contracting activities within the 
CJOA. Thorough consideration and planning for command and coordination authority 
should be conducted during Phase Zero to ensure effective support from day one of 
execution.   
C. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided an analysis of the integration and synchronization of 
OCS and contingency contracting within the joint planning process for each DOTmLPF-
P area. The DoD has taken the initial steps to integrating contractors into the total force 
and are moving towards changing the DNA of the DoD so that it becomes common 




planning. With that said, the changes being implemented seem to be virtually silent on 
how to operationalize contracting and give the appropriate focus to the function 
responsible for executing the OPLANS.   
Based on the data collected by interviewing multiple senior contracting and non-
contracting leaders, we have been able to formulate recommendations that we feel will 
further the success of OCS efforts and achieve the required end state of integration, 
synchronization, and management of contractor support in addition to increasing the 





In the previous two chapters, we provided our findings regarding and analysis of 
contingency contracting operations and the integration of OCS. In this chapter, we 
provide recommendations we received during the course of our interviews and 
recommendations resulting from our research. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM INTERVIEWS   
During the course of our interviews, we specifically asked each interviewee what 
the DoD’s next step should be toward improving contingency contracting operations. 
Being that our interviewees are comprised of previous or current senior leaders within the 
DoD, we feel identifying the responses is relevant to our research. There are four general 
areas of improvement for the DoD based on the responses received from our 
interviewees. The complete list of recommendations can be found in Appendix I.   
First, the DoD must address organization structure to accurately support the 
military landscape of today’s operational environment. Considerations must be made for 
how to most effectively provide theater contract support, how to properly align 
contracting personnel, and how to effectively manage contract oversight. The DoD has 11 
years of lessons learned that should be codified before the corporate knowledge 
disappears.   
Second, the DoD must consider how to create accountability and transparency 
with the contracting system to ensure operational missions are being supported by the 
contracting activity taking place within an area of operations. Operationalizing 
contracting and providing a framework supported by the intelligence and finance 
communities are imperative to supporting future operations relating operating across 
multiple elements of national power.   
Third, the DoD must evaluate administrative roles and responsibilities, and lines 
of command and control, and address the issues of contracting authority. Contingency 
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contracting is challenging when clear lines are not planned for and enforced. There must 
be a focal point to act as the integrator between the multiple contracting activities to 
provide commanders with a common operating picture regarding contracting and 
contractors.   
And, finally, the DoD must incorporate OCS and contingency contracting 
throughout the school systems of the military. Education regarding working with and 
managing contractors should be provided to all DoD employees that will potentially 
support contingency operations. Basic, primary, intermediate, and advanced military 
education programs must contain a block of instruction that enforces the need to view 
contractors as part of the total force. Until this happens, it will be difficult to change the 
culture of the DoD.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THIS RESEARCH 
1. Introduction 
The primary purpose of our research was to determine what conclusions and 
recommendations could be derived from assessing strategic lessons learned from 
contingency contracting operations in OIF, OND, and OEF. After initial analysis of our 
interview findings, the predominant theme we identified was the need for integration and 
synchronization of contingency contracting in joint operation planning. We recognized 
that effective planning and integration of contingency contracting could have prevented a 
significant number of challenges faced by contracting and operational commanders 
during the past 11 years. As such, we focused the remainder of our analysis on the current 
efforts to integrate OCS and contingency contracting into the joint operation planning 
process. Based on that analysis, we have formulated five recommendations we believe 
will help to change the culture of the DoD to support improved contingency contracting 
operations for future operations.  
2. Recommendation 1: Operationalize Contracting by Recognizing it as 
a Line of Effort 
Contracting can no longer be viewed as an administrative execution function. 
Operations increasingly rely on non-organic capabilities that must be procured via 
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contracting officers. While many commissions and oversight committees have recognized 
this fact, the DoD continues to perpetuate the assumption that contingency contracting is 
merely the process of writing a contract.   
In order to effectively support operations, commanders must recognize and 
understand how contracting supports operations as an enabler. A line of effort links 
multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose. Contracting is often the link 
between operational and strategic objectives and links military operations with other 
instruments of national power. As long as the DoD continues to disregard this, the efforts 
taken by leaders such as Maj Gen (Ret) Scott and Brig Gen Blake to integrate contracting 
into the daily battle rhythm of operational commanders will be lost.   
Ensuring the operational community embraces this change will require support 
from senior leadership and will take time, effort, and constant focus. In addition to 
working with the operational community, the contracting community must understand 
how to integrate contingency contracting operations at the appropriate time and place to 
support the assigned mission. The Army reorganization has effectively operationalized 
contracting with the creation of the ECC; however, the Air Force must work to ensure 
their highly skilled cadre of contingency contracting officers receives exposure to and 
experience in planning and integration.  
Deepening the operational community’s understanding of how to use contracting 
as a line of effort and an enabler will provide the foundation for the institutionalization of 
OCS. Regardless of how it is viewed, the requirement to manage OCS is a result of a 
contract award. Additionally, ensuring that contingency contracting officers fully 
understand their role in integrating contracting operations into the overall mission will 
provide the foundation for full integration of contingency contracting.  
3. Recommendation 2: Do Not Treat Operational Contract Support as a 
Separate Distinct Function  
Consistently among our interviews, we heard the adage, “if it had contract in it, it 
became a contracting issue.”  Unfortunately, this perspective is engrained in the culture 
of the DoD. Operational commanders have not been held responsible for managing 
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contractors until recently, and even with those efforts, the DoD has a tall hill to climb in 
changing that part of its culture. Current OCS integration initiatives are intended to 
change this view, but we feel these efforts are misdirected to eradicate this viewpoint. We 
believe by doctrinally creating OCS as a distinct function, separate from contracting, the 
DoD is setting the stage for this issue to be perpetuated.   
During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, J-TSCC became the default option for 
accounting for, integrating, and managing contractors. The commissions and oversight 
committees have cited a need for program management of contingency contracting; 
however, creating a specific directorate within the J4 and associated doctrine for OCS 
will create an environment for commanders to continue placing reliance in “someone 
else” to perform the duties that should be inherently theirs.   
Contractors have been identified as part of the total force and, as such, should be 
managed accordingly. Active duty, reserve, and civilian personnel are managed by the 
current system; with few exceptions, contractors should be managed in the same system. 
We recognize there are special command and control considerations regarding 
contractors. But educating the entire force on those boundaries addresses that. When 
creating an OPLAN, personnel (J1) should manage ALL personnel, logistics (J4) should 
manage ALL equipment, operations (J3) should integrate and synchronize the execution 
of the plan, and so forth. Identifying an organization that is responsible for OCS only 
provides a focal point for other directorates to defer to when it comes to planning for 
OCS.   
To truly shift the DoD culture to effectively integrate, synchronize, and manage 
contractor support during operations will require all planning elements to account for and 
manage their own requirements with the assistance of contingency contracting experts 
that provide the business advice as directed by regulation.   
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4. Recommendation 3: Ensure the Appropriate Personnel Are in the 
Right Place at the Right Time to Integrate Contingency Contracting 
Into Joint Operation Planning 
It is extremely important to recognize the importance of having experienced 
contingency contracting personnel involved in the joint operation planning process. In 
segregating contracting from OCS, there has been a foundation laid that will result in 
future challenges that could have been avoided. The DoD must plan to integrate 
contingency contracting operations with the operation plan. The focus at the combatant 
commands is being directed on what is now OCS, not on integrating contingency 
contracting. Allowing the Annex W to be written by planners with no contracting 
experience is a mistake that will likely result in continued challenges in effective 
contingency contracting execution. 
This issue becomes a question of who should be planning, at what level should 
they be positioned, and what experience should they have. Through our analysis, we have 
determined it is imperative to have contracting experts create the Annex W. This 
recommendation feeds into the previous recommendation of not making OCS a distinct 
function. If the appropriate personnel are available at the combatant commands that 
understand contracting, they will act as the liaison for other staff directorates to provide 
the needed support for all Annexes to address OCS issues, forcing operational 
commanders to own the responsibility of OCS management. 
Not only should seasoned contingency contracting officers be embedded at the 
combatant commands, positions related to contingency contracting should be filled by 
individuals with the appropriate level of experience and expertise. The Yoder Three-Tier 
Model provides a framework for leveraging the contracting officer and integrated planner 
and executor (IPE). We recommend ensuring positions are created at the Joint Staff, 
combatant commands, and Service staffs that are to be filled with individuals meeting 
these requirements 
Having the experienced personnel on staff will provide a conduit to educate the 
other staff directorates in contracting considerations, planning, and integration. Planners 
and logisticians do not have the expertise to act in an advisory capacity for contingency 
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contracting matters, nor should they be required to gain that expertise. The 
responsibilities outlined in the Joint Staff J4 OCS Manpower Study require a contingency 
contracting officer, yet none of the current planners have contingency contracting 
experience. We also recommend filling the JCASO Director position with a joint 
qualified contracting flag officer/general officer that meets the profile of the IPE.   
The contracting planners should be augmented with program managers. During 
the execution of contingency operations, program managers should be incorporated into 
the contingency contracting structure to provide oversight and management of identified 
areas pertaining to contract support. As stated, the management of people and equipment 
should already be managed through typical DoD channels, but contractor oversight 
during execution should have a programmatic approach that includes program managers, 
engineers, and quality assurance personnel. We recommend codifying Brig Gen Blake’s 
integration cell concept for application during contingency contracting execution.       
The placement of appropriately positioned and experienced personnel will also 
support the evolution of joint exercises that adequately rehearse contingency contracting 
execution and the integration, synchronization, and management of contractor support.   
5. Recommendation 4: Reorganize the DoD to Acknowledge and Elevate 
the Importance of Contingency Contracting 
a. Introduction 
As previously discussed, organizational change is not always the answer 
to addressing change. However, when the organization no longer effectively supports the 
new culture, organizational restructuring may be the key to influencing a paradigm shift. 
We recognize organizational change will meet resistance from the DoD in the face of 
force reductions and a diminishing budget, but based on our analysis, it is time for the 
DoD to seriously consider restructuring to fully integrate, synchronize, and manage 
contingency contracting and contractor support, especially in light of the fact that 
approximately 50% of the deployed forces are contractors, a fact that is unlikely to 
change for future contingency responses. In this section, we offer two recommendations. 
Recognizing our primary recommendation will meet resistance; we offer a second 
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recommendation that we believe is a useful compromise that partially addresses the 
challenges we have outlined through our analysis, while not completely reorganizing the 
current structure.   
b. Create a J10 Directorate 
We concur with the CWC recommendation for the DoD to create a J10, 
Contingency Contracting directorate. Removing contracting from the J4 and establishing 
a separate directorate with a flag/general officer billet as the director places the 
appropriate emphasis on contingency contracting needed to influence a change in the 
DoD culture. Change requires an executive-level champion with the authority and 
influence to drive the direction of the organization. 
While there are contending views on the issue, the majority of our 
interviewees, including non-contracting officials, agree with this recommendation. While 
approximately 80% of contracts supporting Iraq and Afghanistan are for logistics-related 
requirements, the fact that logistics is the largest customer does not support the placement 
of contracting within the logistics community. Contracting supports all capabilities across 
all tier one joint capability areas and is utilized by all requiring agencies in the same 
manner. When a requirement is identified that cannot be fulfilled organically or through 
existing means, the determination is made to contract for fulfillment of that requirement. 
Logistics is a requiring activity to contracting, on par with any other function that 
requires contract support. Generally speaking, contracting organizational structures are 
configured to ensure the requiring activity does not have direct control over the acquiring 
activity to avoid organizational conflicts of interest. 
Interestingly, though contracting falls within the J4, there are no 
permanent contracting positions on the combatant command staffs to support joint 
operation planning. This leaves logisticians to answer contracting specific inquiries, or 
the deferment to the associated Service contracting points of contact. There must be a 
home for contracting on the Joint, combatant command, and Service component staffs to 
effectively integrate contingency contracting into planning.   
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The new directorate would be the focal point for contingency contracting 
planning and integrating the contracting strategy with operations under the direction of a 
joint qualified contracting flag/general officer. The staff should be comprised of 
personnel with the ability to provide the needed expertise to plan contingency contracting 
operations, to include contract management and oversight. It is difficult to ascertain the 
specific staff requirements without identifying the complete list of responsibilities; 
however, based on our assessment the organization would need, at a minimum  
 Contracting expertise, 
 Forensic finance and intelligence expertise, 
 Defense agencies liaison capabilities, 
 Inter-agency liaison capabilities (i.e., USAID, Department of State), 
 Acquisition-related expertise (i.e., program managers, quality assurance, 
engineering), and 
 Planning expertise. 
We recommend there be an OCS planner within each of the other 
directorates. This planner would be responsible for acting as the liaison with the J10. This 
planner will create the OCS portion of their assigned Annex and will coordinate with the 
J10 for guidance and ensure J10 has the appropriate information to complete the Annex 
W. This would place the planning for OCS requirements back in the hands of the owning 
commanders and organizations, and force them to take responsibility for the contract 
support needed to perform assigned missions.   
The J10 would also be responsible for providing input to the combatant 
command on the establishment of a lead service for contracting or JTSCC. Ideally, the 
J10 would have the capability to perform historical and market analysis to determine if 
strategic sourcing efforts would be appropriate to support OPLANS. While no 
contracting authority resides within the combatant command, having a central element 
evaluating the need for ready on the shelf contracts would provide focused guidance to 
the Services for action. 
As the J10 structure filters down through the organization structure of the 
DoD, the responsibilities would include obtaining and updating market intelligence for 
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assigned areas of operation to support operation planning. The J10 structure also would 
provide the common operating picture during execution of an operation. The J10 director 
could be dual-hatted as the head of contracting activity during execution and stand up of 
a J-TSCC. Because the J10 concept would trickle down to the JTF staff, there would be a 
contracting liaison official to coordinate with the combatant command J10, JTSCC, and 
other government contracting activities operating in the area of operations. The JTF J10 
would act as the business advisor to the JTF commander and the integrator of 
contingency contracting operations. 
Creating the J10 directorate at the Joint and combatant commands and 
filtering that organizational structure down to the subordinate and Service commands will 
provide the foundation to institutionalize OCS where it should be, at the operational 
commander level. Having a “seat at the big table” is important to influencing an 
organization. The current lack of contracting personnel on commanders’ staffs and the 
placement of OCS deep within the J4 structure precludes contracting representation, 
which is critical in today’s military landscape. 
c. Begin Filling the Deputy Director J4 Positions with Contracting 
Personnel 
Recognizing the DoD will not likely undergo a reorganization of the 
current staff directorates, we offer a secondary recommendation. If contracting is to 
remain a responsibility of the J4, we recommend ensuring that the J4 Deputy Director is 
filled by an experienced contracting official. This will provide the required expertise 
within the J4 to engage with other staff directorates to push OCS planning throughout the 
organization. While not ideal, this will still elevate the position of contracting as 
discussed in the previous recommendation. 
Ideally, the individual filling the Deputy Director billet will meet the 
requirements of the YTTM IPE. Under this construct, the OCS division would become 
the contingency contracting section and report directly to the Deputy Director. The 
contingency contracting section should be responsible for the functions outlined for the 
J10 and requires similar staffing expertise, as previously outlined. OCS planners should 
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shift from the J4 to the other directorates and coordinate with the contingency contracting 
J4 staff for input into the Annex W, and provide business advice and guidance on 
developing requirements and contract solutions.   
The structure of this organization would be very similar to the J10 concept 
with the exception of having a dedicated directorate and flag/general officer. While this 
compromise will provide the needed expertise on the commanders’ staff for effectively 
integrating contingency contracting into planning, this option will likely require 
additional time and senior leader support to shift the culture of the DoD. The reality 
facing the military is that if something is important, there will be a senior leader 
responsible for ensuring it is accomplished. Without the rank and authority associated 
with a separate directorate, the Deputy Director will be required to rely heavily on the 
buy-in of the J4 Director for support. While not impossible, cultural change will likely 
come slower and potentially not as easily under this construct.   
6. Recommendation 5: Ensure the Military School Systems Incorporate 
OCS Education 
Every member of the military is indoctrinated into the culture of the DoD through 
military training and education. The training curriculum supports those areas the DoD 
believes important for all members to embrace and understand. Understanding the 
elements of the total force should be required at all levels. Curriculum should be tailored 
for each level to address management issues as necessary.   
These requirements should apply to all Service and Joint military education. The 
military of today is a leaner force relying heavily on contractor support when called to 
respond to a contingency. As such, the force must understand how contractors fit within 
the organization, how to integrate them, manage them, and support them. This is 




In this chapter, we provided five recommendations for the DoD to improve 
contingency contracting operations and support the institutionalization of OCS into the 
culture of the DoD. We believe these recommendations are in line with the commission 
and oversight committee recommendations outlined in our literature review and support 
the call to manage contingency contracting and contractor support more effectively and 
efficiently.  
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we provide a summary of our research, conclusions drawn from 
the study, and areas highlighted for further research. As a learning institution, it is 
imperative for the DoD to not only capture the lessons learned from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, but institutionalize the needed changes to ensure the same challenges are 
not repeated in future operations. In this study, we sought to capture lessons learned from 
contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this report, we provided 
the background and purpose, the research questions developed, the methodology for 
answering the research questions, a comprehensive literature review of the issues 
associated with contingency contracting, a discussion of the lessons learned from 
strategic leaders, a focused analysis on the integration of contingency contracting in joint 
planning, a presentation of recommendations as a result of our analysis, conclusions from 
our study, and finally, areas for future research. 
B. SUMMARY 
The loss of organic resources during the past 21 years of force restructuring and 
reductions left many capability gaps and the increased need for contracted support. OIF, 
OND, and OEF only magnified the DoD’s reliance on contracted support, and forced 
needed focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of contingency contracting activities. 
The evolution of contingency contracting has not only been in scope, but in the 
expectations placed on contingency contracting officers, the use of contingency 
contracting as a battlefield enabler, and the recognition of the need to manage contractors 
as part of the total force. 
The purpose of this research was to capture valuable corporate knowledge from 
the senior leaders responsible for contingency contracting operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as the senior leaders responsible for current DoD initiatives to 
institutionalize OCS. Our research served two primary purposes. First, to document the 
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history and evolution of C-JTSCC, and second, to use the consolidated lessons learned 
from senior leaders to shape recommendations to improve future contingency contracting 
operations. 
In this study, we focused on senior-level leadership within the DoD, both from the 
acquisition and non-acquisition communities to capture strategic-level lessons learned. 
We utilized two frameworks to analyze our data, depending on whether the data was 
contracting execution related. For contract execution-related data, we categorized the 
findings using the six-phase contract management process. For non-contract execution-
related data, we utilized DOTmLPF-P to categorize the findings.  
C. CONCLUSION 
In this section, we will conclude our research by referring back to our research 
questions stated in Chapter I. We assessed the following primary research question: 
 What conclusions and recommendations can be derived from assessing 
strategic lessons learned from contracting operations in OIF, OND, and 
OEF to improve contingency contracting operations in the future? 
Based on our interviews, we were able to identify several lessons learned that 
should be addressed by the DoD and considered in planning for future operations. 
Through the application of our two frameworks, we were able to identify 25 trends within 
the data that should be addressed by the DoD. Upon completing our initial analysis, we 
conducted a secondary root cause analysis on the findings to determine if there was one 
cause that could be attributed to these challenge areas. Based on that analysis and further 
review of our data, we determined that the lack of planning for and integration of 
contingency contracting during Phase Zero contributed to the challenges faced during 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
The DoD is taking steps to integrate and plan for contractor support through OCS 
initiatives. However, we identified a fundamental difference of opinion between the 
organizations responsible for the institutionalization of OCS and the organizations 
responsible for executing contingency contracting. Doctrine and organizational structure 
fail to support the integration of contingency contracting into the joint planning process 
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and do not address the issue of integrating and synchronizing contingency contracting as 
identified by multiple commission and oversight committees.   
To fully integrate contingency contracting into joint operation planning while 
institutionalizing OCS will require experienced senior-level contracting leaders 
positioned appropriately to ensure that the operational community takes ownership of 
their OCS responsibilities. Contingency contracting officers should be acting as the 
business advisor to the operational commanders, to assist in planning for the integration, 
management, and synchronization of contractors in contingency operations. 
In Chapter 4, we answered our secondary research question:  
 How did the organization and operations of C-JTSCC evolve since its 
inception in 2004? 
We were able to interview commanders assigned to C-JTSCC between 2005 and 
2012. These interviews, combined with our literature review, provided an accurate 
depiction of the challenges faced as the organization grew. The establishment and 
evolution of C-JTSCC provides the framework necessary to address organizational 
structure for future large-scale operations. Ensuring the JTSCC construct is appropriately 
planned for, to include personnel, authority designations, command relationships, 
coordination authorities, and responsibilities, is paramount to not reliving the challenges 
of the past.   
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During the course of this study several areas were identified for further research. 
The following list represents our recommendations for areas of further research. 
 For each combatant command, collect and assess contingency contracting 
and required contract support data from operations for each contingency 
response over the past 10 years (excluding Iraq and Afghanistan) to 
determine the 80% solution for a) the level of contract support needed for 
any given OPLAN, b) the projected contingency contracting requirements, 
c) the projected contingency contracting officer manning and experience 
requirements, and d) the most likely theater contract support arrangement.  
 Conduct an assessment of the use of mentorship in the contracting 
community to determine if contingency contracting officers are receiving 
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the appropriate level of mentorship to promote individual professional 
development. 
 Create a model to estimate the contracting officer representative 
requirements for a given OPLAN. 
 Conduct an analysis of the military school systems to determine the 
training gaps regarding OCS and contingency contracting. 
 Evaluate the current policies associated with the designation of executive 
agent versus head of contracting activity to determine if it is appropriate 
for the DoD to reconsider the current delegation flow of contract authority. 
 Develop a means to adequately and accurately assess the OPLANS for 
OCS and contingency contracting functions during joint exercises,  
placing particular focus on a means to evaluate operations in Phases 4 and 
5.   
 Conduct an analysis of the objectives associated with the allocation of 
funding to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine if the 
desired effects were obtained via that influx of resources. 
 Conduct an analysis of CJITF-Shafafiyat to establish a model to 
incorporate into joint doctrine to ensure transparency and accountability in 
future contingency operations. 
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APPENDIX D. DODI 3020.41, DECEMBER 20, 2011, ENCLOSURE 4 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2011)  
RESPONSIBILITIES 
1. USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L) shall develop, coordinate, establish, and oversee the 
implementation of DoD policy for managing OCS. 
2. DIRECTOR, DPAP. The Director, DPAP, under the authority, direction, and control 
of the USD(AT&L), shall: 
a. Oversee all acquisition and procurement policy matters including the 
development of DoD policies for contingency contracting and the coordinated 
development and publication of contract prescriptions and standardized contract clauses 
in Reference (e) and associated contracting officer guidance in Reference (y). This 
includes working collaboratively with OSD Principal Staff Assistants, CJCS 
representatives, and the DoD Component Heads in the development of OCS related 
policies and ensuring that contracting equities are addressed. 
b. Develop contingency contracting policy and implement other OCS related 
policies into DFARS in support of applicable contingency operations. 
c. Ensure implementation by contracting officers and CORs of relevant laws and 
policies in References (d), (e), and (y). 
d. Propose legislative initiatives that support accomplishment of the contingency 
contracting mission. 
e. Improve DoD business processes for contingency contracting while working in 
conjunction with senior procurement executives across the DoD. Assist other OSD 
Principal Staff Assistants, CJCS representatives, and DoD Component Heads in efforts to 
improve other OCS related business processes by ensuring contracting equities and 
interrelationships are properly addressed. 
f. Support efforts to resource the OCS toolset under the lead of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support (DASD (PS)) pursuant to 
subparagraph 3.f.(2) of this enclosure. 
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g. Coordinate activities with other Government agencies to provide unity of 
effort. Maintain an open, user-friendly source for reports and lessons learned and ensure 
their coordinated development and publication through participation on the FAR Council. 
 
h. As a member of the Contracting Functional Integrated Planning Team, 
collaborate with the Defense Acquisition University to offer education for all 
contingency contracting personnel. 
i. Participate in the OCS Functional Capability Integration Board (FCIB) to 
facilitate development of standard joint OCS concepts, policies, doctrine, processes, 
plans, programs, tools, reporting, and training to improve effectiveness and efficiency. 
j. In concert with the supported Combatant Commander, coordinate in advance of 
execution Executive Agency for Head of Contracting Activity requisite OPLANS, 
CONPLANS, and operations, where a lead service or a Joint Theater Support Contracting 
Command (JTSCC) will be established. 
 
3. DASD (PS). The DASD (PS), under the authority, direction, and control of the 
USD(AT&L) through the ASD(L&MR), is responsible for oversight and management to 
enable the orchestration, integration, and synchronization of the preparation and 
execution of acquisitions for DoD contingency operations, and shall: 
a. Coordinate policy relating to field operations and contingency contractor 
personnel in forward areas and the battle-space. In cooperation with the Joint Staff, 
Military Departments, and OSD, serve as the DoD focal point for the community of 
practice and the community of interest for efforts to improve OCS program management 
and oversight. 
b. Co-chair with the Vice Director, Directorate for Logistics, Joint Staff, (VDJ4) 
the OCS FCIB to lead and coordinate OCS with OSD, Military Department, and Defense 
Agency senior procurement officers in accordance with the OCS FCIB Charter 
(Reference (bj)). 
c. Ensure integration of joint OCS activities across other joint capability areas and 
joint warfighting functions. 
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d. Provide input to the Logistics Capability Portfolio Manager and the CJCS in 
the development of capability priorities; review final capability priorities; and provide 
advice to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) in developing the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (Reference (bk) and defense planning and programming 
guidance, as appropriate. 
e. Serve as the DoD lead to: 
(1)  Develop a programmatic approach for the preparation and execution 
of orchestrating, integrating, and synchronizing acquisitions for contingency 
operations. 
(2)  Establish and oversee DoD policies for OCS program management in 
the planning and execution of combat, post-combat, and other contingency 
operations involving the Military Departments, other Government agencies, 
multinational forces, and non-governmental organizations, as required. 
f. Improve DoD business practices for OCS. 
(1)  In consultation with the USD(P&R); the Director, DPAP; and the 
CJCS, ensure a joint web-based contract visibility and contractor personnel 
accountability system (currently SPOT) is designated and implemented, including 
business rules for its use. 
(2)  Lead the effort to resource the OCS toolset providing improved OCS 
program management, planning, OCS preparation of the battlefield, systems 
support, and theater support contracts, contractor accountability systems, and 
automated contract process capabilities, including reach back from remote 
locations to the national defense contract base (e.g., hardware and software). 
g. In consultation with the Heads of the OSD and DoD Components, provide 
oversight of experimentation efforts focusing on concept development for OCS 
execution. 
h. Serve as the DoD lead for the oversight of training and education of non-
acquisition, non- contracting personnel identified to support OCS efforts. 
4. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA). The Director, DLA, under 
the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), through the ASD(L&MR) shall, 
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through the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO), provide enabler 
OCS support to CCDR OCS planning efforts and training events, and, when requested, 
advise, assist, and support JFC oversight of OCS operations. Specifically, the Director, 
JCASO, shall: 
a. Provide OCS planning support to the CCDR through Joint OCS Planners 
embedded within the geographic Combatant Command staff. Maintain situational 
awareness of all plans with significant OCS equity for the purposes of exercise support 
and preparation for operational deployment. From JCASO forward involvement in 
exercises and operational deployments, develop and submit lessons learned that result in 
improved best practices and planning. 
b. When requested, assist the Joint Staff in support of the Chairman’s OCS 
responsibilities listed in paragraph 10 of this enclosure. 
c. Facilitate improvement in OCS planning and execution through capture and 
review of joint OCS lessons learned. In cooperation with United States Joint Forces 
Command (USJFCOM), Military Services, other DoD Components, and interagency 
partners, collect joint operations focused OCS lessons learned and best practices from 
contingency operations and exercises to inform OCS policy and recommend doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTmLPF-P) 
solutions. 
d. Participate in joint exercises, derive OCS best practices from after-action 
reports and refine tactics/techniques/procedures, deployment drills, and personal and 
functional training (to include curriculum reviews and recommendations). Assist in the 
improvement of OCS related policy, doctrine, rules, tools, and processes. 
e. Provide the geographic CCDRs, when requested, with deployable experts to 
assist the CCDR and subordinate JFCs in managing OCS requirements in a contingency 
environment. 
f. Practice continuous OCS-related engagement with interagency representatives and 
multinational partners, as appropriate and consistent with existing authorities. 
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g. Participate in the OCS FCIB to facilitate development of standard joint OCS 
concepts, policies, doctrine, processes, plans, programs, tools, reporting, and training to 
improve effectiveness and efficiency. 
5. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY (DCMA). The 
Director, DCMA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), through 
the ASD(Acquisition),  plans for and performs contingency contract administration 
services in support of the CJCS and CCDRs in the planning and execution of military 
operations, consistent with DCMA’s established responsibilities and  functions. 
6. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I), 
as the Principal Staff Assistant for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security in 
accordance with DoDD 5143.01 (Reference (bl)), shall: 
a. Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD security 
programs and guidance for those contractors covered in DoDI 5220.22 (Reference (bm)). 
b. Assist the USD(AT&L) in determining appropriate contract clauses for 
intelligence, counterintelligence, and security requirements. 
c. Establish policy for contractor employees under the terms of the applicable 
contracts that support background investigations in compliance with subparts 4.1301, 
4.1303, and 52.204–9 of Reference (d). 
d. Coordinate security and counterintelligence policy affecting contract linguists 
with the Secretary of the Army pursuant to Reference (ab). 
7. ASD(HA). The ASD(HA), under the authority, direction, and control of the 
USD(P&R), shall assist in the development of policy addressing the reimbursement of 
funds for qualifying medical support received by contingency contractor personnel in 
applicable contingency operations. 
8. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR READINESS 
(DASD(READINESS)). The DASD(Readiness) under the authority, direction, and 
control of the USD(P&R), shall develop  policy and set standards for managing contract 
linguist capabilities supporting the total force to include requirements for linguists and 
tracking linguist and role players to ensure that force readiness and security requirements 
are met. 
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9. DIRECTOR, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT DATA CENTER (DMDC). The Director, 
DMDC, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), through the 
Director, DoD Human Resources Activity, shall: 
a. Serve as the central repository of information for all historical data on 
contractor personnel who have been issued CAC and are included in SPOT or its 
successor, that is to be archived. 
b. Ensure all data elements of SPOT or its successor to be archived are 
USD(P&R)-approved and DMDC-system compatible, and ensure the repository is 
protected at a level commensurate with the sensitivity of the information contained 
therein. 
10. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) (USD (C))/CHIEF 
FINANCIAL OFFICER (CFO), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. The USD(C)/CFO 
shall develop policy addressing the reimbursement of funds for qualifying medical 
support received by contingency contractor personnel in applicable contingency 
operations. 
11. SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DIRECTORS OF 
THE DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES. The Secretaries of the 
Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field 
Activities shall incorporate this Instruction into applicable policy, doctrine, programming, 
training, and operations and ensure: 
a. Assigned contracting activities populate SPOT with the required data in 
accordance with Reference (bb) and that information has been reviewed for security and 
OPSEC concerns in accordance with paragraph 3.c(2)(e) of Enclosure 2. 
b. CAAF meet all theater and/or JOA admission procedures and requirements 
prior to deploying to or entering the theater or JOA. 
c. Contracting officers include in the contract: 
 
(1)  Appropriate terms and conditions and clause(s) in accordance with 
subpart 252.225–7040 of Reference (e) and Reference (y). 
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(2)  Specific deployment and theater admission requirements according to 
subpart 252.225–7040 of Reference (e), Reference (y), and the applicable CCDR 
websites. 
(3)  Specific medical preparation requirements according to paragraph 3.h. 
of Enclosure2.   
(4)  The level of protection to be provided to contingency contractor 
personnel in accordance with paragraph 4.e. of Enclosure 2. Contracting officers 
shall follow the procedures on the applicable CCDR websites to obtain theater-
specific requirements. 
(5)  Government-furnished support and equipment to be provided to 
contractor personnel with prior coordination and approval of theater adjudication 
authorities, as referenced on the applicable CCDR websites. 
(6)  A requirement for contractor personnel to show and have verified by 
the COR, proof of professional certifications/proficiencies as stipulated in the 
contract 
d. Standardized contract accountability financial and oversight processes are 
developed and implemented. 
e. Requirements packages are completed to include all required documentation 
(e.g., letter of justification, performance work statement, nominated COR, independent 
Government estimate (IGE)) are completed and funding strategies are articulated and 
updated as required. 
f. CORs are planned for, resourced, and sustained as necessary to ensure proper 
contract management capabilities are in place and properly executed. 
g. Assigned contracting activities plan for, and ensure the contractor plans for, the 
resources necessary to implement and sustain contractor accountability in forward areas 
through SPOT or its successor. 
h. CSIPs and CMPs are developed as directed by the supported CCDR. 
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i. The risk of premature loss of mission-essential OCS is assessed and the 
mitigation of the loss of contingency contractor personnel in wartime or contingency 
operations who are performing essential contractor services is properly planned for. 
j. Assigned contracting activities comply with theater business clearance and 
contract administration delegation policies and processes when implemented by CCDRs 
to support any phase of a contingency operation. 
k. Agency equities are integrated and conducted in concert with the CCDR’s 
plans for OCS intelligence of the battlefield. 
l. The implementation of a certification of, and a waiver process for, contractor-
performed deployment and redeployment processing in lieu of a formally designated 
group, joint, or Military Department deployment center. 
m. Support the effort to resource the OCS toolset under the lead of the DASD 
(PS) pursuant to subparagraph 3.h.(2) of this enclosure. 
12. CJCS. The CJCS shall: 
a. Where appropriate, incorporate program management and elements of this 
Instruction into joint doctrine, joint instructions and manuals, joint training, joint 
education, joint capability development, joint strategic planning system (e.g., JOPES), 
and CCDR oversight. 
b. Co-chair with theVDJ4 the OCS FCIB to lead and coordinate OCS with OSD, 
Military Department, and Defense Agency senior procurement officers in accordance 
with Reference (bj). Provide the OCS FCIB with input and awareness of the CJCS 
functions and activities as defined in sections 153 and 155 of Reference (k). 
c. Perform OCS related missions and functions as outlined in the Joint Staff 
Manual 5100.01 (Reference (bn)) and the Chairman’s authorities as defined in Reference 
(k). 
13. GEOGRAPHIC CCDRS AND CDRUSSOCOM. The geographic CCDRs and the 
CDRUSSOCOM (when they are the supported commander) shall: 
a. Plan and execute OCS program management, contract support integration, and 
contractor management actions in all applicable contingency operations in their AOR. 
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b. Conduct integrated planning to determine and synchronize contract support 
requirements to facilitate OCS planning and contracting and contractor management 
oversight. 
c. In coordination with the Services and functional components, identify military 
capabilities shortfalls in all the joint warfighting functions that require contracted 
solutions. Ensure these requirements are captured in the appropriate CCDR, subordinate 
JFC, Service component and combat support agency CSIP or other appropriate section of 
the CONPLAN with TPFDD, OPLAN or OPORD. 
d. Require Service component commanders and supporting Defense Agencies and 
DoD Field Activities to: 
(1)  Identify and incorporate contract support and operational acquisition 
requirements in supporting plans to OPLANs and CONPLANs with TPFDD, and 
to synchronize their supporting CSIPs, CMPs, and contracted requirements and 
execution plans within geographic CCDR OPLANs and CONPLANs with 
TPFDD. 
(2)  Review their supporting CSIPs and CMPs and identify funding 
strategies for particular contracted capabilities identified to support each OPLAN 
and CONPLAN. 
(3)  Develop acquisition-ready requirements documents as identified in 
CSIPs including Performance Work Statements, IGEs, task order change 
documents, and sole source justifications. 
(4)  Ensure CAAF and their equipment are incorporated into TPFDD 
development and deployment execution processes in accordance with Reference 
(s). 
(5)  Ensure financial management policies and procedures are in place in 
accordance with DoD 7000.14-R (Reference (bo)) and applicable service specific 
financial management implementation guidance.” 
e. Develop and publish comprehensive OCS plans. Synchronize OCS 
requirements among all Service components and Defense Agencies and DoD Field 
Activities operating within or in support of their AORs. Optimize operational unity of 
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effort by analyzing existing and projected theater support and external support contracts 
to minimize, reduce, and eliminate redundant and overlapping requirements and 
contracted capabilities. 
f. Ensure OCS requirements for the Defense Agencies, multinational partners, and 
other Governmental agencies are addressed and priorities of effort for resources are 
deconflicted and synchronized with OCS to military forces. 
g. Ensure policies and procedures are in place for reimbursing Government-
furnished support of  contingency contractor personnel, including (but not limited to) 
subsistence, military air, intra-theater lift, and medical treatment, when applicable. 
h. Ensure CAAF and equipment requirements (regardless if provided by the 
Government or the contractor) in support of an operation are incorporated into plan 
TPFDDs. 
i. Review Service component assessments of the risk of premature loss of 
essential contractor services and review contingency plans to mitigate potential premature 
loss of essential contractor services. 
j. Establish and communicate to contracting officers theater and/or JOA CAAF 
admission procedures and requirements, including country and theater clearance, waiver 
authority, immunizations, required training or equipment, and any restrictions necessary 
to ensure proper deployment, visibility, security, accountability, and redeployment of 
CAAF to their AORs and/or JOAs. Implement Reference (z). 
k. Coordinate with the Office of the USD(P) to ensure special area, country, and 
theater personnel clearance requirements are current in accordance with Reference (z), 
and coordinate with affected agencies (e.g., Intelligence Community agencies) to ensure 
that entry requirements do not impact mission accomplishment. 
l. Determine and distribute specific theater OCS organizational guidance in plans, 
to include command, control, and coordination, and HCA relationships. 
m. Develop and distribute AOR/JOA-wide contractor management requirements, 
directives, and procedures into a separate contractor management plan as an annex or the 
appropriate section of the appropriate plan. 
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n. Establish, staff, and execute appropriate OCS-related boards, centers, and 
working groups.  
o. Integrate OCS into mission rehearsals and training exercises. 
p. When contracts are being or will be executed in an AOR/JOA, designate and 
identify the organization responsible for managing and prescribing processes to: 
(1)  Establish procedures and assign authorities for adjudicating requests 
for provision of Government-furnished equipment and services to contractors 
when such support is operationally required. This should include procedures for 
communicating approval to the requiring activity and the contracting officer for 
incorporation into contracts. 
(2)  Authorize trained and qualified contractor personnel to carry weapons 
for personal protection not related to the performance of contract-specific duties. 
(3)  Establish procedures for, including coordination of, inter-theater 
strategic movements and intra-theater operational and tactical movements of 
contractor personnel and equipment. 
(4)  Collect information on and refer to the appropriate Government 
agency offenses, arrests, and incidents of alleged misconduct committed by 
contractor personnel on or off-duty. 
(5)  Collect and maintain information relating to CAAF and selected non 
CAAF kidnappings, injuries, and deaths. 
(6) Identify the minimum standards for conducting and processing 
background checks, and for issuing access badges to HN, LN, and TCN personnel 
employed, directly or indirectly, through Government-awarded contracts. 
(7)  Remove CAAF from the designated operational area who do not meet 
medical deployment standards, whose contract period of performance has expired, 
or who are noncompliant with contract requirements. 
(8)  Designate additional contractor personnel not otherwise covered by 
personnel recovery policy for personnel recovery support in accordance with 
Reference (av). 
 172
(9) Ensure that contract oversight plans are developed, and that adequate 
personnel to assist in contract administration are identified and requested, in either 
a separate contractor management plan as an annex of plans and orders and/or 
within appropriate parts of plans and orders. 
(10)  Develop a security plan for the protection of contingency contractor 
personnel according to paragraph 4.e. of Enclosure 2. 
(11)  Develop and implement theater business clearance and, if required 
Contract Administration Delegation policies and procedures to ensure visibility of 
and a level of control over systems support and external support contracts 
providing or delivering contracted support in contingency operations. 
q. Enforce the individual arming policy and use of private security contractors in 
accordance with Reference (aq) and DoDD 5210.56 (Reference (bp)). 
r. Establish a process for reviewing exceptions to medical standards (waivers) for 
the conditions in section 11 of Enclosure 3, including a mechanism to track and archive 
all approved and denied waivers and the medical conditions requiring waiver. 
Additionally, serve as the final approval/disapproval authority for all exceptions to this 
policy, except in special operations where the TSOC commander has the final approval or 
disapproval authority. 
s. Establish mechanisms for ensuring contractors are required to report offenses 
alleged to have been committed by or against contractor personnel to appropriate 
investigative authorities. 
t. Assign responsibility for providing victim and witness protection and assistance 
to contractor personnel in connection with alleged offenses. 
u. Ensure applicable predeployment, deployment, in-theater management, and 
redeployment guidance and procedures are readily available and accessible by planners, 
requiring activities, contracting officers, contractors, contractor personnel and other 
interested parties on a webpage, and related considerations and requirements are 
integrated into contracts through contract terms, consistent with security considerations 
and requirements. 
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v. Ensure OCS preparation of the battlefield is vetted with intelligence agencies 
when appropriate. 
w. Integrate OCS planning with operational planning across all primary and 
special staff sections. 
14. FUNCTIONAL CCDRS, EXCEPT CDRUSJFCOM WHEN A SUPPORTED CCDR. 
The functional CCDRs utilizing OCS shall ensure their Commands follow the procedures 
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APPENDIX E. OCS ANALYST AND PLANNER SKILL SETS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES (FROM JOINT STAFF J4, 2012) 
Analyst and planner skills are very similar. Any differences are related to the level of 
subject matter expertise and experience in either planning or acquisition. The OCS 
analyst must possess significant contracting expertise and be conversant and 
knowledgeable in operations and planning. The OCS planner must possess extensive 
knowledge and experience in operations and planning and be a functional subject matter 
expert in logistics, communications, engineering, or some other field. The mutual skill set 
for both planner and analyst includes knowledge in the following areas: 
 Planning 
 Acquisition1 
 Logistics (or other Joint Capability Area) 
 Operations 
Responsibilities of the OCS analyst and planner are shared and accomplished by OCS 
supervisory and non-supervisory analysts and planners alike. This further illustrates the 
great variety of tasks that OCS personnel are required to accomplish on a daily basis. 
Where there is a complete lack of OCS personnel within a headquarters, none of these 
responsibilities are being accomplished. In such situations, ad hoc arrangements are being 
made to meet OCS requirements. Those arrangements usually include personnel that have 
no previous experience with either OCS or contracting. 
 
Analysts and planners alike must be ready to take on the following responsibilities: 
 Act as single command point of contact for OCS within the supported activity. 
 Develop and update OCS-related command guidance, instructions, and policy. 
 Adjudicate contract support among Service components when planning and 
conducting active operations to ensure a fair share of available contracting 
capability. 
 Manage and develop agendas for periodic command logistics procurement 
support boards 
(CLPSB). 
 Access and use information contained in the SPOT system, and be able to train 
others in the use of that system. 
 Manage and conduct periodic OCS-related working group meetings to coordinate 
CLPSB issues, and provide input to the periodic command CLPSB. 
                                                 
 
1 OCS does not require acquisition certification, but some level of acquisition knowledge is 
recommended in all OCS- related positions. Basic acquisition knowledge because the OCS planner may at 
times advise supported commands and staffs on how to best close an operational gap or implement a course 
of action with a contracting solution. 
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 Participate in component joint acquisition review boards (JARBs) as an observer 
and subject matter expert. 
 Maintain the common operating picture of contracting activity within the staff, 
component, interagency, international organization, and non-governmental 
organization areas of responsibility. 
 Assist offices of security cooperation and security cooperation office defense 
attaches (SCO/DAT) in the development of contract requirements and the tasking 
of contracting support activities to meet those requirements. 
 Ensure OCS is included in headquarters and component exercise scenarios and 
story lines, and document exercise mission scenario events. 
 Provide OCS-related training and staff assistance (statements of work, 
independent cost estimates, etc.) to HQ staff and components. 
 Engage with JCASO for additional technical and operational support to 
potentially stand up the JTSCC or lead Service for contracting. 
 Represent CCDR in Joint Staff J4, OSD (DPAP and [DASD (PS)], and 
interagency OCS- related coordination and forums. 
 Coordinate with Department of State representatives to mitigate contracting issues 
that involve embassy support of DoD personnel and DoD programs. 
 Coordinate with all CCMD HQ staff to assist in the review and analysis of 
CONPLANs, OPORDs, etc., and to evaluate contract solutions for force structure 
shortfalls in operational planning. 
 Coordinate with interagency command representatives on support requirements. 
 Capture and document OCS lessons learned. 
 Document OCS in OPORDs, EXORDs, CONPLANs, and OPLAN Annex Ws. 
 Monitor command use of SPOT, The Officer Projection Specialty System 
(TOPSS), and JAMMS. Act as the command’s SPOT program point of contact for 
coordination of database parameters, program report formats, and similar 
programmatic issues. 
 Provide subject-matter expertise to the Joint Staff and OSD concerning OCS-
related issues. 
 Assist with periodic CCMD contracting conferences, including facility selection, 
agenda preparation, announcement preparation, guest speaker coordination, 
attendee management, conduct, documentation of lessons learned, and post-
conference activities. 
 Attend and participate in periodic plans, security cooperation, and exercise 
conferences as participant and presenter. 
 Maintain contractor theater entrance requirements for the command. 
 Participate in operational planning team meetings. 
 Monitor and provide OCS-related audit review and GAO and DoD Inspector 
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General assistance. 
 Attend (as participant and presenter) JCS OCS conferences, community of 
interest meetings, and JCS J4 OCS meetings and conference calls. 
 Participate in daily command update briefings. 
 Conduct component and component contracting support activity coordination and 
staff visits. 
 Research, interpret, and analyze applicable federal and DoD acquisition 
regulations as staff SME. 
 Coordinate with the J3 requests to use private security contractor support with the 
appropriate command operations and legal staffs, and monitor approval process 
for use of private security companies and private security company personnel by 
DoD activities in the AOR. 
 Coordinate with DCMA for contract administration support when necessary. 
 Understand, and in some cases coordinate, the use of acquisition cross-Service 
agreements as an alternative to contracting. 
 Monitor ongoing humanitarian assistance construction project coordination 
involving the engineer and logistics staff activities, and assist with the designation 
of component support for projects and compliance with completion schedule. 
 Develop and synchronizes OCS objectives, scenarios and events to train 
personnel to combat readiness standards and to test new concepts in an exercise 
environment. 
 Remain knowledgeable of the chain of command from the National Command 
Authorities to the individual Military Service headquarters and to the unified 
commands, including the primary missions and responsibilities of the combatant 
commands. 
 Understand joint plan development and the review cycle, including component 
supporting plan development, CCDR plan development, and JCS review and 
approval. 
 Develop an in-depth knowledge of OCS policies, directives, doctrine, laws and 
the ability to apply them in an operational setting. 
 Understand military campaign planning and execution as it passes through 
progressive stages of operations. 
The following are among the general OCS analyst and planner skills, knowledge, and 
experience requirements: 
 Knowledge of sources and means to resolve problems 
 Skill in personal relations 
 Skill in contract support integration and contractor management in operations 
 Leadership experience initiating needed programs or analysis 
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 Ability to originate new ideas, projects, studies, and methodologies 
 Ability to execute projects or studies within established financial and time 
constraints 
 Ability to develop and utilize appropriate data collection techniques 
 Ability to apply analytical tools to solve complex, real-world problems 
 Knowledge of cost and economic analysis principles, techniques, and practices 
 Ability to communicate well, both orally and in writing 
 Ability to plan and organize work 
 Ability to gather, analyze, organize, and present data and supporting analysis 
 Ability to lead and organize special study teams and task forces with members 
from different organizations and commands 
 Ability to identify problems and develop innovative solutions 
 Ability to develop, prepare, coordinate, staff, and implement policies, procedures, 
programs, and directives 
 Knowledge of regulatory requirements, policies, and special procedures 
 Ability to independently draft military messages, warning and execute orders, 
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APPENDIX G. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
1. Adams, Douglas L., Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army 
Date: 28 Sep 2012  Location: Ft. Shafter, Hawaii 
Command Sergeant Major, 413th CSB, Present 
 
2. Acquisition, Logistics & Technology – Integration Office Staff, USA CASCOM 
Date: 29 Jun 2012  Location: Ft Lee, Virginia  
  
3. Bass, Joseph L., Brigadier General, U.S. Army 
Date: 3 Aug 2012  Location: Washington DC 
Commander, Expeditionary Contracting Command, Aug 2011 - Apr 2012 
Commander, 408th CSB, Jun 2007 - Jun 2008 
Deputy Commander, ICO / PARC-I (OIF), Mar 2007 – Jun 2007 
 
4. Blake, Casey D., Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force  
Date: 11 Sep 2012  Location: VTC, NPS 
Senior Contracting Official – Afghanistan, Apr 2011 - May 2012 
 
5. Brown, R. Mark, Major General, U.S. Army  
Date: 4 Oct 2012  Location: VTC, NPS 
Commander, C-JTSCC, Present 
 
6. Cottrell, Daniel T., Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)  
Date: 30 Jul 2012  Location: Redstone Arsenal, AL 
Senior Contracting Official – Afghanistan, May 2009 - Jun 2010 
 
7. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy - Contingency Contracting Staff 
Date: 2 Aug 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
 
8. Dussault, Kathleen M., Rear Admiral (Upper Half), U.S. Navy 
 Date: 25 Jun 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
Commander, Task Force 2010, Mar 2009 – Aug 2009  
Commander, JCC-I/A, Jan 2008 - Feb 2009 
 
9. Ginman, Richard T., 
Date: 3 Aug 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Present 
 
10. Harrison, Theodore C., Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Date: 30 Jul 2012  Location: Redstone Arsenal, AL 
Commander, U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command, Present 
Chief of Staff, JCC-I/A, Feb 2005 - Feb 2006 
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11. Henke, Robert J.  
Date: 2 Jul 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
Commissioner, Commission On Wartime Contracting, 2008 – 2011 
 
12. Installation Directorate, Contracting Division (A7K) Staff, Pacific Air Forces 
Date: 27 Sep 2012  Location: JB Pearl Harbor/Hickam, Hawaii  
 
13. Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office Staff, Defense Logistics Agency 
Date: 27 Jun 2012  Location: Ft Belvoir, VA 
 
 
14. Kalathas, Nicholas T., Rear Admiral (Lower Half), U.S. Navy 
 Date: 28 Jun 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
 Commander, JCC- I/A, Mar 2011 - Feb 2012 
 
15. Lyons, Stephen R., Major General, U.S Army  
Date: 4 Sep 2012  Location: VTC – NPS 
Deputy Chief of Staff – ISAF J4, Oct 2009 - Apr 2011 
 
16. MacLaren, Ron J., Rear Admiral (Lower Half), U.S Navy 
Date: 27 Jun 2012  Location: Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
Director, JCASO, Mar 2010 – Present 
 
17. Masiello, Wendy M., Major General U.S Air Force 
Date: 20 Jul 2012  Location: Phone–NPS  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
PARC-I/A, Jul 2005 - Jan 2006 
 
18. McLeod, Mark M., Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force 
Date: 27 Sep 2012  Location: Camp Smith, Hawaii
 Director, USPACOM J4, Jun 2012 – Present 
 
19. McMaster, Herbert R., Major General, U.S. Army 
Date: 31 Aug 2012  Location: Phone–NPS 
Commanding General, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, 
Present 
Commander, CJITF-Shafafiyat, ISAF Jul 2010 – Mar 2012 
Regimental Commander, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, May 2004 - Jun 
2006 
 
20. Motsek, Gary J. 
Date: 13 Sep 2012  Location: VTC-NPS 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense - Program Support, Present 
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21. Newell, Peter A., Colonel, U.S. Army  
Date: 7 Sep 2012  Location: VTC-NPS  
Director, Rapid Equipping Force, Present 
Commander, 4th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Jun 2008 – Jul 2010 
  
22. Nichols, Camille M., Major General, U.S. Army  
Date: 5 Sep 2012  Location: VTC-NPS 
Commanding General, U.S. Army Contracting Command, Present 
Commander, JCC-I/A, Dec 2009 - Mar 2011 
Commanding General, U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting  
Command, Jan 2008 – Dec 2009 
 
23. Operational Contract Support and Services Division, Joint Staff J4  
Date: 31 Jul 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
 
24. Pasquarette, James F., Brigadier General, U.S. Army 
Date: 3 Aug 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
Deputy Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division, Oct 2010 - Oct 2011 
 
25. Petraeus, David H., General, U.S. Army (Retired) 
Date: 1 Aug 2012  Location: Langley, VA 
Commander, ISAF, Jul 2010 - Jul 2011 
Commander, USCENTCOM, Oct 2008 - Jul 2010 
Commander, MNF-I, Feb 2007 - Oct 2008 
Commander, MNSTC-I, May 2004 - Sep 2005 
Commander, 101st Airborne Division, Mar 2003 - Feb 2004 
 
26. Phillips, William N., Lieutenant General, U.S Army 
 Interview Date: 26 Jun 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
 MILDEP / Director, Army Acquisition Corps, ASA-ALT, Present 
Commander, JCC-I/A, Feb 2009 - Jan 2010 
 
27. Richardson, Renee M., Colonel, U.S. Air Force  
Date: 27 Sep 2012  Location: JB Pearl Harbor/Hickam, HI
 A7K, Pacific Air Forces, Present 
 
28. Rogers, Tommie W., Chief Master Sergeant, U.S Air Force  
Date: 27 Sep 2012  Location: JB Pearl Harbor/Hickam, HI 
Senior Enlisted Advisor, A7K, Pacific Air Forces, Present 
 
29. Schinasi, Katherine  
Date: 2 Jul 2012  Location: Washington D.C 




30. Scott, Darryl A., Major General, U.S. Air Force (Retired)  
Date: 26 Jun 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
Commander, JCC-I/A, Jan 2006 - Jan 2008 
 
31. Shofner, Robert, Colonel, U.S Air Force (Retired)  
Date: 5 Oct 2012  Location: VTC-NPS 
Chief of Operations – J3, JCC-I/A, Aug 2008 – May 2009 
 
32. Simpson, James E., Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Date: 3 Aug 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
Senior Contracting Official – Iraq, Apr 2011 - Feb 2012 
 
33. Spoehr, Thomas W., Major General, U.S Army 
 Date: 31 Jul 2012  Location: Washington D.C. 
 Deputy Commanding General, USF-I, Jul 2011 - Dec 2011 
 
34. Urias, John M., Major General, U.S. Army (Retired) 
 Date: 21 Sep 2012  Location: VTC-NPS 
 Commander, JCC-I/A, Jan 2005 - Jan 2006 
 
35. USPACOM J46 Staff - Operational Contracting Support,  
Date: 26 Sep 2012  Location: Camp Smith, HI 
 
36. Vollmecke, Kirk F., Brigadier General, U.S. Army 
 Date: 3 Jul 2012  Location: Fort Sam Houston, TX 
Commander, Mission and Installation Contracting Command, Present  
Director for Contracting, ASA – ALT, Aug 2010 – Mar 2012 
Commander, DCMA Iraq/Afghanistan, Jun 2007 - Jun 2008 
 
37. Westermeyer, Roger H., Colonel, U.S Air Force 
Date: 30 Aug 2012  Location: Phone-NPS 
PARC-I, Jun 2008 - Jun 2009 
 
38. Willey, Jeffery D., Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired) 
Date: 28 Aug 2012  Location: Phone-NPS 
PARC-A, May 2008 - May 2009 
 
39. Zybura, Martin A., Colonel, U.S. Army 
Date: 28 Sep 2012  Location: Ft. Shafter, HI 
Commander, 413th CSB, Present 
 
40. 413th CSB Staff, U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command 
Date: 28 Sep 2012  Location: Ft. Shafter, HI 
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1. Describe the environment you faced upon assuming your position? 
2. What were the biggest challenges you faced? 
3. What major changes did you implement? 
4. What best practices did you observe while in your position? 
5. How do you envision the future of C-JTSCC will be? 
6. How do you see JCASO fitting into the DoD contracting structure? 
7. In your opinion, in the absence of a JTSCC, who should maintain command and 
control of contracting responsibilities during phase 1 of operations for future 
contingencies? 
8. What do you believe your greatest contribution has been to the improvement of 
operations? 
9. In your opinion, did the CWC accurately capture the major issues with contingency 
contracting in Iraq/Afghanistan? 
10. In your opinion, what should DoD’s next step be toward improving contingency 
contracting operations? 
11. Were the Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) trained sufficiently to perform 
required duties in theater? 
12. Were reach-back capabilities effectively utilized? 
13. Were policies associated with local sourcing effectively implemented and did they 
support the intended local economic growth? 
14. Moving forward, what policy changes could be implemented during a contingency to 
allow for more effective contracting support? 








1. Describe the environment you faced upon assuming your position? 
2. What were the biggest challenges you faced? 
3. What major changes have you implemented/plan to implement? 
4. What best practices have you observed while in your position? 
5. What do you believe your greatest contribution has been/will be to the improvement 
of operations? 
6. How do you see JCASO fitting into the DoD contracting structure (currently and for 
future ops)? 
7. In your opinion, is JCASO properly positioned within DoD and provided the 
appropriate authority levels to effectively conduct its mission? 
8. In your opinion, are the JCASO planners assigned to COCOMs able to effectively 
influence the planning process to ensure appropriate emphasis is placed on 
contracting operations for a given contingency?  
9. What is the reachback plan for JCASO? 
10. What do you envision the future of C-JTSCC will be? 
11. In your opinion, in the absence of a JTSCC, who should maintain command and 
control of contracting responsibilities during phase 1 of operations for future 
contingencies? 
12. In your opinion, should JCASO be a part of the scalable joint capability packages 
deployed by the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) to support Combatant 
Commanders? 
13. In your opinion, did the CWC accurately capture the major issues with contingency 
contracting in Iraq/Afghanistan? 
14. In your opinion, what should DoD’s next step be toward improving contingency 
contracting operations? 
15. Moving forward, what policy changes could be implemented during a contingency to 
allow for more effective contracting support? 
16. What are the primary policy challenges in regard to contingency response? 
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COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING: 
 
1. Describe the environment you faced upon assuming your position? 
2. What were the biggest challenges you faced? 
3. Did the original objectives of the commission remain unchanged, or did they evolve 
over time?  
4. Were there any trends that were not included in the report that should have been? 
5. In your opinion, how receptive was DoD of the commission’s recommendations? 
6. In your opinion, has DoD taken the appropriate steps to address the 15 
recommendations found in the final report? 
7. In your opinion, what should DoD’s next step be toward improving contingency 
contracting operations? 
8. In your opinion, looking back would you have done anything differently or looked at 





























1. Upon assuming your position in Iraq or Afghanistan, what was your opinion of 
contracting and operational contracting support (OCS)? 
2. Was contracting and OCS integrated into the planning process? 
3. What were your biggest challenges with the acquisition process?  
4. Did your view of contracting/OCS change throughout your assignment? 
5. How could contracting have better supported your mission? 
6. Since the inclusion of contracting into COIN doctrine, do you believe commanders at 
all level have internalized money as a weapon system and how contracting can help 
shape the battlefield? 
7. What is your opinion regarding the: 
a. Recommendation of the Gansler Commission report to increase the number of 
USA general officers in Contracting? 
b. Recommendation of the Commission on Wartime Contracting to remove 
contracting/OCS from J4 and create a new J10 directorate within the joint 
staff? 
8. If you were reorganizing the current staff model, what would the model look like to 
fully integrate contracting/OCS into the joint planning process? 
9. In your opinion, what should DoD’s next step be to improve contingency contracting 















1. Based on requested support from theater, what did you perceive were their biggest 
challenges were? 
2. What were the biggest challenges you faced in supporting C-JTSCC? 
3. What areas of relief were requested the most? 
4. What major changes were implemented as a result of operations in CENTCOM? 
5. What DPAP led initiatives have resulted from operations over the past 11 years? 
6. What future plans/programs are ongoing within DPAP in regard to contingency 
response? 
7. How do you envision the future of C-JTSCC? 
8. In your opinion, did the CWC accurately capture the major issues with contingency 
contracting in Iraq/Afghanistan? 
9. What is your opinion on the recommendation of the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting to remove contracting/OCS from J4 and create a new J10 directorate? 



















1. In your opinion, what is operational contract support and who should be responsible 
for it? 
2. What are the biggest challenges regarding OCS? 
3. What major changes have been implemented regarding OCS? 
4. In your opinion, does the separation of OCS roles and responsibilities complicate 
oversight?  
5. How do you see JCASO fitting into the DoD OCS structure (for current and future 
ops)? 
6. In your opinion, is JCASO properly positioned within DoD and provided the 
appropriate authority levels to effectively conduct its mission (for current and future 
ops)? 
7. In your opinion, did the CWC accurately capture the major issues with contingency 
contracting/OCS in Iraq/Afghanistan? 
8. What is your opinion on the Commission on Wartime Contracting’s recommendation 
to remove contracting/OCS from J4 and create a new J10 directorate within the joint 
staff? 
9. Are there current efforts in place to fully integrate the intelligence community with 
OCS oversight to enable contracting transparency?  
10. In your opinion, what changes are needed to encourage commanders at all levels to 
take responsibility for OCS? 
11. In your opinion, what should DoD’s next step be toward improving contingency 
contracting operations and OCS management? 
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APPENDIX I. INTERVIEWEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
DOD 
 The DoD must address and answer the questions of: are planners strictly planners 
or should contracting be planners as well?  This is imperative to get right because 
if it gets codified incorrectly there is a bad trickledown effect. 
 The DoD must determine where contracting is going to be fit into the structure 
and organization. 
 The DoD must codify the hard lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 The DoD must understand that before they go into an operation the organizational 
structure has to be set up in a way that manages the battlespace as a portfolio. 
 Contracting and contractor management must be fully integrated into the school 
systems of the DoD for both civilian and military personnel. 
 Define transition points between contingency contracting phases and ensure 
operations move to the next phase when those definitions are met. 
 Learn from the past. Write about it, teach about it, and execute it. Research is only 
good if the results are applied to doctrine, organization, and policy. 
 Implement the recommendations already made by commissions and oversight 
committees. 
 The Services need to define their contract needs in terms of peacetime operations 
and contingency operations, and rationalize that definition and resource properly 
to provide the required support to joint operations. 
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 The J1, personnel community should take on the responsibility of tracking and 
accounting for contractor personnel, no different than any other individual 
performing service under the U.S. flag during contingency operations. 
 The DoD must take ownership of the value chain and integrate the chain fully, 
which includes intelligence and forensic finance. The DoD must provide 
appropriate management, and the knowledge management tools to support he 
value chain that will allow commanders to make informed decisions regarding 
contract support. “Right now we can’t see ourselves.” 
 OCS/contracting planners must be present at the Service level, not just the 
combatant command level. 
 The DoD must find ways to be more efficient in terms of contingency policy and 
contingency response. 
 The DoD must establish procedures and policy that provide adequate transparency 
and accountability in contingency expenditures 
 The DoD must get the automated tools out to the field to bring themselves into the 
21st century (i.e., biometrics, automated COR reports, etc.) 
 OCS training must become part of the normal training process, not as a separate 
function or responsibility. 
 Doctrine must catch up with everything else and must capture the lessons learned 
not only from Iraq and Afghanistan, but from all contingency responses over the 
past ten years. 
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 The DoD must reassess the gaps between Service and Defense Agencies’ 
capabilities, then reshape and then conduct directive training, education and 
exercising as it relates to filling those gaps. 
 Future contracting commands must be provided the authority and coordinating 
responsibility over other agencies performing contracting activities within an area 
of operations. 
 Consideration should be given to establish a standard of service to avoid each 
forward operating base having different levels of service for base operations 
support services. 
 The DoD should address the issuance of executive agent for all combatant 
commands. 
 Contracting should have a permanent residence on the commander’s staff. 
 The DoD needs a central organization reviewing contingency contracting 
operations. 
 Joint exercises must include contingency contracting and OCS scenarios. 
 The DoD should work to increase the minor construction limit of $750,000 for 
operations and maintenance funds for contingency operations. 
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